§1.12Brutus quidem noster excellens omni genere laudis sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur nihil ut isdem de rebus Graeca desideres; et eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu, nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquamdiu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum.
Indeed, our friend Brutus, who excels in every kind of praise, pursues philosophy in Latin literature in such a way that you would not desire Greek writings on the same subjects; and he follows the very same view as you do, for he studied under Aristus in Athens for some time, whose brother Antiochus you studied under.
quam ob rem da quaeso te huic etiam generi litterarum. ” §1.13Tum ille: 'Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te.
Therefore, I beg you, apply yourself to this genre of literature as well." Then he said: "I will indeed consider that, and certainly not without you.
sed de te ipso quid est' inquit
"quod audio?"
"Quanam"
inquam
"de re?"
"Relictam a te veterem Academiam"
inquit,
"tractari autem novam. "
"Quid ergo"
inquam
"Antiocho id magis licuerit nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova, quam nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime.
But what is this that I hear about you yourself?" "About what subject?" I asked. "That the Old Academy has been abandoned by you," he said, "and the New is being practiced." "Why then," I said, "should our close friend Antiochus have been more permitted to migrate back into the old house from the new, than we into the new from the old? For certainly, whatever is most recent is also most corrected and amended.
quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir ut tu existimas ipse, †negaret in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum qui ita putarent coarguit. "
"Est"
inquit
"ut dicis; sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra Philonis Antiochus scripserit. " §1.14"Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum tam diu, renovari a te nisi molestum est velim"
, et simul
"adsidamus"
inquam
"si videtur. "
"Sane istuc quidem"
inquit,
"sum enim admodum infirmus.
Although Antiochus's master Philo, a great man as you yourself judge, denied in his books—as we also used to hear from him in person—that there are two Academies, and refuted the error of those who thought so." "It is as you say," he said, "but I do not think you are ignorant of what Antiochus wrote against Philo's views." "On the contrary, unless it is troublesome, I would like both those matters and the whole of the Old Academy, from which I have been away for so long, to be renewed by you," and at the same time I said, "let us sit down, if it seems good." "Certainly, let's do that," he said, "for I am quite weak.
sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me quod te velle video. "
"Mihi vero"
ille; "quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possint Latine?"
Quae cum essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus omnes.
But let us see if Atticus would like the same thing to be done by me which I see you desire." "Indeed I would," said Atticus; "for what is there that I would prefer more than to recall what I heard long ago from Antiochus, and at the same time to see whether those things can be expressed suitably enough in Latin?" When these things had been said, we all sat down in each other's view.
§1.15Tum Varro ita exorsus est: 'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum.
Then Varro began as follows: 'Socrates seems to me, as is agreed among all, to have been the first to call philosophy away from things hidden and enveloped by nature itself—in which all philosophers before him were occupied—and to have brought it to common life, so that he might inquire about virtues and vices, and generally about good and bad things, while holding that heavenly matters are either far from our knowledge or, even if they were fully known, have nothing to do with living well.
§1.16hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque sunt, ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat.
In almost all his discourses, which were written down in various and rich ways by those who heard him, he disputes in such a manner that he asserts nothing himself but refutes others; he says that he knows nothing except that very fact, and that in this he excels the rest, because they think they know what they do not know, while he himself knows this one thing, that he knows nothing, and for that reason he believes he was called the wisest of all by Apollo, because this was the only wisdom of man, not to think he knows what he does not know.
quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intellegi potest.
Since he spoke these things consistently and remained in that opinion, his entire discourse was consumed only in praising virtue and in exhorting men to the study of virtue, as can be understood from the books of the Socratics, and especially of Plato.
§1.17Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant.
Now, by the authority of Plato, who was varied, manifold, and rich, a single and consistent form of philosophy under two names was established, that of the Academics and the Peripatetics, who agreed in facts but differed in names.
nam cum Speusippum sororis filium Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, duo autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Calchedonium et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele Peripatetici dicti sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, quia Platonis instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt.
For when Plato had left Speusippus, his sister's son, as a sort of heir to his philosophy, and two others of outstanding zeal and learning, Xenocrates of Chalcedon and Aristotle of Stagira, those who were with Aristotle were called Peripatetics because they used to dispute while walking about in the Lyceum; while those others, because by Plato's institution they were accustomed to have their gatherings and discourses in the Academy, which is another gymnasium, took their name from the name of the place.
sed utrique Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitanter de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
But both, filled with the richness of Plato, composed a certain fixed formula of doctrine, and that indeed full and complete, but they abandoned that Socratic custom of debating about all things with hesitation and without making any assertion.
ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae.
Thus was made—what Socrates least approved of—a certain art of philosophy, and an order of things, and a description of doctrine.'