§9.4.1τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον ἐξιέναι μὲν πρὸς μάχην οὐκ ἐθάρρει τῷ δεδιέναι τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἱππεῖς, §9.4.2ἔμενε δʼ ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τετολμηκότως, σαφῶς εἰδὸς ἀβλαβῆ τὴν ἵππον αὐτοῖς ἐσομένην, ὑφʼ ἧς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἡττᾶτο.
For the Roman army did not dare to go out to battle because of their fear of the enemy's cavalry, but remained in the camp with resolution, knowing clearly that the cavalry, by which they had been defeated in the battles, would be harmless to them there.
§9.4.3οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι πάλιν εὐλόγως οὔτε στρατοπεδεύσαντες μετὰ τῆς ἵππου μένειν ἐδύναντο πλείω χρόνον διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ παρακειμένῃ χώρᾳ χορτάσματα πάντα κατεφθαρκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους αὐτοῦ τούτου χάριν, τοῖς δὲ νώτοις οὐκ ἐφικτὸν εἶναι τοσαύτῃ μὲν ἵππῳ, τοσούτοις δʼ ὑποζυγίοις κατανύσαι χόρτον ἢ κριθὰς κομίζοντας ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος· §9.4.4οὔτε μὴν ἄνευ τῶν ἱππέων παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐθάρρουν πολιορκεῖν χάρακα καὶ τάφρον προβεβλημένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἴσου κίνδυνον αὐτοῖς ἀμφίδοξον εἶναι συνέβαινε χωρὶς τῶν ἱππέων.
On the other hand, the Carthaginians, for their part, naturally could not remain for any length of time encamped with their cavalry, both because the Romans had destroyed all the forage in the neighboring country for this very purpose, and because it was impossible to supply forage or barley carried on the backs of beasts from a great distance for so many horses and so many beasts of burden; nor, indeed, if they encamped near them without their cavalry, did they dare to besiege enemies who had thrown up a palisade and a trench in front of them, against whom, even in an equal contest, the result was bound to be doubtful for them without their cavalry.
§9.4.5ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἠγωνίων καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους ὑπάτους μὴ παραγενηθέντες ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσαιεν καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν σφίσι παραστήσαιεν, ἀφελόμενοι τὴν τῶν χορηγιῶν ἐπάρκειαν.
And in addition to this, they were anxious lest the incoming consuls should arrive and encamp against them, and cause them great difficulty by cutting off their supply of provisions.
§9.4.6ἐξ ὧν συλλογιζόμενος Ἀννίβας ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχον τὸ διὰ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς βίας λῦσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἐπʼ ἄλλης ἐγένετο γνώμης.
Weighing these considerations, Hannibal, concluding that it was impossible to raise the siege by direct force, changed his plan.
§9.4.7ὑπέλαβε γάρ, εἰ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν αἰφνιδίως ἐπιφανείη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην τόποις, ἴσως μὲν ἂν καὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνύσασθαί τι τῶν χρησίμων, ἐκπλήξας τῷ παραδόξῳ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας· §9.4.8εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, τούς γε περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον ἀναγκάσειν ἢ λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, σπεύδοντας τῇ πατρίδι βοηθεῖν, ἢ διαιροῦντας τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαταγωνίστους ὑπάρξειν καὶ τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους αὐτῶν.
For he calculated that if he made a secret march and suddenly appeared in the neighborhood of Rome, he might perhaps, by terrifying the inhabitants with the unexpected event, accomplish something of advantage even against the city itself; or, if not that, he would at least force Appius and his army to raise the siege, in their haste to succor their fatherland, or else, by causing them to divide their forces, render both those who went to help and those who were left behind easy to defeat.