§9.26.1πλὴν ὅτι γε καὶ τὴν Ἀννίβου φύσιν οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν φίλων παράθεσις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων περίστασις ἐβιάζετο καὶ μετετίθετο πολλάκις, ἔκ τε τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων ἐστὶ φανερόν. §9.26.2ἅμα γὰρ τῷ γενέσθαι τὴν Καπύην τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον εὐθέως ἦσαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, αἱ πόλεις μετέωροι, καὶ περιέβλεπον ἀφορμὰς καὶ προφάσεις τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μεταβολῆς· §9.26.3ὅτε δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ μάλιστα δυσχρηστηθεὶς Ἀννίβας εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. §9.26.4οὔτε γὰρ τηρεῖν τὰς πόλεις πάσας πολὺ διεστώσας ἀλλήλων δυνατὸς ἦν, καθίσας εἰς ἕνα τόπον, τῶν πολεμίων καὶ πλείοσι στρατοπέδοις ἀντιπαραγόντων, οὔτε διαιρεῖν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν οἷός τʼ ἦν. §9.26.5εὐχείρωτος γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑπάρξειν καὶ διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τῷ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι πᾶσιν αὐτὸς συμπαρεῖναι. §9.26.6διόπερ ἠναγκάζετο τὰς μὲν προδήλως ἐγκαταλείπειν τῶν πόλεων, ἐξ ὧν δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξάγειν, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πραγμάτων συγκαταφθείρῃ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας. §9.26.7ἐνίας δὲ καὶ παρασπονδῆσʼ ὑπέμεινε, μετανιστὰς εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ποιῶν ἀναρπάστους αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους. §9.26.8ἐξ ὧν προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν, οἱ δʼ ὠμότητα κατεγίνωσκον. §9.26.9καὶ γὰρ ἁρπαγαὶ χρημάτων ἅμα τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ φόνοι καὶ βίαιοι προφάσεις ἐγίνοντο διά τε τῶν ἐξιόντων καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰσιόντων στρατιωτῶν εἰς τὰς πόλεις, ἑκάστων ὑπειληφότων ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους μεταβαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. §9.26.10ἐξ ὧν καὶ λίαν δυσχερὲς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου φύσεως, διά τε τὴν τῶν φίλων παράθεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων περίστασιν. §9.26.11κρατεῖ γε μὴν ἡ φήμη παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδοίοις ὡς φιλαργύρου, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ὡς ὠμοῦ γενομένου [αὐτοῦ].
However, that both the influence of his friends, and still more the circumstances of his situation, forced and frequently altered the character of Hannibal, is clear from what has been said and from what is about to be told. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of the Romans, the other cities immediately, as was natural, became unsettled, and began to look around for opportunities and pretexts for changing to the side of the Romans. At this very juncture, Hannibal seems to have been in the greatest difficulty and to have fallen into embarrassment concerning the situation before him. For he was neither able, by remaining in one place, to guard all the cities which lay at a great distance from each other while the enemy were opposing him with several armies, nor was he capable of dividing his own force into many parts. For he was bound to become an easy prey to his enemies, both because he was inferior in numbers and because he could not be present everywhere himself. Therefore he was forced to abandon some of the cities openly, and from others to withdraw his guards, being anxious lest, in the changing turn of affairs, he might lose his own soldiers along with them. Some cities he even submitted to treat with treachery, removing their populations to other towns and giving up their property to plunder. In consequence of this, people took offense and accused him, some of impiety, others of cruelty. For indeed, in addition to the aforementioned events, robberies of property, murders, and violent pretexts occurred at the hands of the soldiers who were either evacuating or entering the cities, as everyone assumed that those left behind were on the very point of going over to the enemy. For these reasons, it is extremely difficult to pronounce a judgment on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to both the influence of his friends and the force of circumstances. At any rate, the prevailing opinion is that among the Carthaginians he was greedy, and among the Romans he was cruel.