§8.36.1διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀσκέπτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐγχειρίζουσι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἐπιτιμητέον, τοῖς δὲ τὴν ἐνδεχομένην πρόνοιαν ποιουμένοις οὐκ ἐγκλητέον· §8.36.2τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδενὶ πιστεύειν εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον, τὸ δὲ λαβόντα τὰς ἐνδεχομένας πίστεις πράττειν τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἀνεπιτίμητον. §8.36.3εἰσὶ δʼ ἐνδεχόμεναι πίστεις ὅρκοι, τέκνα, γυναῖκες, τὸ μέγιστον ὁ προγεγονὼς βίος. §8.36.4ᾗ καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀλογηθῆναι καὶ περιπεσεῖν οὐ τῶν πασχόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα. §8.36.5διὸ καὶ μάλιστα μὲν τοιαύτας ζητεῖν πίστεις δεῖ, διʼ ὧν ὁ πιστευθεὶς οὐ δυνήσεται τὴν πίστιν ἀθετεῖν. §8.36.6ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο, δεύτερος ἂν εἴη πλοῦς τὸ τῶν κατὰ λόγον φροντίζειν, ἵνʼ ἄν του καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς συγγνώμης μὴ διαμαρτάνωμεν.
Therefore also, those who heedlessly commit themselves to their opponents are to be blamed, but those who take all possible precautions are not to be accused. For to trust no one at all is impractical, whereas to act after receiving all possible guarantees is reasonable and unblamable. And possible guarantees are oaths, children, wives, and, most importantly, one's past life. Wherefore also, to be deceived and fall into disaster despite such guarantees is not a fault of the victims, but of those who committed the treachery. Therefore, one must especially seek such guarantees by which the trusted person will not be able to break his trust. But since it is rare to find such a thing, the next best course (the "second voyage") would be to attend to what is reasonable, so that even if we are deceived in some way, we may not fail to obtain sympathy from those outside.
ὃ καὶ περὶ πλείους μὲν δὴ γεγένηται τῶν πρότερον· §8.36.7ἐναργέστατον δʼ ἔσται καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς ἔγγιστον τοῖς ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἐνέστηκε τὸ κατʼ Ἀχαιὸν συμβάν. §8.36.8ὃς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων πρὸς εὐλάβειαν καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν παραλιπών, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων προνοηθείς, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ὅμως ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριος. §8.36.9τό γε μὴν συμβὰν ἔλεον μὲν τῷ παθόντι καὶ συγγνώμην ἀπειργάσατο παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, διαβολὴν δὲ καὶ μῖσος τοῖς πράξασιν. [Ὅτι Τιβέριος — συγγνώμην ἔχειν, κα 376, 2 ποστ θυαε περιιτ φολιυμ· εχξ. ϝατ. π. 374 μ. 26, 29 η, περὶ δὲ τῶν 375, 31 υσθυε αδ φινεμ ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 101 εχξ. αντ. π. 196. ]
This indeed has happened to many in former times. But the clearest example, and the closest to the very circumstances which our present discourse concerns, is what happened to Achaeus. He, having left nothing undone that was possible for caution and safety, but having provided for everything as far as was possible for human intellect, nevertheless fell into the hands of his enemies. Yet this occurrence brought sympathy and pardon to the victim from those outside, but reproach and hatred upon those who did the deed.