§3.70.1ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι φιλοτίμως εἶχε πρὸς τὸ τὴν ταχίστην κρῖναι τὰ ὅλα. §3.70.2προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν· ὅμως δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχοντος γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο λόγους περὶ τούτων πρὸς αὐτόν. §3.70.3ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων· §3.70.4τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελτίω τὰ παρʼ αὑτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατʼ ἐκείνων. §3.70.5πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινὴν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἤλπιζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. §3.70.6διὸ καὶ τοιούτοις χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἠξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. §3.70.7ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ᾔδει μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδεν κρῖναι διʼ αὑτοῦ τὰ ὅλα καὶ μήτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μήτε τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχήν· οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ χρόνος. §3.70.8διόπερ οὐ τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἔμελλε τοῦ δέοντος σφαλήσεσθαι προφανῶς. §3.70.9ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὁρμαῖς, §3.70.10δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγοις συμβαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδοις, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προΐεσθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. §3.70.11τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόξοις ἐγχειροῦντι πράγμασιν εἷς τρόπος ἐστὶν οὗτος σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχῶς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλπίδας. §3.70.12Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν
Tiberius, on his part, elated and overjoyed by his recent success, was eager to bring about a decisive battle as quickly as possible. It was indeed his intention to act on his own judgment under the present circumstances, owing to Publius being ill; nevertheless, wishing to secure the opinion of his colleague as well, he discussed these matters with him. But Publius held the opposite view concerning the present situation. For he supposed that their own legions, after passing the winter in training, would become better, and that the untrustworthy Celts would not remain true to their allegiance, but while the Carthaginians were inactive and forced to keep quiet, they would again make some fresh move against them. In addition to this, he hoped that, once recovered from his wound, he himself could render true service to the common cause. Therefore, using such arguments, he urged Tiberius to remain in his present position. But the aforementioned, though he knew that each of these arguments was stated truly and properly, yet driven by ambition and blindly confident in the situation, was hastening to decide the whole issue by himself, before Publius could be present at the battle, and before the incoming consuls could arrive and take over the command; for the time for this was at hand. Therefore, choosing not the opportune moment for action but his own, he was clearly bound to fail in his duty. Hannibal, having very similar views to Publius concerning the present situation, was on the contrary eager to engage the enemy, wishing first to make full use of the enthusiasm of the Celts while it was still fresh, secondly, to engage the Roman legions while they were untrained and newly recruited, thirdly, to risk a battle while Publius was still incapacitated, and, most of all, to be active and not let time go by in vain. For to one who has led an army into a foreign country and engaged in hazardous enterprises, the only means of safety is to constantly and continually keep alive the hopes of his allies. Hannibal then, knowing what the coming onset would be...