§10.8.1καὶ Ποπλίῳ τῷ πατρὶ περιπέσῃ συμφοραῖς.
... and meet with the same disasters as his father Publius.
διὸ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ μέρος ἀπεδοκίμασε, πυνθανόμενος δὲ τὴν προειρημένην Καρχηδόνα μεγίστας μὲν χρείας παρέχεσθαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, μέγιστα δὲ βλάπτειν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον αὐτόν, ἐξητάκει τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ διὰ τῶν εἰδότων.
For this reason he rejected this course; but learning that the aforementioned Carthage provided the greatest services to the enemy, and caused the greatest damage to himself in the present war, he had thoroughly investigated the details about it during the winter through those who knew.
§10.8.2ἀκούων δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι λιμένας ἔχει στόλῳ καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι μόνη σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διότι πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης πλοῦν καὶ πελάγιον δίαρμα λίαν εὐφυῶς κεῖται τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, §10.8.3μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διότι καὶ τὸ τῶν χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἁπάσας ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει συνέβαινε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ὁμήρους τοὺς ἐξ ὅλης τῆς Ἰβηρίας, §10.8.4τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι μάχιμοι μὲν ἄνδρες εἴησαν εἰς χιλίους οἱ τὴν ἄκραν τηροῦντες διὰ τὸ μηδένα μηδέποτʼ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι κρατούντων Καρχηδονίων σχεδὸν ἁπάσης Ἰβηρίας ἐπινοήσει τις τὸ παράπαν πολιορκῆσαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν, §10.8.5τὸ δʼ ἄλλο πλῆθος ὅτι πολὺ μὲν εἴη διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ, πᾶν δὲ δημιουργικὸν καὶ βάναυσον καὶ θαλαττουργὸν καὶ πλεῖστον ἀπέχον πολεμικῆς ἐμπειρίας, ὃ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι, παραδόξου γενομένης ἐπιφανείας.
For he heard, first, that it possessed harbors for a fleet and naval forces, almost alone among the cities in Iberia, and at the same time that it was situated very advantageously for the Carthaginians for the voyage from Libya and the passage across the open sea; and after this, that both the abundance of money and all the baggage of their armies happened to be there for the Carthaginians, and furthermore, the hostages from the whole of Iberia; and what was greatest of all, that the fighting men guarding the citadel were only about a thousand, because no one would ever have supposed that, while the Carthaginians were masters of almost the whole of Iberia, anyone would conceive the idea of besieging this city at all; and as for the rest of the population, that although it was exceptionally large within it, it consisted entirely of artisans, laborers, and seafaring men, and was utterly lacking in military experience—which he assumed would work against the city if a sudden and unexpected appearance were made.
§10.8.6καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν θέσιν τῆς Καρχηδόνος οὐδὲ τὴν κατασκευὴν οὐδὲ τὴν τῆς περιεχούσης αὐτὴν λίμνης διάθεσιν ἠγνόει, §10.8.7διὰ δέ τινων ἁλιέων τῶν ἐνειργασμένων τοῖς τόποις ἐξητάκει διότι καθόλου μέν ἐστι τεναγώδης ἡ λίμνη καὶ βατὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, ὡς δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γίνεταί τις αὐτῆς ἀποχώρησις καθʼ ἡμέραν ἐπὶ δείλην ὀψίαν.
Furthermore, he was not ignorant of either the situation of Carthage, or its construction, or the nature of the lake surrounding it; but through some fishermen who worked in those parts, he had ascertained that the lake was generally marshy and fordable for the most part, and that as a rule there was a certain recession of its waters daily in the late afternoon.
§10.8.8ἐξ ὧν συλλογισάμενος ὅτι καθικόμενος μὲν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐ μόνον βλάψει τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν παρασκευάσει, §10.8.9διαπεσὼν δὲ τῆς προθέσεως, ὅτι δύναται σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους διὰ τὸ θαλαττοκρατεῖν, ἐὰν ἅπαξ ἀσφαλίσηται τὴν στρατοπεδείαν — τοῦτο δʼ ἦν εὐχερὲς διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπεσπάσθαι τὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεις — §10.8.10οὕτως ἀφέμενος τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ταύτην
Calculating from these things that if he succeeded in his attempt, he would not only damage his opponents but also bring about a great advancement to his own affairs, and that if he failed in his purpose, he would be able to save his subordinates because of his command of the sea, if once he secured his camp—which was easy because the forces of the opponents were drawn far away— thus abandoning other matters, concerning this...