§1.57.1φῆς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδοῦναι λόγον·
...to give a detailed account in writing.
καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιότησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται πληγὴν ἐπὶ πληγῇ τιθέντες ἀδιαπαύστως, λόγον μὲν ἢ πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πληγῆς οὔτε τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τοῖς θεωμένοις ἐστὶ δυνατόν, §1.57.2ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθόλου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ἑκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐψυχίας, ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. §1.57.3τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰτίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, διʼ ὧν ἀνʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐποιοῦντο κατʼ ἀλλήλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπιθέσεις, προσβολάς, οὔτʼ ἂν ὁ γράφων ἐξαριθμούμενος ἐφίκοιτο, τοῖς τʼ ἀκούουσιν ἀπέραντος ἅμα δʼ ἀνωφελὴς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως γίνοιτο χρεία· §1.57.4ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς φιλοτιμίας μᾶλλον ἄν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθοι τῶν προειρημένων. §1.57.5οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας στρατηγημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὔτε τῶν εἰς παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρελείφθη. §1.57.6κρίσιν γε μὴν ὁλοσχερῆ γενέσθαι διὰ πλείους αἰτίας οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἦν· αἵ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἦσαν ἐφάμιλλοι, τά τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας ὁμοίως ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τό τε διάστημα τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. §1.57.7ὅπερ αἴτιον ἦν μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύστους γίνεσθαι καθʼ ἡμέραν, ὁλοσχερὲς δὲ συντελεῖσθαι μηδέν. §1.57.8τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ συνέβαινε διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ περιπεσόντας· οἱ δʼ ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀσφαλείαις καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκινδύνευον.
For just as, when fist-fighters outstanding in both spirit and physical condition meet at the moment of competing for the crown itself and fight, dealing blow after blow without ceasing, it is impossible either for the combatants or for the spectators to keep account of or foresee every single attack and blow, but from the general activity of the men and the emulation of each, one can obtain a sufficient idea of their skill, strength, and moreover of their courage; so it is also with the generals now under discussion. For as to the causes or the methods by which day by day they laid ambushes, counter-ambushes, assaults, and attacks against one another, neither could the writer exhaust them by enumeration, nor would the reading of them be of any but an endless and at the same time unprofitable utility to the audience. Rather, from a general statement about them and from the final result of their emulation, one would arrive at a better understanding of the aforementioned matters. For nothing was omitted, whether of stratagems derived from history, or of plans suggested by the occasion and the present circumstances, or of daring deeds belonging to the class of hazardous and violent enterprises. Nevertheless, a decisive issue could not be reached for several reasons; for the forces of both sides were equally matched, their ramparts were similarly inaccessible due to their strength, and the distance between the camps was extremely short. This was the main cause why the partial encounters were incessant day by day, but nothing decisive was accomplished. For it always happened in these skirmishes that only those who fell into hand-to-hand combat were destroyed; whereas those who once gave way were all immediately out of danger under the protection of their own works, and on changing front, would again risk themselves in battle.