§131ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ, καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται.
When all the pain due to want is removed, even simple bread and water bring the highest pleasure, when one who is in need takes them.
τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἁπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελέσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῖς πολυτελέσιν ἐκ διαλειμμάτων προσερχομένοις κρεῖττον ἡμᾶς διατίθησι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει.
Therefore, to become accustomed to simple and non-luxurious diets is both productive of health and makes a person unshrinking in the face of the necessary demands of life, and disposes us better when we approach luxurious things at intervals, and prepares us to be fearless of fortune.
Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμένοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·
When, therefore, we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate and those that consist in consumption, as some who are ignorant and do not agree or who interpret us badly think, but rather the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.
§132οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.
For it is not drinking bouts and continuous revelries, nor the enjoyment of boys and women, nor of fish and other things that a luxurious table offers, which produce the pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the causes of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs from which the greatest tumult takes possession of the soul.
Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.
Of all these things, the beginning and the greatest good is prudence.
διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως 〈οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως〉 ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως.
Therefore prudence is even more honorable than philosophy, from which all the other virtues spring, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, nor to live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly.
συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον.
For the virtues have grown together with living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is inseparable from them.
§133Ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς;
For whom do you believe to be better than the man who holds pious opinions about the gods, and is entirely fearless of death, and has reasoned out the end of nature, and understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, while the limit of evils is short in duration or brief in pain?
τὴν δὲ ὑπό τινων δεσπότιν εἰσαγομένην πάντων †ἀγγέλλοντος * * (〈λέγει ἐν ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι ἃ μὲν κατ’ ἀνάγκην〉, ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν, τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν) — §134ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν·
And who [laughs at] the destiny introduced by some as the mistress of all? (For he says in other works that some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some through ourselves, because necessity is subject to no responsibility, chance is unstable to behold, and what is through ourselves is subject to no master, which by nature is accompanied by blame and its opposite.) — For it would be better to follow the myth about the gods than to be a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers; for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods through honor, while the latter possesses an inexorable necessity.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἣ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην — τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε θεὸν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν ὑπολαμβάνων — οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται ἀβέβαιον οὔτε αἰτίαν — 〈οὐκ〉 οἴεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι — §135κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν — βέλτιον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς κριθὲν 〈μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθὲν〉 ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην.
And he does not regard chance as a god, as the many believe (for nothing is done in an orderly way by a god), nor as an unstable cause (for he does not think that good or evil is given by chance to humans for a blessed life, though he believes that the starting points of great goods or evils are provided by it) — believing that it is better to be unfortunate with reason than to be fortunate without reason; for it is better in our actions that what has been well judged should not succeed, than that what has been poorly judged should succeed because of chance.
Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πρός 〈τε〉 τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις.
Meditate, therefore, on these things and things akin to them by day and by night, both by yourself and with one like yourself, and you will never be disturbed, either waking or dreaming, but you will live as a god among humans.
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.
For a human being who lives among immortal goods is in no way like a mortal animal.