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Aelius Aristides · To Capito §323-324

Quoting Criticism of Pericles and Justifying Plato's Censure

Passage 5 of 8 · Greek

Summary

The author uses the analogy of competitors striving for their own benefit and quotes a passage from Plato's Alcibiades where Pericles is unnecessarily criticized, defending his own criticism of Plato as equally or more justified.

§323ἀλλὰ τὰ αὑτοῖς συμφέροντα καὶ ποιοῦντας καὶ λέγοντας, ἕως ἂν μή τις περιφανῶς κωλύῃ νόμος.
but doing and saying what is advantageous to themselves, as long as no law clearly prevents them.
ὥστʼ εἰ τὰ μάλιστα μὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν τισιν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, ἔλεγχον δὲ εἶχον ἢ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐκείνου ἢ τοῦ βίου, ἀρχαῖος ὁ νόμος χρῆσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ κατέδειξα αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασα παλαιός ἐστιν· ἢ δέδοικα αὖ λέγειν μὴ Πλάτων ὁ καταδείξας αὐτὸν ᾖ·
And so, even if the arguments were not at all for the pleasure of some, but contained a refutation of either his words or his life, the law to use such things is ancient, and it was not I who introduced it, but it is entirely old; or rather, I fear to say lest it was Plato who introduced it.
κἀμοὶ μὲν ἀπολελόγηται μετρίως ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰτίας, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω·
And as for me, I have defended myself moderately against the accusation, as I think.
ὅτι δὲ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ οὐ πάνυ φροντίζων εἴ του δέοι καθάπτεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν εἰκὸς ἄμεινόν σε ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μεμνῆσθαι τούτοις σχολάζοντα, ἃ δʼ οὖν κἀγὼ μέμνημαι φέρε ἀναμνήσθητι.
But that he is the one who does not care at all if it is necessary to attack someone, it is most likely that you know and remember this better, having leisure for these things; at any rate, come, recall what I too remember.
καὶ ὅπως αὖ μή με φήσεις Πλάτωνος κατηγορεῖν.
And mind that you do not again say that I accuse Plato.
οὐ γὰρ κατηγορίας ἕνεκα ἐκείνου, ἀλλʼ ἀπολογίας ἕνεκα παρʼ αὐτοῦ χρήσομαι τῷ παραδείγματι.
For I shall use the example not for the sake of accusing him, but for the sake of defense from him.
ὅτι δὲ ἄκων εἰς τούτους ἐμπίπτω τοὺς λόγους σχεδὸν οἶσθα.
And that I fall into these arguments unwillingly, you almost know.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτως ἐκείνους ἐποίουν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὡς ἀπολογίας μοι δεῆσαν.
For from the beginning I did not make those arguments concerning rhetoric as if I had need of a defense.
οὐχ ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῷ βούλεται παράκλησιν τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι ἐπιμελείας ἑαυτῶν;
Does not Alcibiades wish for him a call to those who are going to engage in politics to take care of themselves?
προελθὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου κακίζει Περικλέα οὐ πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκάζοντος.
But having advanced in the argument, he abuses Pericles, although the matter does not at all compel it.
παρρησιάζομαι γὰρ πρὸς σὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα.
For I speak frankly to you and to Plato himself.
σκέψαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων.
Consider it from the words.
ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ἀμαθίᾳ γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ.
From the book: "For you live with the extreme ignorance, my excellent friend, as your argument accuses you and you yourself accuse yourself.
διὸ καὶ ᾁττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι.
Therefore, you rush into politics before being educated.
πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ ἴσως γε τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους. ἔστω ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα, εἰ βούλει, μέχρι τούτου πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὦ πρὸς θεῶν τί βούλεται τῷ σοφῷ ἀνδρὶ πλὴν ὀλίγων τε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους;
And you are not the only one who has experienced this, but also the majority of those who manage the affairs of this city, except a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles." Let these be necessary, if you wish, up to this point: "And you are not the only one who has experienced this, but also the majority of those who manage the affairs of this city," but as for the rest, by the gods, what does the wise man mean by: "except a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles"?
ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἡ ἐκβολὴ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐξεπίτηδες ἐζητημένη ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακῶς εἰπεῖν Περικλέα αὐτὸς μαρτυρήσει.
But that this digression is intentionally sought for the sake of speaking ill of Pericles, he himself will bear witness.
καὶ ὅπως μὴ πάλιν ἀχθεσθῇς §324ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. σκόπει γὰρ αὐτὰ ἃ λέγει.
And lest you be vexed again on account of the same thing, consider the very things he says.
ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου λέγεταί γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ· καὶ νῦν ὅτι τηλικοῦτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.
From the Alcibiades: "It is said at least, Socrates, that he did not become wise by chance, but associated with many wise men, both Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and now, though of such an age, he associates with Damon for this very purpose." "What then?
τί οὖν; ἤδη τινὰ εἶδες σοφὸν ὁντιναοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός;
Have you ever seen any wise man whatsoever who was unable to make another wise in the very things in which he himself was wise?
ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξε γράμματα αὐτός τε ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων ὁντιναοῦν ἐβούλετο; ἦ γάρ; ναί. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρʼ ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός τε ἔσει; ναί. καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως. πάνυ γε. ἱκανὸν γὰρ δή που τοῦτο τεκμήριον τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὁτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὰν καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί οὖν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησε σοφὸν ἀπὸ τῶν υἱέων ἀρξάμενος; τί δὲ εἰ τὼ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν. τί δʼ ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον; ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τὼ δὲ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, διότι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ; ἐγὼ, οἶμαι, αἴτιος, οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἰπὲ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονὼς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοι διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου· ὧν ἑκάτερος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔχω.
Just as he who taught you letters was himself wise and made you so, and anyone else of the others whom he wished?" "Yes." "Therefore, you also, having learned from him, will be able to make another?" "Yes." "And the citharistan and the trainer in the same way?" "Certainly." "For this is surely a sufficient proof of those who know anything, that they know it, when they are able to show another also knowing it." "To me at least it seems so." "What then can you say, whom did Pericles make wise, beginning from his sons?" "But what if Pericles' two sons became foolish, Socrates?" "But Cleinias your brother." "But why would you speak of Cleinias, a madman?" "Since then Cleinias is mad, and Pericles' two sons became foolish, what cause shall we assign to you, because he overlooks you being in such a state?" "I, I think, am the cause, not paying attention." "But of the other Athenians, slave or free, tell me who has the reputation of having become wiser through the company of Pericles, just as I can name to you, through the company of Zeno, Pythodorus the son of Isolochus and Callias the son of Calliades; each of whom, having paid Zeno a hundred minae, became wise and famous." "But by Zeus, I cannot." I seem to be causing you trouble; not more, however, than to myself and my scribe.
πράγματά σοι παρέχειν ἔοικα· οὐ μέντοι πλείω ἢ ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ ὑπογραφεῖ. περὶ γὰρ λύχνων ἁφὰς ταῦτα ἐζητεῖτο, καὶ ἔδει πρὶν εἰς εὐνὴν ἰέναι τέλος ἔχειν.
For these things were being investigated around the lighting of the lamps, and it was necessary to have an end before going to bed.
οὐκοῦν ὃ λέγω σκόπει.
Consider then what I say.
ταῦτα εἰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ παρʼ ἡμῶν εἰς ἐκεῖνον μετέχει τῆς ἀπολογίας, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα, ὅρα τὸ περιὸν τῆς
If these things were necessary for the argument, then what we said against him also shares in the defense; but if they were not necessary, see the excess of...

Notes

  1. §323ἀλλὰ τὰ αὑτοῖς συμφέροντα — This structure stands in contrast to the phrase in the preceding sentence (§322 end), `οὐ τοῖς τῶν ἀντιπάλων βουλήμασιν ἀκολουθοῦντας` (not following the wishes of their opponents). The accusative present participles `ποιοῦντας καὶ λέγοντας` function as the object complements of the verb of perception `ὁρῶμεν` (we see), completing the clause "we see them doing and saying..."
  2. §323ὅπως αὖ μή με φήσεις — An idiomatic construction where the conjunction `ὅπως` followed by the negative `μή` and the future indicative (`φήσεις`) expresses a negative command, strong warning, or entreaty ("mind that you do not say"). The main governing verb (such as `ὅρα` or `φυλάττου`) is omitted.
  3. §323ὅτι δὲ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ οὐ πάνυ φροντίζων — This `ὅτι` clause ("that he is the one who does not care at all") functions as the substantive subject (noun clause) of the main clause's predicate `εἰκός` (it is natural / likely). `τούτοις` is a dative complement governed by the following participle `σχολάζοντα` (having leisure for / devoting oneself to these things).
  4. §324τὼ Περικλέους υἱέε ἠλιθίω ἐγενέσθην — The noun `υἱέε`, the adjective `ἠλιθίω`, and the verb `ἐγενέσθην` (third-person dual aorist) are all dual forms, referring to the "two" sons of Pericles (Paralus and Xanthippus). This is a characteristic grammatical feature reflecting the stylistic prose of Plato's dialogues.

Cite this passage

Aelius Aristides, To Capito §323-324. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0284.tlg047.humanitext-grc2:323-324

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