§53b.1Fr. 53b
Ἄμεινον δὲ τὰ Θεοφράστου παραθέσθαι περί τε τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ.
It is better to set out the words of Theophrastus concerning the intellect in potentiality and that in activity.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δυνάμει τάδε φησίν· "Ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτὲ ἔξωθεν ὢν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος ὅμως συμφυὴς, καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ;
Concerning the one in potentiality, then, he says the following: "But how on earth is the intellect, being from without and as it were adventitious, nevertheless connate, and what is its nature?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατʼ ἐνέργειαν δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις.
For that it is nothing in activity but all things in potentiality is well said, just as is the case with perception.
Οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός· ἐριστικὸν γάρ· ἀλλʼ ὡς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν.
For we must not take it in such a way that it too is nothing—for that would be eristic—but rather as a certain underlying potentiality, just as in the case of material things.
Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξωθεν ἄρα οὐχ ὡς ἐπίθετον ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει συμπεριλαμβανόμενον θετέον.
But, therefore, the 'from without' must be posited not as adventitious but as comprehended together in the first generation.
Πῶς δέ ποτε γίνεται τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τί τὸ πάσχειν αὐτόν;
And how on earth do the objects of thought come to be, and what is its undergoing?
δεῖ γὰρ, εἴπερ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἥξει, καθάπερ ἡ αἴσθησις·
For it must undergo, if indeed it is to come into activity, just as perception does.
ἀσωμάτῳ δὲ ὑπὸ σώματος τί τὸ πάθος, ἢ ποία μεταβολή, καὶ πρότερον ἀπʼ ἐκείνου ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ ἀπʼ αὐετοῦ;
But what is the affection of an incorporeal thing by a body, or what kind of change is it, and is the origin from the former first or from the intellect itself?
τὸ μὲν χὰρ πάσχειν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου δόξειεν ἂν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐν πάθει, τὸ δὲ ἀρχὴ πάντων εἶναι καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ.
For undergoing would seem to be from the former, since nothing of the things in a state of affection is from itself; but that it is the origin of all things and that thinking is in its own power, and not, as in the case of perceptions, from the object, [points to the contrary].
Τάχα δʼ ἂν φανείη καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ὕλης ἔχει φύσιν μηδὲν ὣν ἅπαντα δὲ δυνατός" ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῶν περὶ Ψυχῆς ἀπαθὴς γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ νοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἄλλως παθητικὸς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ παθητικὸν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὡς τὸ κινητικὸν ληπτέον, ἀτελὴς γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐνέργειαν.
And perhaps this too might appear strange, if the intellect has the nature of matter, being nothing but capable of all things." —This is in the fifth book of the Physics, which is the second of On the Soul—for he says that the intellect is unaffected, unless indeed it is passive in some other way, and that the passive state according to him must be taken not as that which involves motion (for motion is incomplete), but as activity.
Καὶ προϊών φησι τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, τὸν δὲ νοῦν χωριστόν.
And proceeding, he says that perceptions are not without a body, but the intellect is separable.
Ἁψάμενος δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ νοῦ διωρισμένων Ἀριστοτέλει, ἐκεῖνο, φησὶν, ἐπισκεπτέον, ὁ δή φαμεν ἐν πάσῃ φύσει τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην καὶ δυνάμει τὸ δὲ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν, καὶ, ὅτι ἀεὶ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης· ταῦτα μὲν ἀποδέχεται, διαπορεῖ δέ· τίνες οὖν αὗται αἱ δύο φύσεις, καὶ τί πάλιν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ συνηρτημένον τῷ ποιητικῷ, μικτὸν γάρ πως ὁ νοῦς ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δυνάμει·
And having also touched upon what was defined by Aristotle concerning the active intellect, he says: "We must examine that which we say in every nature, namely, that one part is as matter and in potentiality, and the other is as cause and active, and that the active is always more honorable than the passive, and the origin than the matter." He accepts these things, but raises difficulties: "What then are these two natures, and what again is that which underlies or is linked with the active, for the intellect is in a way mixed from both the active and that in potentiality?
εἰ μὲν οὖν σύμφυτος ὁ κινῶν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐχρῆν καὶ ἀεί· εἰ δὲ ὕστερον, μετὰ τίνος, καὶ πῶς ἡ γένεσις;
If, therefore, the mover is connate, it ought to have been so immediately and always; but if later, with what, and how is its generation?
ἔοικεν οὖν καὶ ἀγέννητος εἴπερ καὶ ἄφθαρτος.
It seems, then, to be also ungenerated, if indeed it is also imperishable.
Ἐνυπάρχων δʼ οὖν διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεί;
But since it is immanent, why is it not always active?
ἢ διὰ τί λήθη καὶ ἀπάτη καὶ ψεῦδος, ἢ διὰ τὴν μίξιν;
Or why is there forgetfulness, deception, and falsehood?
ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐ φαύλως ὑπονοοῦμεν ἄλλον μέν τινα παρʼ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν παθητικὸν νοῦν καὶ φθαρτὸν, ὃν καὶ κοινὸν ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ ἀχώριστον τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοῦτο μίξιν τὴν λήθην καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην γίνεσθαι, φησὶν ὁ Θ., ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ὥσπερ συγκείμενον ἐκ τοῦ δυε͂ νάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὃν καὶ χωριστὸν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τιθέασι καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ πὼς μὲν δύο φύσεις τούτους τοὺς νοῦς, πὼς δὲ μίαν.
Is it because of the mixture?" From all of these things it is clear that we do not suspect idly that there is among them, on the one hand, a certain other passive and perishable intellect, which they also call common, and inseparable from the body, and that because of its mixture with this, forgetfulness and deception come to be, as Theophrastus says; and on the other hand, another intellect which is as it were composed of that in potentiality and that in activity, which they also posit to be separable from the body, imperishable, and ungenerated, and how these intellects are in one way two natures, and in another way one.
Ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους.
For that which is from matter and form is one.