§53.1Fr. 53
Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τῷ κορυφαίῳ ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων Θλεοφράστῳ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντι ὅτι αἱ μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ὀργαὶ σωματικαὶ κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀγαγεῖν ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῆ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔτι δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς, κρεῖττόν τι μέρος καὶ θειότερον ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιὼν, καὶ παντελῶς.
These things also please Theophrastus, the leader of Aristotle’s companions, who says in the first book of his *On Motion* that while appetites, desires, and angers are bodily motions and have their origin in these, yet as many judgments and contemplations as there are, it is not possible to reduce these to anything else, but rather in the soul itself are their origin, activity, and end; and furthermore, also the intellect, being a better and more divine part, inasmuch as it enters from without, is completely so.
Καὶ τούτοις ἐπάιγει· ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴ τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὅρον· ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον.
And to these he adds: "Therefore, concerning these things we must consider whether they have some separation from the definition; since that these too are motions is agreed upon."