§26.1Fr. 26
Θαυμαστὸν τοίνυν, καθάπερ φησὶν ὁ Θ., καὶ λίαν παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, πέρας δὲ ἔστιν, καὶ ὅλως εἰ μὴ ἄμφω πεπερασμένα, ἀλλὰ τέλος μέν ἐστι τοῦ βαδίζειν, ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τέλος μὲν τοῦ πλεῖν, ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἡνίκα μὲν ἐπαύσατο τοῦ τρέχειν ὁ ἵππος ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἡνίκα δὲ ἤρξατο οὐκ ἔστιν.
Fr. 26 Therefore, as Theophrastus says, it is surprising and very much contrary to common notions if there is no beginning of motion but there is an end, and in general if both are not limited, but there is an end of walking but not a beginning, and there is an end of sailing but there is no beginning, and it is possible to say when the horse stopped running, but not when it began.
Ἢ οὐ τοῦτό φησιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλʼ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν;
Or does he not mean this, that there is no beginning of motion, but rather that it is not possible to grasp it?