§4#2Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἢ χρυσοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσός.
Generally, concerning every sense, we must grasp that sense is that which is receptive of sensible forms without their matter, just as wax receives the imprint of a signet ring without the iron or gold; it receives the bronze or golden imprint, but not qua bronze or gold.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ ψόφον ἢ χυμὸν πάσχει, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τοιόνδε καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
Similarly, each sense also is acted upon by that which has color or sound or flavor, but not in so far as each of those is called what it is, but in so far as it is of such a quality and in accordance with its formula.
αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις.
And the primary sensory organ is that in which such a potentiality resides.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δʼ εἶναι ἕτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γάρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μέντοι τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι ἢ αἰσθήσει μεγέθει ἐστὶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.
Therefore, they are the same, although their essence is different; for that which perceives must be a certain magnitude, yet for it to be a perceiving subject or a sense is not to be a magnitude, but rather a certain formula and potentiality of that magnitude.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις (ἂν γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, λύεται ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο δʼ ἧν αἴσθησις, ὡσπερανεὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος σφόδρα κρουομένων τῶν χορδῶν), καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν· καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται·
It is also clear from this why the excesses of sensible objects destroy the senses (for if the movement is too strong for the sensory organ, the formula is dissolved—and this formula was the sense—just as the harmony and the pitch are destroyed when the strings are struck too violently), and why plants do not perceive, though they have some portion of soul and are acted upon by tangible things (for they are both cooled and heated).
αἴτιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης πάσχειν.
The cause is that they do not possess a mean, nor such a principle as is capable of receiving the forms of sensible objects, but they are acted upon along with the matter.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, ἆρα πάθοι ἂν ὑπʼ ὀσμῆς τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
One might, however, raise the question whether that which is unable to smell could be acted upon by odor, or that which is unable to see by color; and similarly in the case of the others.
εἰ δʼ ἡ ὀσμὴ τὸ ὀσφραντόν, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ποιεῖ ὀσμή, ὥστε οὐθὲν πάσχειν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι (ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ᾗ αἰσθητικόν ἕκαστον.
But if odor is the object of smell, if it produces any effect, odor produces it on the sense of smell, so that nothing which is unable to smell can be acted upon by it (and the same argument holds for the others too), nor can those which are able to smell be acted upon, except in so far as each is a perceiving subject.
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ οὕτως.
At the same time, this is also clear from the following.
οὔτε γὰρ ψόφος οὔτε τὸ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐθὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ τῆς βροντῆς διέστησε τὸ ξύλον.
For neither sound, nor light and darkness, nor odor produces any effect on bodies, but rather the media in which they are, as when the air accompanying thunder splits the wood.
ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο;
But indeed, tangible qualities and flavors do produce effects; for if they do not, by what would inanimate things be acted upon or altered?
ἆρ᾿ οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιεῖ;
Do those other things then also produce effects?
ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ᾿ ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον ἀήρ·
Or is it that not every body is susceptible to being acted upon by odor and sound, and those that are acted upon are indeterminate and do not abide, like air?
ὄζει γὰρ ὡς παθών τι.
For air smells as if it has been acted upon in some way.
τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι;
What then is smelling besides being acted upon in some way?
ἢ τό μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δ᾿ ἀὴρ παθὼν τοῦτο ταχὺ αἰσθητός γίγνεται.
Perhaps, while smelling is perceiving, the air, on being acted upon, quickly becomes itself an object of perception.