§4#1## IV
lib. II, 423b8—424b18
εἴρηται πρότερον ὅτι καὶ διʼ ὑμένος ἂν πάντων αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν, κἂν εἰ λανθάνοι διείργων, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· δοκοῦμεν γὰρ αὐτῶν θιγγάνειν καὶ οὐθὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου.
It has been said before that even through a membrane we would perceive all tangible things, and even if it should escape our notice that it separates us, we would be in the same state as we are now in water and in air; for we seem to touch them and there is nothing in between.
ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τούτῳ τὰ ἁπτὰ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δʼ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλʼ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ οἱ διὰ τῆς ἀσπίδος πληvγέντες· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλʼ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν συνέβη πληγῆναι.
But tangible things differ in this from visible and sounding things, namely, that we perceive the latter because the medium acts upon us in some way, whereas we perceive tangible things not by the medium but simultaneously with the medium, just like those who are struck through a shield; for the shield did not, after being struck, strike them, but it happened that both were struck simultaneously.
ὅλως δʼ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον.
In general, both the flesh and the tongue seem to stand to the sensory organ in the same relation as air and water stand to sight, hearing, and smell, just as each of those (stands to them).
αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου οὔτʼ ἐκεῖ οὔτʼ ἐνταῦθα γένοιτʼ ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις τὸ σῶμα τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον.
But if the sensory organ itself is touched, no perception would occur either in the former case or in the latter, just as if one should place a white body upon the very surface of the eye.
ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν.
And for this reason it is also clear that the sensory organ for the tangible is within.
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπιτιθεμένου γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένου αἰσθάνεται· ὥστε μεταξὺ ἄρα τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.
For in this way the same thing would happen as in the case of the other senses; for when placed upon the sensory organ itself it does not perceive, but when placed upon the flesh it does perceive; so that the flesh must be the medium for the sense of touch.
ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα· λέγω δὲ διαφοράς, αἷς τὰ στοιχεία διορίζουσι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων.
Now, tangible things are the differences of body qua body; and by differences I mean those by which they define the elements—hot and cold, dry and wet, concerning which we have spoken before in our discussion of the elements.
τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἁρὴ ὑπάρχει πρώτῳ, τό δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τί ἐστιν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ δυνάμει ὄν.
And their sensory organ, the tactile organ—and that in which the so-called touch primarily resides—is the part which is potentially such; for perceiving is a kind of being acted upon; so that the acting agent makes that which is potentially such like itself, which is so in actuality.
διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ ἢ μαλακοῦ, οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως.
Therefore we do not perceive what is equally hot or cold, or hard or soft, but only excesses, since sense is as it were a mean of the opposition present in the objects of sense.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά.
And for this reason it judges the objects of sense.
τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὰς ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων·
For the mean is capable of judging; for it becomes, in relation to either of them, the other of the two extremes.
καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ μέλανος μηδέτερον εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν.
And just as that which is to perceive white or black must be neither of them in actuality, but both in potentiality, so indeed it must be also in the case of the other senses, and in the case of touch, it must be neither hot nor cold.
ἔτι δʼ ὥσπερ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου ἧν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἁρὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου·
Moreover, just as sight was in a way of both the visible and the invisible, and similarly the other senses of their opposites, so also touch is of both the tangible and the intangible.
ἄναπτον δὲ τό τε μικρὰν πάμπαν ἔχον διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἶον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά.
And the intangible is both that which has an altogether small difference of tangible qualities, as is the case with air, and the excesses of tangible qualities, such as those that are destructive.
καθʼ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν εἴρηται ὡς ἐν τύπῳ εἰπεῖν.
Thus, concerning each sense, we have spoken in outline.