§2#1## II
lib.
## II lib.
II, 414b13—416a9
ὁ δὲ χυμός ὥσπερ ἥδυσμα τούτοις ἐστίν· διόπερ ὅσα ἔχει τῶν ζῴων ἁφήν, πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει καὶ ὄρεξις.
II, 414b13—416a9 And flavor is like a seasoning to these; wherefore, to all such animals as have touch, there belongs also desire.
πεςρὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
But concerning imagination, it is unclear, and must be investigated later.
ἐνίοις δὲ ταῦτά τε ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τοῖς δʼ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις διάνοια καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ζῷον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον.
In some, both these and the power of local movement belong, and in others, additionally, thought and intellect—such as in man, or if there is any other such animal, or even more honorable.
δῆλον οὖν ὡς ὁμοίως σχήματος καὶ ψυχῆς εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος.
It is clear, therefore, that in like manner there would be one definition for both figure and soul.
οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τρίγωνον ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ᾿ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας.
For neither is there a figure there apart from the triangle and those that follow in order, nor is there a soul here apart from those mentioned.
γένοιτο δʼ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος ὃς ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν, οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι ἴδιος οὐθενὸς σχήματος.
A definition might indeed be produced for figures also which will apply to all of them, but it will not be peculiar to any one figure.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς.
In like manner also concerning the mentioned souls.
διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπʼ ἄλλων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ὃς οὐκ ἔσται οὐθενὸς τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀφέντας.
Therefore, it is ridiculous to seek the common definition both in other cases and in these, which will not be peculiar to any of the things that exist, nor according to the proper and indivisible species, while dismissing such [a proper definition].
παραπλησίως δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων, ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν·
In a manner very similar to what holds of figures, the facts hold also concerning the soul.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, λέγω δʼ ὥσπερ ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν.
For always in that which follows in order, the prior is present potentially, both in figures and in ensouled things; I mean, for example, the triangle in the quadrangle, and the nutritive power in the sensitive.
ὥστε καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον δεῖ ζητεῖν τίς ἡ ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τίς θηρίου.
So that we must also investigate in each case what the soul of each is, for instance, what is that of a plant, and what that of a man, and what that of a beast.
διὰ τίνα δʼ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον.
And we must consider for what reason they stand in this relation of succession.
ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ οὐθέν ἐστιν αἰσθητικόν· τοῦ δʼ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικόν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς.
For without the nutritive, there is no sensitive; but the nutritive is separated from the sensitive, as in plants.
πάλιν δʼ ἄνευ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἁφὴ δʼ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ζῴων, ἃ οὔτʼ ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτʼ ἀκοήν.
Again, without the tactile, none of the other senses exists, but touch exists without the others; for there are many animals which have neither sight nor hearing.
καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ κίνησις τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δʼ οὐχ ὑπάρχει· τελευταῖον δὲ διάνοια καὶ λογισμός·
And of sensitive beings, movement belongs to some but not to others; and last of all, thought and reasoning.
οἶς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμός, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον· τῶν εἰρημένων, οἷς δʼ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει λογισμός.
For to those to whom reasoning belongs, each of the other mentioned powers also belongs, but to those to whom each of those belongs, reasoning does not belong to all.
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει τὰ δὲ ταύτην μόνον.
On the contrary, some do not even possess imagination, while others have this alone.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων ἑκάστου λόγος οἰκειότατος περὶ ψυχῆς ἐστι, δῆλον.
That the account, therefore, concerning each of these is also the most appropriate account concerning the soul, is clear.
Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν περὶ τούτων μέλλοντα πραγματεύεσθαι λαβεῖν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν, εἶθ᾿ οὕτω περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν.
And it is necessary for one who intends to inquire into these to grasp what each of them is, and then in this way to make the investigation concerning the contiguous and the other things.
εἰ δὲ δεῖ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι πρότεραι κατὰ τὸν λόγον εἰσὶ τῶν δυνάμεων.
And if one must say what each is—for instance, what is the thinking, or what the sensitive, or the nutritive—one must first say what thinking is and what perceiving is; for actions and actualities are prior in definition to potential powers.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ταῦτα, πρότερον ἔτι τούτων διοριστέον τὰ ἀντικείμενα, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.
But indeed, if this is so, even prior to these one must define their objects—for instance, concerning food, the sensible object, and the intelligible object—for the same reason.
ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη, ψυχῆς δʼ ἐστὶ δύναμις καθʼ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν πᾶσιν.
So that first one must speak of food and reproduction; for this soul is both the first and most common also to the others, and it is, a power of the soul in virtue of which living belongs to all.