§B.35## ὁ στρατηγὸς.
## The general.
διαιρεῖται ὁ στρατηγὸς εἰς τρία.
The general is divided into three.
ἔστι γὰρ ἢ τῷ νόμῳ στρατηγὸς ἢ κατὰ δύναμίν τινα καὶ πραγμάτων κυρείαν στρατηγὸς ἢ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην.
For one is a general by law, or a general according to some power and command of affairs, or a general according to science.
ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν κατὰ νόμον στρατηγὸς οἷον οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἱρούμενοι, ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἔχων τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁ δὲ κατὰ δύναμίν τινα καὶ πραγμάτων κυρείαν οἷον ὁ ἀπό τινος ἐπισταθεὶς ἢ αὐτὸς ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κύριος χρημάτων καὶ στρατιωτῶν γενόμενος.
Now, the general by law is, for example, those who are elected in cities; the general according to science is the one who possesses the military science; and the general according to some power and command of affairs is, for example, the one appointed by someone or the one who has himself by his own efforts become master of funds and soldiers.
§B.37## αἱ μέθοδοι αἱ εἰς τὰ προβλήματα.
## The methods towards problems.
διαιροῦνται αἱ μέθοδοι αἱ εἰς τὰ προβλήματα εἰς τρία.
The methods towards problems are divided into three.
εἰσὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν αἱ μὲν κριτικαί, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαί, αἱ δὲ ἐριστικαί.
For of them, some are critical, some are theoretical, and some are eristic.
καὶ κριτικαὶ μέν εἰσιν αἷς τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον διακρίνομεν, οἷον πότερον βέλτιον δικαιοσύνη ἢ ἀνδρεία.
And the critical are those by which we distinguish the better and the worse, for example, whether justice or courage is better.
θεῳρητικαὶ δὲ αἷς θεωροῦμεν τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸν νόσος ἐστὶν ὑγείᾳ καὶ εὐεξίᾳ ἢ οὔ.
The theoretical are those by which we contemplate such things, for example, whether disease is the same as health and vigor or not.
ἐριστικαὶ δὲ αἷς τοὺς ὅρους ἀναιροῦμεν, οἷον οὐκ ἔστιν εὐεξία σωμάτων ἡ κρατίστη.
The eristic are those by which we refute definitions, for example, that vigor is not the best state of bodies.
§B.38## ἡ λύπη.
## Pain.
διαιρεῖται ἡ λύπη εἰς τρία.
Pain is divided into three.
ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἓν μὲν ἐφ’ οἷς προσήκει τὸν φρόνιμον λυπεῖσθαι, ἓν δὲ ἐπὶ [τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς καὶ] τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσι λυπεῖσθαι.
For one part of it is over things about which it is fitting for the prudent person to be pained, and one is to be pained over [other people's goods and evils and] other things about which it is not at all fitting to be pained.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐφ’ οἷς προσήκει τὸν φρόνιμον λυπεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ἀτυχήμασιν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινὸς οἰκείων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῆς συμπάσης πόλεως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
Now, that which is over things about which it is fitting for the prudent person to be pained is, for example, over one's own misfortunes or those of one's own relatives or friends or of the whole city, and over other such things.
τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ [τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς λυπεῖσθαι ἐστὶ φθόνος τις καὶ βασκανία καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πᾶσι] τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσι λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἔλεος, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φθόνος [, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσι φθόνος καὶ βασκανία].
And [to be pained over other people's goods is a kind of envy and malice, and all such things; and to be pained over all evils and goods and all] other things about which it is not at all fitting to be pained, that which is over other people's evils is pity, and that over their goods is envy [, and that over other things about which it is not at all fitting is envy and malice].
§B.39## ἡ ἡδονὴ.
## Pleasure.
διαιρεῖται ἡ ἡδονὴ εἰς τέσσαρα.
Pleasure is divided into four.
ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἓν μὲν περὶ τὸ λογ〈ιστ〉ικόν, 〈ἓν δὲ περὶ τὸ θυμικόν,〉 ἓν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἓν δὲ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις.
For of it, one is concerning the rational part, [one concerning the spirited part,] one concerning the appetitive part, and one concerning the senses.
ἔστι δὲ ἡ 〈μὲν〉 [τὸ μανθάνειν] περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀνευρίσκειν ἡδονὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Now, the pleasure concerning the rational part is that from learning and discovering, and suchlike.
περὶ δὲ τὸ θυμικὸν οἷον ἥ τε τοῦ κρατεῖν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ ἀντιτιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται.
That concerning the spirited part is, for example, that of ruling, conquering, and taking revenge, and suchlike.
αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν αἵ τε ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ συνουσίας καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται ἡδοναὶ γινόμεναι.
Those concerning the appetitive part are the pleasures arising from food and sexual intercourse, and suchlike.
ἡ δὲ [περὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν] περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οἷον ἥ τε διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ γεύεσθαι καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται.
That concerning the senses is, for example, that through seeing, tasting, smelling, and suchlike.
§B.40## ἡ εὐταξία.
## Order.
διαιρεῖται ἡ εὐταξία εἰς τέσσαρα.
Order is divided into four.
ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἓν μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, ἓν δὲ περὶ σῶμα, ἓν δὲ περὶ πλῆθος, ἓν δὲ περὶ κινήσεις.
For of it, one is concerning the soul, one concerning the body, one concerning a multitude, and one concerning movements.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εὐταξία ἐγγινομένη κοσμιότης καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι εὐταξία κάλλος καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐν κινήσει εὐταξία εὐρυθμία ὀνομάζεται, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ πλήθει, οἷον ἡ πρὸς ἄρχοντας πειθαρχία εὐταξία προσαγορεύεται.
Now, the order arising in the soul is called decorum; the order in the body is called beauty; the order in movement is named rhythm; and the order in a multitude, for example, obedience to rulers, is addressed as order.
§B.41## ἡ ἀταξία
διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀταξία εἰς τέσσαρα.
## Disorder. Disorder is divided into four.
ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἓν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἓν δὲ ἐν σώματι, ἓν δὲ ἐν πλήθει, ἓν δὲ ἐν κίνήσει.
For of it, one is in the soul, one in the body, one in a multitude, and one in movement.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀταξία ἐγγινομένη ἀσωτία ἢ ἀκολασία καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀταξία αἰσχρότης καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀταξία ἀπειθαρχία καλεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐν κινήσει ἀρρυθμία προσαγορεύεται.
Now, the disorder arising in the soul is called profligacy or licentiousness; the disorder in the body is called ugliness; the disorder in a multitude is called disobedience; and the disorder in movement is addressed as lack of rhythm.