§7.1#1## Η.
Πότερον δὲ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν κυριώτατον τῶν ῥηθέντων περὶ ταὐτοῦ τρόπων (ἐλέγετο δὲ κυριώτατα ταὐτὸν τὸ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἕν) σκοπεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν πτώσεων καὶ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων.
Book VII Whether things are the same or different, according to the most proper of the senses spoken of 'the same' (and 'the same' was said to be most properly that which is one in number), must be examined from inflections, coordinates, and opposites.
Εἰ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτὸν τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ, καὶ ὁ δίκαιος τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ τὸ δικαίως τῷ ἀνδρείως.
For if justice is the same as courage, then the just man is also the same as the courageous man, and 'justly' is the same as 'courageously'.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· εἰ γὰρ τάδε ταὐτά, καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τούτοις ταὐτὰ καθ᾿ ὁποιανοῦν τῶν λεγομένων ἀντιθέσεων.
And similarly in the case of opposites; for if these things are the same, their opposites are also the same according to any of the spoken oppositions.
Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ τούτῳ ἢ τούτῳ ἀντικείμενον λαβεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
For it makes no difference to take the opposite of this or of that, since they are the same.
Πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ φθαρτικῶν καὶ γενέσεων καὶ φθορῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἑκάτερον· ὅσα γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτά, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις αὐτῶν καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ αἱ αὐταί, καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φθαρτικά.
Again, one must examine from productive and destructive agents, and generations and destructions, and in general from those things which stand in a similar relation to each; for whatever things are absolutely the same, their generations and destructions are also the same, and so are their productive and destructive agents.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ ὧν θάτερον μάλιστα λέγεται ὁτιοῦν, εἰ καὶ θάτερον τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μάλιστα λέγεται, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἱρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἓν γὰρ τὸ αἱρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον.
One must also examine, in cases where one of them is said to be most of all some thing, whether the other is also said to be most of all that same thing in the same respect, just as Xenocrates proves that the happy life and the good life are the same, since of all lives the good life and the happy life are the most desirable; for that which is most desirable and greatest is one.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
And similarly in the case of other such things.
Δεῖ δ᾿ ἑκάτερον ἓν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον μέγιστον ἢ αἱρετώτατον.
But each of the things said to be greatest or most desirable must be one in number.
Εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται δεδειγμένον ὅτι ταὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ ἀνδρειότατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι Πελοποννησίους Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ εἷς ἀριθμῷ Πελοποννήσιος οὐδὲ Λακεδαιμόνιος.
Otherwise, it will not have been proved that they are the same; for it is not necessary, if the Peloponnesians and the Lacedaemonians are the most courageous of the Greeks, that Peloponnesians are the same as Lacedaemonians, since a Peloponnesian is not one in number, nor is a Lacedaemonian.
Ἀλλὰ περιέχεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀναγκαῖον, καθάπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων.
But it is necessary that one of them is contained by the other, just as the Lacedaemonians are by the Peloponnesians.
Εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται ἀλλήλων εἶναι βελτίους, ἐὰν μὴ περιέχωνται οἱ ἕτεροι ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων.
Otherwise, it will result that they are better than each other, if one is not contained by the other.
Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους βελτίους εἶναι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἴπερ μὴ περιέχονται οἱ ἕτεροι ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων· πάντων γὰρ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσὶ βελτίους.
For it is necessary that the Peloponnesians are better than the Lacedaemonians, if one is not contained by the other; for they are better than all the rest.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀνάγκη βελτίους εἶναι τῶν Πελοποννησίων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι πάντων τῶν λοιπῶν εἰσὶ βελτίους.
Similarly, the Lacedaemonians must be better than the Peloponnesians; for these too are better than all the rest.
ὥστε ἀλλήλων βελτίους γίνονται.
Thus they become better than each other.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἓν ἀριθμῷ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ μέγιστον λεγόμενον, εἰ μέλλει ὅτι ταὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσθαι.
It is clear, therefore, that what is called best and greatest must be one in number, if it is to be proved that they are the same.
Διὸ καὶ Ξενοκράτης οὐκ ἀποδείκνυσιν· οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὁ εὐδαίμων οὐδ᾿ ὁ σπουδαῖος βίος, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διότι ἄμφω αἱρετώτατοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὸν ἕτερον.
Therefore Xenocrates also fails to prove it; for neither the happy life nor the good life is one in number, so that it is not necessary that they are the same because both are most desirable, but rather that one is contained under the other.
Πάλιν σκοπεῖν εἰ ᾧ θάτερον ταὐτόν, καὶ θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ταὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾿ ἀλλήλοις.
Again, see whether that with which one of them is the same, the other is also; for if both are not the same as the same thing, it is clear that they are not the same as each other.