§6.14Πάλιν εἰ τὴν τούτων σύνθεσιν εἴρηκε τὸ ὅλον, οἷον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος σύνθεσιν ζῷον, πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε ποία σύνθεσις, καθάπερ εἰ σάρκα ὁριζόμενος ἢ ὀστοῦν τὴν πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος εἶπε σύνθεσιν.
Again, see whether he has stated that the whole is the composition of these, for example, defining a living thing as the composition of soul and body. First, see whether he has failed to state what kind of composition it is, just as if, in defining flesh or bone, he called it the composition of fire, earth, and air.
Οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ σύνθεσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις προσδιοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν συντεθέντων τούτων σὰρξ γίνεται, ἀλλ᾿ οὑτωσὶ μὲν συντεθέντων σάρξ, οὑτωσὶ δ᾿ ὀστοῦν.
For it is not sufficient to say "composition", but one must also specify what kind of composition it is; for it is not by these being put together in any way whatsoever that flesh is made, but if they are put together in this way, it is flesh, and if in that way, bone.
Ἔοικε δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν συνθέσει ταὐτὸν οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων·
Moreover, neither of the aforesaid seems to be at all identical with a composition.
συνθέσει μὲν γὰρ πάσῃ διάλυσις ἐναντίον, τῶν δ᾿ εἰρημένων οὐδετέρῳ οὐδέν.
For to every composition, dissolution is contrary, but to neither of the aforesaid is there anything contrary.
Ἔτι εἰ ὁμοίως πιθανὸν πᾶν τὸ σύνθετον σύνθεσιν εἶναι ἢ μηδέν, τῶν δὲ ζῴων ἕκαστον σύνθετον ὂν μή ἐστι σύνθεσις, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν τῶν συνθέτων σύνθεσις ἂν εἴη.
Moreover, see whether it is equally plausible that either every composite thing is a composition, or none is; and if each of living things, being a composite, is not a composition, neither would any of the other composite things be a composition.
Πάλιν εἰ ὁμοίως ἔν τινι πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν τἀναντία, ὥρισται δὲ διὰ θατέρου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ὥρισται.
Again, if contraries are by nature equally capable of belonging to something, and it has been defined by means of one of them, it is clear that it has not been defined.
Εἰ δὲ μή, πλείους τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβήσεται ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ διὰ τούτου ἢ ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὁρισάμενος εἴρηκεν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ;
Otherwise, it will result that there are several definitions of the same thing; for why has he who defined by this one spoken any more than he who defined by the other, since both are by nature equally capable of arising in it?
τοιοῦτος δ᾿ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ἐπιστήμης δεκτική· Ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοίας ἐστὶ δεκτική.
Such is the definition of the soul, if it is "a substance receptive of knowledge"; for it is equally receptive of ignorance.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ὅλον ἔχῃ τις ἐπιχειρεῖν τὸν ὁρισμὸν διὰ τὸ μὴ γνώριμον εἶναι τὸ ὅλον, πρὸς τῶν μερῶν τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐὰν ᾖ γνώριμον καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον φαίνηται· τοῦ γὰρ μέρους ἀναιρεθέντος καὶ ὁ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς ἀναιρεῖται.
And one must also, if one cannot attack the definition as a whole because the whole is not familiar, attack some of its parts, if it is familiar and appears to have been rendered incorrectly; for if the part is refuted, the whole definition is also refuted.
Ὅσοι τ᾿ ἀσαφεῖς τῶν ὁρισμῶν, συνδιορθώσαντα καὶ συσχηματίσαντα πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν τι καὶ ἔχειν ἐπιχείρημα, οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἢ δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐκλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ αὐτὸν διασαφῆσαι τί ποτε τυγχάνει τὸ δηλούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.
And as for those definitions which are obscure, one should examine them after first jointly correcting them and shaping them so that they signify something and afford a line of attack; for it is necessary for the respondent either to accept the meaning as understood by the questioner, or himself to clarify what on earth is meant by the expression.
Ἔτι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις νόμον εἰώθασιν ἐπεισφέρειν, κἂν ᾖ βελτίων ὁ ἐπεισφερόμενος, ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν ποιητέον καὶ αὐτὸν ὁρισμὸν ἕτερον οἰστέον· ἐὰν γὰρ φαίνηται βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον δηλῶν τὸ ὁριζόμενον, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνῃρημένος ἔσται ὁ κείμενος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ εἰσὶ πλείους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοί.
Moreover, just as in the public assemblies they are accustomed to introduce a new law, and if the one introduced is better, they repeal the former one, so too one must act in the case of definitions and bring forward another definition oneself; for if it appears to be better and more clearly explanatory of the term defined, it is clear that the established one will be repealed, since there are not several definitions of the same thing.
Πρὸς ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον στοιχεῖον τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εὐστόχως ὁρίσασθαι τὸ προκείμενον ἢ καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὥσπερ πρὸς παράδειγμα θεώμενον, τό τ᾿ ἐλλεῖπον ὧν προσῆκεν ἔχειν τὸν ὁρισμὸν καὶ τὸ προσκείμενον περιέργως καθορᾶν, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἐπιχειρημάτων εὐπορεῖν.
In dealing with all definitions, it is no minor element to define the subject for oneself with good aim, or to adopt a well-stated definition; for it is necessary, as if looking toward a model, to clearly perceive both what is lacking of those things which the definition ought to have, and what is superfluously added, so as to be more abundant in lines of attack.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
Let this, then, suffice for what concerns definitions.