§6.6#3Καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν πρός τι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο τὴν διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν· τῶν γὰρ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρός τι, καθάπερ καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων πρός τι σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ γάρ τινος καὶ ποιητική τινος καὶ πρακτική.
And if, in the case of any relative term, he has rendered the difference not in relation to something else; for the differences of relative terms are also relative, just as with knowledge; for it is called theoretical, practical, and productive, and each of these signifies relation; for theoretical is of something, and productive of something, and practical of something.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον τῶν πρός τι ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ ὁριζόμενος.
One must also examine if the definer renders each of the relative terms in relation to that for which it is naturally suited.
Ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον τῶν πρός τι μόνον ἔστι χρῆσθαι, πρὸς ἄλλο δ᾿ οὐδέν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον τῇ ὄψει πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν μόνον, τῇ δὲ στλεγγίδι κἂν ἀρύσαιτό τις·
For some of the relative terms can be used only for that for which each is naturally suited, and for nothing else, but others also for something else; for example, sight only for seeing, but a scraper one might even use to draw water.
ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως εἴ τις ὁρίσαιτο τὴν στλεγγίδα ὄργανον πρὸς τὸ ἀρύειν, ἡμάρτηκεν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο πέφυκεν.
But nevertheless, if someone should define the scraper as an instrument for drawing water, he has erred; for it is not naturally suited for this.
Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν, ἐφ᾿ ὃ ἂν χρήσαιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ᾗ φρόνιμος, καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκεία ἐπιστήμη.
And the limit of that for which it is naturally suited is that for which the prudent person would use it as prudent, and the science proper to each.
Ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦ πρώτου ἀπέδωκεν, ὅταν τυγχάνῃ πρὸς πλείω λεγόμενον, οἷον τὴν φρόνησιν ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπου ἢ ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· πρώτου γὰρ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ ἡ φρόνησις· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονεῖν λέγεται.
Or if he has not rendered it of the primary thing, when it happens to be spoken of in relation to several things; for example, if he renders prudence as the virtue of a man or of a soul, and not of the rational part; for prudence is the virtue of the rational part primarily; for it is in respect of this that both the soul and the man are said to be prudent.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ δεκτικόν ἐστιν οὗ εἴρηται τὸ ὡρισμένον πάθος ἢ ἡ διάθεσις ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, ἡμάρτηκεν.
Moreover, if that of which the defined affection or disposition or whatever else is said is not receptive of it, he has erred.
Πᾶσα γὰρ διάθεσις καὶ πᾶν πάθος ἐν ἐκείνῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι οὗ ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἢ πάθος, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ διάθεσις οὖσα ψυχῆς.
For every disposition and every affection is naturally suited to arise in that of which it is a disposition or affection, just as knowledge, being a disposition of the soul, is in the soul.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἷον ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὅτι ὕπνος ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἡ ἀπορία ἰσότης ἐναντίων λογισμῶν, καὶ ἡ ἀλγηδὼν διάστασις τῶν συμφύτων μερῶν μετὰ βίας·
Sometimes they err in such matters, as for example those who say that sleep is an inability of sensation, and perplexity is an equality of contrary reasonings, and pain is a violent separation of parts naturally joined.
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ὕπνος ὑπάρχει τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἔδει δ᾿, εἴπερ ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν.
For neither does sleep belong to sensation, though it ought to, if indeed it is an inability of sensation.
Ὁμοίως δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἀπορία ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐναντίοις λογισμοῖς, οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἀλγηδὼν τοῖς συμφύτοις μέρεσιν· ἀλγήσει γὰρ τὰ ἄψυχα, εἴπερ ἀλγηδὼν αὐτοῖς παρέσται.
Likewise, neither does perplexity belong to contrary reasonings, nor pain to parts naturally joined; for inanimate things would feel pain, if indeed pain is present in them.
Τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρισμός, εἴπερ συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἐστίν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν τὰ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά· ἡ γὰρ ἑκάστου συμμετρία ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει ὧν ἐστὶ συμμετρία, ὥσθ᾿ ἡ ὑγίεια ὑπάρχοι ἂν αὐτοῖς.
Such also is the definition of health, if indeed it is a symmetry of hot and cold elements; for the hot and cold elements would necessarily be healthy; for the symmetry of each thing belongs to those things of which it is a symmetry, so that health would belong to them.
Ἔτι τὸ ποιούμενον εἰς τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ ἀνάπαλιν συμβαίνει τιθέναι τοῖς οὕτως ὁριζομένοις.
Moreover, those who define in this way happen to put the effect for the cause, or vice versa.
Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλγηδὼν ἡ διάστασις τῶν συμφύτων μερῶν, ἀλλὰ ποιητικὸν ἀλγηδόνος· οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἀδυναμία τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὕπνος, ἀλλὰ ποιητικὸν θάτερον θατέρου· ἤτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ὑπνοῦμεν, ἢ διὰ τὸν ὕπνον ἀδυνατοῦμεν.
For the separation of parts naturally joined is not pain, but productive of pain; nor is the inability of sensation sleep, but one of them is productive of the other; for we either sleep on account of the inability, or are unable on account of sleep.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας δόξειεν ἂν ποιητικὸν εἶναι ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων ἰσότης λογισμῶν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐπ᾿ ἀμφότερα λογιζομένοις ἡμῖν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνηται καθ᾿ ἑκάτερον γίνεσθαι, ἀποροῦμεν ὁπότερον πράξωμεν.
Likewise also, the equality of contrary reasonings would seem to be productive of perplexity; for when, as we reason on both sides, everything appears to happen similarly according to each side, we are perplexed as to which of the two we should do.
Ἔτι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους πάντας ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ που διαφωνεῖ, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀθάνατον ὡρίσατο ζῷον ἄφθαρτον νῦν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νῦν ἄφθαρτον ζῷον νῦν ἀθάνατον ἔσται.
Moreover, one must examine with respect to all times if there is any discrepancy; for example, if he defined the immortal as 'a living thing which is indestructible now'; for the living thing which is indestructible now will be immortal now.
ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τούτου οὐ συμβαίνει· ἀμφίβολον γὰρ τὸ νῦν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔφθαρται νῦν σημαίνει, ἢ ὅτι οὐ δυνατὸν φθαρῆναι νῦν, ἢ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι νῦν οἷον μηδέποτε φθαρῆναι.
Or in this case it does not follow; for 'being indestructible now' is ambiguous; for it signifies either that it has not been destroyed now, or that it cannot be destroyed now, or that it is now of such a nature as never to be destroyed.
Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄφθαρτον νῦν ἐστὶ ζῷον, τοῦτο λέγομεν ὅτι νῦν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι ζῷον οἷον μηδέποτε φθαρῆναι.
When, therefore, we say that a living thing is indestructible now, we say this, that it is now a living thing of such a nature as never to be destroyed.
Τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν, ὥστ᾿ οὐ συμβαίνει νῦν αὐτὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι.
And this was the same as the immortal, so that it does not follow that it is immortal now.
Ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως ἂν συμβαίνῃ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν ὑπάρχειν νῦν ἢ πρότερον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν.
But nevertheless, if it should happen that what is rendered according to the definition belongs now or previously, but that according to the name does not belong, they would not be the same.
Χρηστέον οὖν τῷ τόπῳ καθάπερ εἴρηται.
One must therefore use this topic as has been said.