§6.3Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ σαφῶς, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον.
If, then, he has defined obscurely, we must examine from such topics.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἴρηκε τὸν ὅρον, πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν εἴ τινι κέχρηται ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅλως τοῖς οὖσιν ἢ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος τῷ ὁριζομένῳ· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ εἰρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο.
But if he has stated the definition at greater length than is necessary, we must first consider whether he has used anything that belongs to all, either to existing things in general or to those under the same genus as the thing defined; for this must necessarily be stated at greater length than is necessary.
Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν γένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζειν, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν ἀπό τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει.
For the genus must distinguish the thing from other things, and the difference from something of those in the same genus.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον ἁπλῶς ἀπ᾿ οὐδενὸς χωρίζει, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον οὐ χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, ὥστε μάταιον τὸ τοιοῦτον προσκείμενον.
Now, that which belongs to all simply distinguishes nothing, and that which belongs to all those under the same genus does not distinguish from those in the same genus, so that such an addition is useless.
Ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ἴδιον τὸ προσκείμενον, ἀφαιρεθέντος δὲ τούτου καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς λόγος ἴδιός ἐστι καὶ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν.
Or if the addition is indeed proper, but when this is removed, the remaining formula is also proper and declares the essence.
Οἷον ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν προστεθὲν περίεργον· καὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος τούτου ὁ λοιπὸς λόγος ἴδιος καὶ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν.
For example, in the formula of man, the addition of "capable of knowledge" is superfluous; for even when this is removed, the remaining formula is proper and declares the essence.
Ἁπλῶς δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, ἅπαν περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον.
To speak simply, everything is superfluous when, if it is removed, the remainder makes the thing defined clear.
Τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἰ ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κινῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ψυψή, καθάπερ Πλάτων ὥρισται.
And such is also the definition of the soul, if it is "a number that moves itself"; for that which moves itself is soul, as Plato has defined.
Ἢ ἴδιον μέν ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον, οὐ δηλοῖ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.
Or is what has been said indeed proper, but does not declare the essence if "number" is removed?
Ποτέρως μὲν οὖν ἔχει, χαλεπὸν διασαφῆσαι· χρηστέον δ᾿ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον.
Which of the two is the case, is difficult to make clear; but we must use it in all such cases to our advantage.
Οἷον ὅτι ὁ τοῦ φλέγματος ὅρος ὑγρὸν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τροφῆς ἄπεπτον. Ἣν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ πολλά, ὥστε περίεργον τὸ ἄπεπτον προσκείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τούτου ἀφαιρεθέντος ὁ λοιπὸς ἔσται ἴδιος λόγος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο τι πρῶτον εἶναι.
For example, let the definition of phlegm be "the first undigested moisture from nourishment." For what is first is one, not many, so that the addition of "undigested" is superfluous; for even when this is removed, the remaining formula will be proper; for it is not possible that both this and something else are first from nourishment.
Ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς πρῶτον ἀπὸ τροφῆς τὸ φλέγμα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀπέπτων πρῶτον, ὥστε προσθετέον τὸ ἄπεπτον·
Or is phlegm not simply the first from nourishment, but the first of undigested things, so that "undigested" must be added?
ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ῥηθέντος οὐκ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ μὴ πάντων πρῶτόν ἐστιν.
For if spoken in the former way, the formula is not true, if indeed it is not the first of all things.
Ἔτι εἴ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδος· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος χεῖρον ὥρισται τῶν χρωμένων ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν.
Further, if something in the formula does not belong to all those under the same species; for such a person has defined worse than those who use what belongs to all existing things.
Ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὁ λοιπὸς ἴδιος ᾖ λόγος, καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἴδιος ἔσται· ἁπλῶς γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ὁτουοῦν προστεθέντος ἀληθοῦς ὅλος ἴδιος γίνεται.
For in the former case, if the remaining formula is proper, the whole will also be proper; for simply, if anything true is added to what is proper, the whole becomes proper.
Εἰ δέ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδος, ἀδύνατον ὅλον τὸν λόγον ἴδιον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀντικατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ πράγματος.
But if something in the formula does not belong to all those under the same species, it is impossible for the whole formula to be proper; for it will not be co-extensive in predication with the thing.
Οἷον τὸ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν τετράπηχυ· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν εἶδος τὸ τετράπηχυ.
For example, "an animal, pedestrian, biped, four cubits high"; for such a formula is not co-extensive in predication with the thing because "four cubits high" does not belong to all those under the same species.
Πάλιν εἰ ταὐτὸν πλεονάκις εἴρηκεν, οἷον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὄρεξιν ἡδέος εἰπών· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἡδέος ἔσται.
Again, if he has said the same thing several times, as when he calls desire "a longing for the pleasant"; for all desire is for the pleasant, so that what is the same as desire will also be for the pleasant.
Γίνεται οὖν ὅρος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἡδέος· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιθυμίαν εἰπεῖν ἢ ὄρεξιν ἡδέος, ὥσθ᾿ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἡδέος ἔσται.
The definition of desire, then, becomes "a longing for the pleasant of the pleasant"; for it makes no difference to say "desire" or "a longing for the pleasant," so that each of them will be for the pleasant.
Ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον·
Or is this not at all absurd?
καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δίπουν ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δίπουν ἔσται.
For man also is biped, so that what is the same as man will also be biped.
Ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, ὥστε ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν δίπουν ἐστίν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἄτοπόν τι συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ζῴου πεζοῦ τὸ δίπουν κατηγορεῖται (οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν δὶς περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ δίπουν ἂν κατηγοροῖτο), ἀλλὰ περὶ ζῴου πεζοῦ δίποδος τὸ δίπουν λέγεται, ὥστε ἅπαξ μόνον τὸ δίπουν κατηγορεῖται.
And what is the same as man is "a pedestrian biped animal," so that "a pedestrian biped animal is biped." But no absurdity arises because of this; for "biped" is not predicated of "pedestrian animal" (for in that way "biped" would be predicated twice of the same thing), but "biped" is said of "a pedestrian biped animal," so that "biped" is predicated only once.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τῆς ὀρέξεως τὸ ἡδέος εἶναι κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὥστε ἅπαξ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ κατηγορία γίνεται.
And likewise also in the case of desire; for being for the pleasant is not predicated of longing, but of the whole, so that here too the predication is made once.
Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ δὶς φθέγξασθαι ταὐτὸν ὄνομα τῶν ἀτόπων, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεονάκις περί τινος τὸ αὐτὸ κατηγορῆσαι, οἷον ὡς Ξενοκράτης τὴν φρόνησιν ὁριστικὴν καὶ θεωρητικὴν τῶν ὄντων φησὶν εἶναι. Ἡ γὰρ ὁριστικὴ θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει προσθεὶς πάλιν καὶ θεωρητικήν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τὴν κατάψυξιν στέρησιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν θερμοῦ φασὶν εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος, ὥστε περίεργον τὸ προσθεῖναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἱκανὸν ἦν εἰπεῖν στέρησιν θερμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὴ ἡ στέρησις γνώριμον ποιεῖ ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται.
And it is not uttering the same word twice that is among absurdities, but predicated the same thing several times of something, as Xenocrates says that wisdom is "definitive and contemplative of existing things." For the definitive is a kind of contemplative, so that he says the same thing twice by adding again "contemplative." And likewise also those who say that cooling is "the privation of natural heat"; for all privation is of what is naturally present, so that the addition of "natural" is superfluous, but it was sufficient to say "privation of heat," since privation itself makes it known that it is said of what is natural.
Πάλιν εἰ τοῦ καθόλου εἰρημένου προσθείη καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἐλάττωσιν τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ δικαίων· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συμφέρον τι, ὥστε περιέχεται ἐν τῷ συμφέροντι.
Again, if when the universal is said, he adds also the particular, for instance, if he calls equity "a diminution of the advantageous and the just"; for the just is a kind of advantageous, so that it is contained in the advantageous.
Περιττὸν οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, ὥστε καθόλου εἴπας ἐπὶ μέρους προσέθηκεν.
The "just," then, is superfluous, so that having spoken universally he has added the particular.
Καὶ εἰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ζῴῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ τὸν νόμον εἰκόνα τῶν φύσει καλῶν καὶ δικαίων· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον καλόν τι, ὥστε πλεονάκις τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει.
And if he calls medicine "the science of what is healthy for animal and man," or law "an image of things naturally noble and just"; for the just is a kind of noble, so that he says the same thing several times.