§6.1## Ζ.
Τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας μέρη πέντε ἐστίν.
Of the treatise on definitions there are five parts.
Ἢ γὰρ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ τὸν λόγον (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεσθαι), ἢ ὅτι ὄντος γένους οὐκ ἔθηκεν εἰς τὸ γένος ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον γένος ἔθηκεν (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁριζόμενον εἰς τὸ γένος θέντα τὰς διαφορὰς προσάπτειν· μάλιστα γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τὸ γένος δοκεῖ τὴν τοῦ ὁριζομένου οὐσίαν σημαίνειν), ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἴδιος ὁ λόγος (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἴδιον εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ἢ εἰ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα πεποιηκὼς μὴ ὥρισται μηδ᾿ εἴρηκε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ ὁριζομένῳ.
For it must be either that it is not true at all to say both the name and the formula of that of which the name is true (for the definition of man must be true of every man), or that, though there is a genus, he has not placed the thing in its genus, or not in its proper genus (for the person defining must place the thing in its genus and then attach the differences; for of the things in the definition, the genus is thought to signify most of all the essence of the thing defined), or that the formula is not proper (for the definition must be proper, as has indeed been said before), or if, having done all the aforesaid, he has not defined nor stated what it is to be for the thing defined.
Λοιπὸν δὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, εἰ ὥρισται μέν, μὴ καλῶς δ᾿ ὥρισται.
And finally, besides the aforesaid, if he has defined, but not defined well.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἀληθεύεται, καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον.
If, then, the formula is not true of that of which the name is true, we must examine from the topics concerning accident.
Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ, πότερον ἀληθὲς ἢ οὐκ ἀληθές, πᾶσα ἡ σκέψις γίνεται· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διαλεγώμεθα, ὅτι ἀληθὲς λέγομεν, ὅταν δ᾿ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθές.
For there too, all inquiry is whether a thing is true or not true; for when we argue that the accident belongs, we say it is true, and when we argue that it does not belong, we say it is not true.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει ἔθηκεν, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἴδιος ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ῥηθέντων τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον.
But if he has not placed it in its proper genus, or if the rendered formula is not proper, we must examine from the topics stated concerning genus and property.
Λοιπὸν δ᾿, εἰ μὴ ὥρισται ἢ εἰ μὴ καλῶς ὥρισται, πῶς μετιτέον, εἰπεῖν.
And for the rest, if he has not defined or if he has not defined well, we must state how we should proceed.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπισκεπτέον εἰ μὴ καλῶς ὥρισται.
First, then, we must examine if he has not defined well.
Ῥᾷον γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ποιῆσαι ἢ καλῶς ποιῆσαι.
For it is easier to do anything whatsoever than to do it well.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἁμαρτία περὶ τοῦτο πλείων, ἐπειδὴ ἐργωδέστερον, ὥσθ᾿ ἡ ἐπιχείρησις ῥᾴων ἡ περὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνο γίνεται.
Clearly, then, the error in this is greater, since it is more laborious, so that the line of attack concerning this becomes easier than that concerning the other.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μέρη δύο, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀσαφεῖ τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ κεχρῆσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁριζόμενον ὡς ἐνδέχεται σαφεστάτῃ τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ κεχρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ γνωρίσαι χάριν ἀποδίδοται ὁ ὁρισμός), δεύτερον δ᾿, εἰ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἴρηκε τὸν λόγον τοῦ δέοντος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ προσκείμενον ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ περίεργον.
Now of "not well" there are two parts: one is using obscure language (for the person defining must use the clearest language possible, since a definition is rendered for the sake of making something known), and second, if he has stated the formula at greater length than is necessary; for everything added in a definition is superfluous.
Πάλιν δ᾿ ἑκάτερον τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς πλείω μέρη διείληπται.
Again, each of the aforesaid is divided into several parts.
§6.2Εἷς μὲν οὖν τόπος τοῦ ἀσαφῶς, εἰ ὁμώνυμόν ἐστί τινι τὸ εἰρημένον, οἷον ὅτι ἡ γένεσις ἀγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ ὅτι ἡ ὑγίεια συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν.
Now, one topic of obscurity is if what is said is homonymous with something, for instance, that generation is a passage into essence, or that health is a symmetry of hot and cold elements.
Ὁμώνυμος γὰρ ἡ ἀγωγὴ καὶ ἡ συμμετρία· ἄδηλον οὖν ὁπότερον βούλεται λέγειν τῶν δηλουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου.
For "passage" and "symmetry" are homonymous; it is therefore unclear which of the things signified by the term used in several senses he wishes to mean.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζομένου πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ διελὼν εἶπεν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁποτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἐνδέχεταί τε συκοφαντεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ πάντα ὧν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.
Likewise also if, when the thing defined is spoken of in several senses, he speaks without distinguishing them; for it is unclear of which of them he has rendered the definition, and it is possible to cavil on the ground that the formula does not fit everything of which he has rendered the definition.
Μάλιστα δ᾿ ἐνδέχεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν λανθανούσης τῆς ὁμωνυμίας.
Such a thing is especially possible when the homonymy is unnoticed.
Ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διελόμενον αὐτόν, ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ ἀποδοθέν, συλλογισμὸν ποιῆσαι· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδένα τῶν τρόπων ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ὡρισμένος εἴη κατὰ τρόπον.
It is also possible, when he has himself distinguished in how many senses the term rendered in the definition is spoken of, to make a deduction; for if in none of the ways it is adequately stated, it is clear that it would not have been defined in a proper manner.
Ἄλλος, εἰ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηκεν, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον ἢ τὴν γῆν τιθήνην ἢ τὴν σωφροσύνην συμφωνίαν.
Another is if he has spoken metaphorically, for instance, if he states that knowledge is inconvertible, or that the earth is a nurse, or that temperance is a harmony.
Πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον.
For everything said metaphorically is obscure.
Ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντα συκοφαντεῖν ὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα· οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης· πᾶσα γὰρ συμφωνία ἐν φθόγγοις.
It is also possible, when someone has spoken metaphorically, to cavil as though he had spoken in the literal sense; for the stated definition will not fit, for instance, in the case of temperance; for all harmony is in sounds.
Ἔτι εἰ γένος ἡ συμφωνία τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐν δύο γένεσιν ἔσται ταὐτὸν οὐ περιέχουσιν ἄλληλα· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ συμφωνία τὴν ἀρετὴν οὔθ᾿ ἡ ἀρετὴ τὴν συμφωνίαν περιέχει.
Further, if harmony is the genus of temperance, the same thing will be in two genera which do not contain each other; for neither does harmony contain virtue, nor does virtue contain harmony.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ κειμένοις ὀνόμασι χρῆται, οἷον Πλάτων ὀφρυόσκιον τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἢ τὸ φαλάγγιον σηψιδακές, ἢ τὸν μυελὸν ὀστεογενές· πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.
Further, if he uses terms that are not established, as Plato calls the eye "brow-shaded," or the spider "rot-biting," or marrow "bone-begotten"; for everything unusual is obscure.
Ἔνια δ᾿ οὔτε καθ᾿ ὁμωνυμίαν οὔτε κατὰ μεταφορὰν οὔτε κυρίως εἴρηται, οἷον ὁ νόμος μέτρον ἢ εἰκὼν τῶν φύσει δικαίων.
And some things are spoken neither by homonymy nor metaphorically nor in the literal sense, as when law is called a measure or an image of things naturally just.
Ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα χείρω τῆς μεταφορᾶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημαινόμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα· πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατά τινα ὁμοιότητα μεταφέρουσιν· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ ποιεῖ γνώριμον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιότης ὑπάρχει, καθ᾿ ἣν μέτρον ἢ εἰκὼν ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, οὔτε κυρίως εἴωθε λέγεσθαι.
Such things are worse than metaphors; for a metaphor makes the thing signified known in some way because of the similarity (for all who use metaphors do so because of some similarity), but this sort of thing does not make it known; for neither does the similarity exist, by virtue of which law is a measure or an image, nor is it customary to speak of it in the literal sense.
Ὥστε εἰ μὲν κυρίως μέτρον ἢ εἰκόνα τὸν νόμον φησὶν εἶναι, ψεύδεται· εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν οὗ ἡ γένεσις διὰ μιμήσεως, τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ νόμῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ κυρίως, δῆλον ὅτι ἀσαφῶς εἴρηκε καὶ χεῖρον ὁποιουοῦν τῶν κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγομένων.
So if he says that law is literally a measure or an image, he speaks falsely (for an image is that whose generation is through imitation, and this does not belong to law); but if not in the literal sense, it is clear that he has spoken obscurely, and worse than any of those things said metaphorically.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ δῆλος ὁ τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγος ἐκ τοῦ λεχθέντος· οἱ γὰρ καλῶς ἀποδεδομένοι καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους προσσημαίνουσιν.
Further, if the definition of the contrary is not clear from what is said; for those that are well rendered also signify their contraries.
Ἢ εἰ καθ᾿ αὑτὸν λεχθεὶς μὴ φανερὸς εἴη τίνος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφέων, εἰ μή τις ἐπιγράψαι, οὐκ ἐγνωρίζετο τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον.
Or if, when spoken by itself, it is not plain of what it is the definition, but just like the works of ancient painters, unless one wrote an inscription, it was not known what each thing was.