§4.2#1Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἴδους, ὃ μήτε περιέχει τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος μήθ᾿ ὑπ᾿ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ τις τῆς δικαιοσύνης τὴν ἐπιστήμην θείη γένος.
One must also see if there is any other genus of the assigned species, which neither contains the assigned genus nor is contained under it; as, for example, if someone should lay down "knowledge" as the genus of "justice".
Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ γένος, καὶ οὐδέτερον τῶν γενῶν τὸ λοιπὸν περιέχει, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐπιστήμη γένος τῆς δικαιοσύνης· δοκεῖ γάρ, ὅταν ἓν εἶδος ὑπὸ δύο γένη ᾖ, τὸ ἕτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου περιέχεσθαι.
For "virtue" also is its genus, and neither of these genera contains the other, so that "knowledge" would not be the genus of "justice"; for it is held that when one species falls under two genera, one of them must be contained by the other.
Ἔχει δ᾿ ἀπορίαν ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων τὸ τοιοῦτο.
However, this presents a difficulty in some cases.
Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον τῶν γενῶν ὑπ᾿ οὐδετέρου περιέχεσθαι· οὐ μὴν ὑπὸ πάντων γε συγχωρεῖται τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι.
For to some, "prudence" seems to be both a virtue and a knowledge, and neither of these genera to be contained by the other; yet it is not indeed conceded by all that prudence is a knowledge.
Εἰ δ᾿ οὖν τις συγχωροίη τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τό γε ὑπ᾿ ἄλληλα ἢ ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ ἄμφω γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένη τῶν ἀναγκαίων δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης συμβαίνει· ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστίν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕξις καὶ διάθεσίς ἐστιν.
But if, then, anyone should concede that what is said is true, still it would seem to be necessary that the genera of the same thing should either fall under one another or both under the same thing, just as happens in the case of virtue and knowledge; for both are under the same genus, since each of them is a habit and a disposition.
Σκεπτέον οὖν εἰ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀποδοθέντι γένει.
One must therefore see if neither of these is true of the assigned genus.
Εἰ γὰρ μήθ᾿ ὑπ᾿ ἄλληλά ἐστι τὰ γένη μήθ᾿ ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος.
For if the genera are neither under one another nor both under the same thing, the assigned genus would not be a genus.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὸ γένος τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος γένους, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ τὸ ἐπάνω γένος, εἰ πάντα κατηγορεῖται τοῦ εἴδους καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐπάνω γένη κατηγορεῖσθαι δεῖ τοῦ εἴδους ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν.
One must also examine the genus of the assigned genus, and so always the higher genus, to see if all are predicated of the species, and if they are predicated in the category of essence; for all the higher genera must be predicated of the species in the category of essence.
Εἰ οὖν που διαφωνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ γένος τὸ ἀποδοθέν.
If, then, there is a discrepancy anywhere, it is clear that the assigned genus is not a genus.
Πάλιν εἰ μετέχει τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τῶν ἐπάνω τι γενῶν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ ἐπάνω μετέχει.
Again, one must see if the genus partakes of the species, either itself or any of the higher genera; for the higher does not partake of any of the lower.
Ἀνασκευάζοντι μὲν οὖν καθάπερ εἴρηται χρηστέον· κατασκευάζοντι δέ, ὁμολογουμένου μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῷ εἴδει τοῦ ῥηθέντος γένους, ὅτι δ᾿ ὡς γένος ὑπάρχει ἀμφισβητουμένου, ἀπόχρη τὸ δεῖξαί τι τῶν ἐπάνω γενῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορούμενον.
For refuting, then, one must use this method as has been said; but for establishing, when it is agreed that the mentioned genus belongs to the species, but it is disputed whether it belongs as a genus, it is sufficient to show that some of the higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence.
Ἑνὸς γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορουμένου, πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω τούτου καὶ τὰ ὑποκάτω, ἄν περ κατηγορῆται τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορηθήσεται· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται.
For if one is predicated in the category of essence, all the genera both above and below this, provided that they are predicated of the species, will be predicated in the category of essence; so that the assigned genus also is predicated in the category of essence.
Ὅτι δ᾿ ἑνὸς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορουμένου πάντα τὰ λοιπά, ἄν περ κατηγορῆται, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορηθήσεται, δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς ληπτέον.
That when one is predicated in the category of essence, all the rest, if indeed they are predicated, will be predicated in the category of essence, must be assumed by induction.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχειν ἀμφισβητεῖται τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, οὐκ ἀπόχρη τὸ δεῖξαι τῶν ἐπάνω τι γενῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορούμενον.
But if it is disputed whether the assigned genus belongs at all, it is not sufficient to show that some of the higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence.
Οἷον εἴ τις τῆς βαδίσεως γένος ἀπέδωκε τὴν φοράν, οὐκ ἀπόχρη τὸ δεῖξαι διότι κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ βάδισις πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι φορά ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄλλαι κινήσεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ προσδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδενὸς μετέχει ἡ βάδισις τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν εἰ μὴ τῆς φορᾶς.
For example, if someone has assigned "locomotion" as the genus of "walking", it is not sufficient to show that walking is a motion in order to show that it is locomotion, since there are also other motions, but one must further show that walking partakes of none of the species falling under the same division except locomotion.
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ τοῦ γένους μετέχον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τινὸς μετέχειν τῶν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν.
For that which partakes of the genus must of necessity also partake of some of the species falling under the first division.
Εἰ οὖν ἡ βάδισις μήτ᾿ αὐξήσεως μήτε μειώσεως μήτε τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων μετέχει, δῆλον ὅτι τῆς φορᾶς ἂν μετέχοι, ὥστ᾿ εἴη ἂν γένος ἡ φορὰ τῆς βαδίσεως.
If, then, walking partakes of neither increase, nor decrease, nor any of the other motions, it is clear that it would partake of locomotion, so that locomotion would be the genus of walking.
Πάλιν ἐφ᾿ ὧν τὸ εἶδος τὸ τεθὲν ὡς γένος κατηγορεῖται, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν τούτων κατηγορεῖται ὧνπερ τὸ εἶδος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐπάνω τοῦ γένους πάντα.
Again, in the cases of those things of which the species laid down as genus is predicated, one must see if the assigned genus also is predicated in the category of essence of these very things of which the species is predicated, and similarly if all the genera higher than the genus are so.
Εἰ γάρ που διαφωνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ γένος τὸ ἀποδοθέν· εἰ γὰρ ἦν γένος, ἅπαντ᾿ ἂν καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω τούτου καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖτο, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται.
For if there is a discrepancy anywhere, it is clear that the assigned genus is not a genus; for if it were a genus, all the genera above it and this itself would be predicated in the category of essence of those very things of which the species also is predicated in the category of essence.
Ἀνασκευάζοντι μὲν οὖν χρήσιμον, εἰ μὴ κατηγορεῖται τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὧνπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατηγορεῖται· κατασκευάζοντι δ᾿, εἰ κατηγορεῖται ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, χρήσιμον.
For refuting, then, it is useful if the genus is not predicated in the category of essence of those things of which the species also is predicated; but for establishing, it is useful if it is predicated in the category of essence.
Συμβήσεται γὰρ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ δύο γένη γίνεται.
For the result will be that the genus and the species are both predicated in the category of essence of the same thing, so that the same thing falls under two genera.
Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ὑπ᾿ ἄλληλα τὰ γένη εἶναι.
It is therefore necessary that the genera should be under one another.
Ἂν οὖν δειχθῇ, ὃ βουλόμεθα γένος κατασκευάσαι, μὴ ὂν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦτ᾿ ἂν εἴη, ὥστε δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ὅτι γένος τοῦτο.
If, then, that which we wish to establish as the genus is shown not to be under the species, it is clear that the species would be under this, so that it would be demonstrated that this is the genus.