§4.1#2Ἔτι εἰ κατά τινος τὸ ἀποδοθὲν εἶδος ἀληθεύεται, τὸ δὲ γένος μή, οἷον εἰ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τοῦ δοξαστοῦ γένος τεθείη.
Furthermore, one must see if the assigned species is true of something of which the genus is not; as for example, if "being" or "knowable" should be laid down as the genus of "opinable".
Κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τὸ δοξαστὸν κατηγορηθήσεται· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν μὴ ὄντων δοξαστά.
For "opinable" will be predicated of "not-being"; for many of the things that are not are opinable.
Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, δῆλον.
But it is clear that "being" or "knowable" is not predicated of "not-being".
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ γένος τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τοῦ δοξαστοῦ· καθ᾿ ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ κατηγορεῖσθαι.
Therefore "being" or "knowable" is not the genus of "opinable"; for the genus must also be predicated of those things of which the species is predicated.
Πάλιν εἰ μηδενὸς τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνδέχεται μετέχειν τὸ τεθὲν ἐν τῷ γένει·
Again, one must see if the thing placed in the genus cannot partake of any of the species.
ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦ γένους μετέχειν μηδενὸς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχον, ἂν μή τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ᾖ· ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ γένους μόνον μετέχει.
For it is impossible to partake of the genus without partaking of any of the species, unless it is one of the species under the first division; and these partake of the genus alone.
Ἂν οὖν ἡ κίνησις γένος τῆς ἡδονῆς τεθῇ, σκεπτέον εἰ μήτε φορὰ μήτ᾿ ἀλλοίωσις ἡ ἡδονὴ μήτε τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων μηδεμία· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἂν τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχοι·
If, then, "movement" is laid down as the genus of "pleasure", one must examine if pleasure is neither locomotion, nor alteration, nor any other of the remaining assigned movements; for it is clear that it would partake of none of the species.
ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲ τοῦ γένους, ἐπειδὴ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ γένους μετέχον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τινὸς μετέχειν·
Consequently, it would not partake of the genus either, since that which partakes of the genus must also partake of some of the species.
ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη εἶδος ἡ ἡδονὴ κινήσεως, οὐδὲ τῶν ἀτόμων [οὐδὲ] τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος τὸ τῆς κινήσεως ὄντων.
Thus, pleasure would not be a species of movement, nor would it be one of the individuals falling under the species of movement.
Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄτομα μετέχει τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀνθρώπου μετέχει καὶ ζῴου.
For individuals also partake of both the genus and the species, as a particular man partakes of both "man" and "animal".
Ἔτι εἰ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τοῦ γένους τὸ ἐν τῷ γένει τεθέν, οἷον τὸ δοξαστὸν τοῦ ὄντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξαστόν, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ εἴη τὸ δοξαστὸν εἶδος τοῦ ὄντος· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους λέγεται.
Moreover, one must see if the thing placed in the genus is of wider application than the genus itself, as, for example, "opinable" in relation to "being"; for both "being" and "not-being" are opinable, so that "opinable" cannot be a species of "being"; for the genus is always of wider application than the species.
Πάλιν εἰ ἐπ᾿ ἴσων τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος λέγεται, οἷον εἰ τῶν πᾶσιν ἑπομένων τὸ μὲν εἶδος τὸ δὲ γένος τεθείη, καθάπερ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· παντὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, ὥστ᾿ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γένος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπ᾿ ἴσων λέγεται.
Again, one must see if the species and the genus are of equal application, as, for example, if, of those things which follow all things, one is laid down as the species and the other as the genus, such as "being" and "the one"; for "being" and "the one" belong to everything, so that neither of them is the genus of the other, since they are of equal application.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐπ᾿ ἄλληλα τεθείη· ἥ τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχή, ὥστ᾿ ἢ ἀμφότερα τὰ εἰρημένα ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γένος.
Similarly also if "the first" and "the principle" should be laid down in relation to each other; for the principle is first and the first is the principle, so that either both the terms mentioned are the same or neither is the genus of the other.
Στοιχεῖον δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ γένος ἢ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν λέγεσθαι· ἐπ᾿ ἔλαττον γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ γένους λέγεται.
The basic principle for all such cases is that the genus is of wider application than both the species and the difference; for the difference also is of narrower application than the genus.
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων εἴδει μή ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον γένος ἢ μὴ δόξειεν ἄν, κατασκευάζοντι δέ, εἰ ἔστι τινός.
One must also see if the mentioned genus is not, or would not seem to be, the genus of any of the things that are indivisible in species; or, for one who is establishing, if it is the genus of some.
Ταὐτὸν γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἀδιαφόρων εἴδει γένος.
For the genus of all things that are indivisible in species is the same.
Ἂν οὖν ἑνὸς δειχθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι πάντων, κἂν ἑνὸς μή, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδενός, οἷον εἴ τις ἀτόμους τιθέμενος γραμμὰς τὸ ἀδιαίρετον γένος αὐτῶν φήσειεν εἶναι.
If, then, it is shown to be so for one, it is clear that it is so for all, and if not for one, it is clear that it is for none; as, for example, if someone, laying down "indivisible lines", should say that "the indivisible" is their genus.
Τῶν γὰρ διαίρεσιν ἐχουσῶν γραμμῶν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἰρημένον γένος, ἀδιαφόρων οὐσῶν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· ἀδιάφοροι γὰρ ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἱ εὐθεῖαι γραμμαὶ πᾶσαι.
For the mentioned genus does not belong to those lines which admit of division, though they are indivisible in species; for all straight lines are indivisible in species from one another.