§2.7Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία συμπλέκεται μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἑξαχῶς, ἐναντίωσιν δὲ ποιεῖ τετραχῶς συμπλεκόμενα, δεῖ λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐναντία, ὅπως ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ καὶ ἀναιροῦντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι.
Since contraries are combined with one another in six ways, and they produce contrariety when combined in four ways, one must grasp contraries in whatever way is useful both for refuting and for establishing.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑξαχῶς συμπλέκεται, δῆλον· ἢ γὰρ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκατέρῳ συμπλακήσεται· τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς, οἷον τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ.
That they are combined in six ways is clear: for either each of the contraries will be combined with each [of the other pair]; and this in two ways, for example, doing good to friends and doing evil to enemies, or conversely, doing evil to friends and doing good to enemies.
Ἢ ὅταν ἄμφω περὶ τοῦ ἑνός· διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, οἷον τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ καὶ τὸ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς, ἢ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.
Or when both are about the one [object]; and this in two ways, for example, doing good to friends and doing evil to friends, or doing good to enemies and doing evil to enemies.
Ἢ τὸ ἓν περὶ ἀμφοτέρων· διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, οἷον τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ, ἢ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.
Or the one is about both [objects]; and this also in two ways, for example, doing good to friends and doing good to enemies, or doing evil to friends and doing evil to enemies.
Αἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶται δύο ῥηθεῖσαι συμπλοκαὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν ἐναντίωσιν· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίον· ἀμφότερα γὰρ αἱρετὰ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους.
Now the first two mentioned combinations do not produce contrariety; for doing good to friends is not contrary to doing evil to enemies; for both are desirable and belong to the same character.
Οὐδὲ τὸ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα φευκτὰ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους.
Nor is doing evil to friends contrary to doing good to enemies; for these also are both to be avoided and belong to the same character.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ φευκτὸν φευκτῷ ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ μὲν καθ᾿ ὑπερβολὴν τὸ δὲ κατ᾿ ἔνδειαν λεγόμενον ᾖ· ἥ τε γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ τῶν φευκτῶν δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἔνδεια.
But it does not seem that what is to be avoided is contrary to what is to be avoided, unless one is spoken of as an excess and the other as a deficiency; for excess seems to belong to things to be avoided, and similarly also deficiency.
Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τέτταρα ποιεῖ ἐναντίωσιν.
But all the remaining four produce contrariety.
Τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ἐναντίον· ἀπό τε γὰρ ἐναντίου ἤθους ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἱρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτόν.
For doing good to friends is contrary to doing evil to friends; for it proceeds from a contrary character, and the one is desirable while the other is to be avoided.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καθ᾿ ἑκάστην γὰρ συζυγίαν τὸ μὲν αἱρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικοῦς ἤθους τὸ δὲ φαύλου.
Similarly also in the other cases; for in each pair the one is desirable and the other is to be avoided, and the one belongs to a good character and the other to a bad one.
Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ πλείονα ἐναντία συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that several contraries happen to belong to the same thing.
Τῷ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ ποιεῖν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς.
For to doing good to friends, both doing good to enemies and doing evil to friends are contrary.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστῳ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπισκοποῦσι δύο τὰ ἐναντία φανήσεται.
Similarly also for each of the others, to those who examine in the same way, two contraries will appear.
Λαμβάνειν οὖν τῶν ἐναντίων ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν χρήσιμον.
One should, therefore, take whichever of the contraries is useful for the thesis.
Ἔτι εἰ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον τῷ συμβεβηκότι, σκοπεῖν εἰ ὑπάρχει ᾧπερ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς εἴρηται ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει, ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τἀναντία ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν.
Furthermore, if there is any contrary to the accident, to examine whether it belongs to that to which the accident is said to belong; for if this belongs, that could not belong; for it is impossible for contraries to belong to the same thing at the same time.
Ἢ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον εἴρηται κατά τινος, οὗ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχειν.
Or if any such thing is said of something, such that, if it exists, the contraries must necessarily belong to it.
Οἷον εἰ τὰς ἰδέας ἐν ἡμῖν ἔφησεν εἶναι· κινεῖσθαί τε γὰρ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν αὐτὰς συμβήσεται, ἔτι δὲ αἰσθητὰς καὶ νοητὰς εἶναι.
For example, if someone said that the ideas are in us; for it will follow that they are both in motion and at rest, and furthermore that they are both sensible and intelligible.
Δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ ἰδέαι ἠρεμεῖν καὶ νοηταὶ εἶναι τοῖς τιθεμένοις ἰδέας εἶναι, ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ οὔσας ἀδύνατον ἀκινήτους εἶναι· κινουμένων γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πάντα συγκινεῖσθαι.
For the ideas seem to be at rest and to be intelligible to those who posit that there are ideas, but if they are in us, it is impossible for them to be motionless; for when we are moved, it is necessary that all things in us also move together.
Δῆλον δ᾿ ὅτι καὶ αἰσθηταί, εἴπερ ἐν ἡμῖν εἰσί· διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ μορφὴν γνωρίζομεν.
It is also clear that they are sensible, if indeed they are in us; for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the form in each of us.
Πάλιν εἰ κεῖται συμβεβηκὸς ᾧ ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου δεκτικόν, ὅπερ καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μῖσος ἕπεσθαι ὀργῇ ἔφησεν, εἴη ἂν τὸ μῖσος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ·
Again, if an accident is posited to which there is some contrary, to examine whether that which admits of the accident also admits of its contrary; for the same thing admits of contraries.
ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή.
For example, if someone said that hatred follows anger, hatred would be in the spirited part; for anger is there.
Σκεπτέον οὖν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ἡ φιλία· εἰ γὰρ μή, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία, οὐκ ἂν ἕποιτο μῖσος ὀργῇ.
One must, then, examine whether its contrary, friendship, is also in the spirited part; for if not, but friendship is in the desiderative part, hatred would not follow anger.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἀγνοεῖν ἔφησεν.
Similarly also if someone said that the desiderative part is ignorant.
Εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, εἴπερ καὶ ἀγνοίας· ὅπερ οὐ δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δεκτικὸν εἶναι ἐπιστήμης.
For it would also be capable of receiving knowledge, if indeed it admits of ignorance; which does not seem to be the case, that the desiderative part is capable of receiving knowledge.
Ἀνασκευάζοντι μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, χρηστέον· κατασκευάζοντι δέ, ὅτι μὲν ὑπάρχει τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὐ χρήσιμος ὁ τόπος, ὅτι δ᾿ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, χρήσιμος.
For refuting, then, one should use this as has been said; but for establishing, the topic is not useful for showing that the accident belongs, but it is useful for showing that it can belong.
Δείξαντες μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐ δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου, δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὔτε ὑπάρχει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὔτ᾿ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι· ἐὰν δὲ δείξωμεν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὅτι δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐστίν, οὐδέπω δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα ὅτι καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον μόνον δεδειγμένον ἔσται.
For if we have shown that it does not admit of the contrary, we shall have shown that the accident neither belongs nor can belong; but if we show that the contrary belongs, or that it admits of the contrary, we shall not yet have shown that the accident also belongs, but only that it can belong, and it will have been shown only to this extent.