§2.5Ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς τρόπος, τὸ ἄγειν εἰς τοιοῦτον πρὸς ὃ εὐπορήσομεν ἐπιχειρημάτων.
Furthermore, there is the sophistical method, namely, to lead [the discussion] to a point on which we shall have plenty of arguments.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔσται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ὁτὲ δὲ φαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον, ὁτὲ δ᾿ οὔτε φαινόμενον οὔτ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον.
This will be sometimes necessary, sometimes apparently necessary, and sometimes neither apparently nor really necessary.
Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν, ὅταν ἀρνησαμένου τοῦ ἀποκριναμένου τῶν πρὸς τὴν θέσιν τι χρησίμων πρὸς τοῦτο τοὺς λόγους ποιῆται, τυγχάνῃ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν τοιούτων ὂν πρὸς ὃ εὐπορεῖν ἔστιν ἐπιχειρημάτων.
It is necessary when the answerer has denied something useful to the thesis, and the questioner directs his arguments toward this, provided this happens to be one of those things on which it is easy to find arguments.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐπαγωγὴν πρός τι διὰ τοῦ κειμένου ποιησάμενος ἀναιρεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ· τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος καὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἀναιρεῖται.
Similarly also when one has made an induction to something by means of the thesis and tries to refute it; for if this is refuted, the subject before us is also refuted.
Φαινόμενον δ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν φαίνηται μὲν χρήσιμον καὶ οἰκεῖον τῆς θέσεως, μὴ ᾖ δέ, πρὸς ὃ γίγνονται οἱ λόγοι, εἴτε ἀρνησαμένου τοῦ τὸν λόγον ὑπέχοντος, εἴτε ἐπαγωγῆς ἐνδόξου διὰ τῆς θέσεως πρὸς αὐτὸ γινομένης ἀναιρεῖν ἐπιχειροίη αὐτό.
It is apparently necessary when that towards which the arguments are directed appears to be useful and relevant to the thesis, but is not so—whether this happens because the defender of the argument has denied something, or because one tries to refute it by means of an acceptable induction directed toward it through the thesis.
Τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ὅταν μήτ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ μήτε φαινόμενον πρὸς ὃ γίνονται οἱ λόγοι, ἄλλως δὲ παρεξελέγχεσθαι συμβαίνῃ τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ.
The remaining case is when that towards which the arguments are directed is neither necessary nor apparently so, but it happens that the answerer is refuted in some other irrelevant way.
Δεῖ δ᾿ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον τῶν ῥηθέντων τρόπων· παντελῶς γὰρ ἀπηρτημένος καὶ ἀλλότριος ἔοικεν εἶναι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς.
One should guard against the last of the mentioned methods; for it seems to be completely disconnected from and foreign to dialectic.
Διὸ δεῖ καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον μὴ δυσκολαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τιθέναι τὰ μὴ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν θέσιν, ἐπισημαινόμενον ὅσα μὴ δοκεῖ, τίθησι δέ.
Therefore, the answerer also should not be bad-tempered, but should grant what is not useful to the thesis, marking whatever he does not believe though he grants it.
Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀπορεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πάντων τιθεμένων αὐτοῖς τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν μὴ περαίνωσιν.
For it generally happens that the questioners are more at a loss if all such things are granted to them, provided they do not reach a conclusion.
Ἔτι πᾶς ὁ εἰρηκὼς ὁτιοῦν τρόπον τινὰ πολλὰ εἴρηκεν, ἐπειδὴ πλείω ἑκάστῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκόλουθά ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ εἰρηκὼς ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ ὅτι ζῷόν ἐστιν εἴρηκε καὶ ὅτι ἔμψυχον καὶ ὅτι δίπουν καὶ ὅτι νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, ὥστε ὁποιουοῦν ἑνὸς τῶν ἀκολούθων ἀναιρεθέντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ.
Furthermore, anyone who has said anything has, in a way, said many things, since several consequences necessarily follow upon each thing; for example, he who has said that it is a man has also said that it is an animal, and that it is animate, and two-footed, and capable of receiving intellect and knowledge, so that if any single one of the consequences is refuted, the original statement is also refuted.
Εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ τὸ χαλεπωτέρου τὴν μετάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι· ἐνίοτε μὲν γὰρ ῥᾷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἀνελεῖν, ἐνίοτε δ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ προκείμενον.
But one must guard against making the transition to what is more difficult; for sometimes it is easier to refute the consequence, and sometimes the subject itself.
§2.6Ὅσοις δ᾿ ἀνάγκη θάτερον μόνον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν νόσον ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν, ἐὰν πρὸς θάτερον εὐπορῶμεν διαλέγεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν εὐπορήσομεν.
In the case of things where only one of two must necessarily belong (for example, sickness or health to a man), if we are well supplied with arguments to discuss one of them, showing that it belongs or does not belong, we shall also be well supplied for the remaining one.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἄμφω· δείξαντες μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὑπάρχει θάτερον, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λοιπὸν δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα· ἐὰν δ᾿ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει δείξωμεν, τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι ὑπάρχει δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα.
And this is convertible for both cases: for if we have shown that one of them belongs, we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong; but if we show that it does not belong, we shall have shown that the remaining one belongs.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι πρὸς ἄμφω χρήσιμος ὁ τόπος.
Clearly, then, the topic is useful for both.
Ἔτι τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν μεταφέροντα τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, ὡς μάλιστα προσῆκον ἐκλαμβάνειν ἢ ὡς κεῖται τοὔνομα, οἷον εὔψυχον μὴ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καθάπερ νῦν κεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸν εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα, καθάπερ καὶ εὔελπιν τὸν ἀγαθὰ ἐλπίζοντα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εὐδαίμονα, οὗ ἂν ὁ δαίμων ᾖ σπουδαῖος, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα.
Furthermore, one should argue by transferring the name to its definition, taking it in the sense that is most appropriate rather than how the name is established by custom; for example, interpreting "stout-hearted" not as "brave," which is how it is currently used, but as "having one's soul in a good state," just as also "hopeful" means "one who hopes for good things"; and similarly "happy" as "one whose daimon is good," just as Xenocrates says that happy is he who has a noble soul, for this is each person's daimon.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τὰ δ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ᾿ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τεθῇ ἢ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀεὶ δίδωσι τόπον ἐπιχειρήματος.
Since of things some are necessary, others are for the most part, and others are as it happens, if what is necessary is posited as for the most part, or what is for the most part as necessary, either itself or its contrary to what is for the most part, it always provides a topic for argument.
Ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ παντί φησιν ὑπάρχειν, ὑπάρχοντος παντί, ὥστε ἡμάρτηκεν· εἴ τε τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔφησε· παντὶ γάρ φησιν ὑπάρχειν, οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος παντί.
For if what is necessary is posited as for the most part, it is clear that he says it does not belong to all, whereas it does belong to all, so that he has made a mistake; and also if he said that what is spoken of as for the most part is necessary, for he says it belongs to all, whereas it does not belong to all.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴρηκεν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾿ ἔλαττον λέγεται τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φαῦλοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀγαθοὶ ἐπ᾿ ἔλαττον, ὥστ᾿ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμάρτηκεν, εἰ ἀγαθοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴρηκεν.
Similarly also if he has said that the contrary to what is for the most part is necessary; for the contrary to what is for the most part is always spoken of as holding in fewer cases; for example, if humans are for the most part bad, they are good in fewer cases, so that he has made an even greater mistake if he has said that they are good of necessity.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔφησεν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν οὔθ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
In the same way also if he said that what is as it happens is necessary or for the most part; for what is as it happens is neither of necessity nor for the most part.
Ἐνδέχεται δέ, κἂν μὴ διορίσας εἴπῃ πότερον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴρηκεν, ᾖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰρηκότος αὐτοῦ, οἷον εἰ φαύλους τοὺς ἀποκλήρους ἔφησεν εἶναι μὴ διορίσας, ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰρηκότος αὐτοῦ διαλέγεσθαι.
It is also possible, even if he says something without defining whether he means it as for the most part or of necessity, and the thing is for the most part, to argue as if he had spoken of it as necessary; for example, if he said without defining that disinherited persons are bad, one can argue as if he had said it of necessity.
Ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὀνόματά ἐστιν.
Furthermore, also if he has posited something as an accident of itself, as though it were different because the name is different, just as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy, delight, and gladness; for all these are names of the same thing, namely pleasure.
Εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὐφραίνεσθαι φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἂν αὑτῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι.
If, then, anyone says that to feel joy is an accident of feeling gladness, he would be saying that a thing is an accident of itself.