§5#1Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοί εἰσιν, ὅταν ὁμοίως ὁτιοῦν ἀξιωθῇ τῷ πράγματι καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρχειν.
Fallacies depending on accident occur when it is claimed that any attribute belongs similarly to the thing itself and to its accident.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πολλὰ συμβέβηκεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις, καὶ καθ᾿ οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ταῦτα πάντα ὑπάρχειν.
For since many things are accidental to the same thing, it is not necessary that all these belong to all the predicates and to that of which they are predicated.
Οἷον εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἕτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος.
For example, if Coriscus is different from 'man', he is different from himself; for he is a man.
Ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου φασὶν ὡμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι, οὗ ἔφησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον.
Or if he is different from Socrates, and Socrates is a man, they say that he has agreed that he is different from 'man', because it is accidental that this person, whom he said he was different from, is a man.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς τόδε ἢ πῇ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῇ, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστι δοξαστόν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναί τέ τι καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς.
Those depending on saying something absolutely or in a certain respect, and not strictly, occur when what is said in part is taken as spoken absolutely. For example, if 'non-being' is an object of opinion, to conclude that 'non-being' is; for to be something and to be absolutely are not the same.
Ἢ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄν, εἰ τῶν ὄντων τι μή ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος.
Or again, that 'being' is not being, if some one of being things is not, for example, if it is not a man.
Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ μὴ εἶναί τι καὶ ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι; φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὸ πάρεγγυς τῆς λέξεως, καὶ μικρὸν διαφέρειν τὸ εἶναί τι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.
For to not be something and to not be absolutely are not the same; but it appears to be so because of the closeness of the expression, and because to be something seems to differ little from to be, and to not be something from to not be.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς.
Likewise also with those depending on 'in a certain respect' and 'absolutely'.
Οἷον εἰ ὁ Ἰνδὸς ὅλος μέλας ὢν λευκός ἐστι τοὺς ὀδόντας· λευκὸς ἄρα καὶ οὐ λευκός ἐστιν.
For example, if an Indian, being completely black, has white teeth, then he is white and not white.
Ἢ εἰ ἄμφω πῇ, ὅτι ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει.
Or if both belong in a certain respect, that the contraries belong at the same time.
Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων μὲν παντὶ θεωρῆσαι ῥᾴδιον, οἷον εἰ λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα τοὺς ὀδόντας ἔροιτ᾿ εἰ λευκός· εἰ οὖν ταύτῃ λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οἴοιτο διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τὴν ἐρώτησιν.
In some cases, indeed, this sort of thing is easy for anyone to see, as for example, if, having taken the Ethiopian to be black with respect to his teeth, one should ask if he is white; if, then, he is white in this respect, the questioner might think, having finished the question, that he has argued syllogistically that he is black and not white.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δὲ λανθάνει πολλάκις, ἐφ᾿ ὅσων, ὅταν πῇ λέγηται, κἂν τὸ ἁπλῶς δόξειεν ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ὅσοις μὴ ῥᾴδιον θεωρῆσαι πότερον αὐτῶν κυρίως ἀποδοτέον.
But in some cases it often escapes notice, in all those where, when it is said in a certain respect, the absolute also would seem to follow, and in those where it is not easy to see which of them should strictly be attributed.
Γίνεται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν οἷς ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τὰ ἀντικείμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ ἄμφω ἢ μηδέτερον δοτέον ἁπλῶς εἶναι κατηγορεῖν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ λευκὸν τὸ δ᾿ ἥμισυ μέλαν, πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν;
This sort of thing occurs in cases where the opposites belong in a similar way; for it seems that either both or neither must be granted to be predicated absolutely, for example, if one half is white and the other half black, is it white or black?
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ διωρίσθαι τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἢ τί ἔλεγχος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν γίνονται τοῦ λόγου·
Those depending on not having defined what a syllogism is or what a refutation is, occur because of the lack of the definition (logos).
ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
For a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same thing, not of a name but of a reality, and of a name that is not synonymous but the same, from the given premises, by necessity, not including the point in the beginning, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, in the same way, and at the same time.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ψεύσασθαι περί τινος.
In the same way also is to lie about something.
Ἔνιοι δὲ ἀπολιπόντες τι τῶν λεχθέντων φαίνονται ἐλέγχειν, οἷον ὅτι ταὐτὸ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον· τὰ γὰρ δύο τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς διπλάσια, τῶν δὲ τριῶν οὐ διπλάσια.
But some, omitting one of these mentioned points, seem to refute, as, for example, that the same thing is double and not double; for two is double of one, but not double of three.
Ἣ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μῆκος διπλάσιον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος οὐ διπλάσιον.
Or if the same thing is double and not double of the same thing, but not in the same respect; for it is double in length, but not double in width.
Ἣ εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἅμα· διόπερ ἐστὶ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.
Or if it is of the same thing, in the same respect, and in the same way, but not at the same time; wherefore it is a apparent refutation.
Ἕλκοι δ᾿ ἄν τις τοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν.
One might also draw this fallacy into those depending on language.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν γίνονται μὲν οὕτως καὶ τοσαυταχῶς ὁσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι, φαίνονται δ᾿ ἐλέγχειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον.
Those depending on assuming the original point occur in this way and in as many ways as it is possible to beg the original question, but they seem to refute because of the inability to see together the same and the different.