§4#1Τρόποι δ᾿ εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.
There are two modes of refutation: for some depend on the language used, while others are independent of the language.
Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως.
Those which produce the illusion depending on language are six in number: these are homonymy, ambiguity, composition, division, accent, and figure of speech.
Τούτου δὲ πίστις ἥ τε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμός, ἄν τε ληφθῇ τις ἄλλος, καὶ ὅτι τοσαυταχῶς ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις μὴ ταὐτὸ δηλώσαιμεν.
Of this, the proof is both induction and syllogism—whether any other proof be assumed—and the fact that we can signify not the same thing by the same names and expressions in just so many ways.
Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι· τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί.
Arguments depending on homonymy are of the following kind, for example: 'those who know learn'; for it is the literate who learn what is dictated.
Τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.
For 'to learn' is homonymous, signifying both 'to understand' by using knowledge and 'to acquire' knowledge.
Καὶ πάλιν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθά· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακὰ δέοντα. Διττὸν γὰρ τὸ δέον, τό τ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον, ὃ συμβαίνει πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν (ἔστι γὰρ κακόν τι ἀναγκαῖον), καὶ τἀγαθὰ δὲ δέοντά φαμεν εἶναι.
And again, that 'evil things are good; for what is necessary is good, and evil things are necessary.' For 'what is necessary' (deon) has a double meaning: both that which is compulsory (which happens often even in the case of evils, for some evil is compulsory), and we also say that good things are necessary.
Ἔτι τὸν αὐτὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι, καὶ κάμνειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν. Ὅσπερ γὰρ ἀνίστατο, ἕστηκεν, καὶ ὅσπερ ὑγιάζετο, ὑγιαίνει· ἀνίστατο δ᾿ ὁ καθήμενος καὶ ὑγιάζετο ὁ κάμνων.
Furthermore, that 'the same person is sitting and standing, and is sick and well.' For he who was rising is standing, and he who was recovering is well; but it was the sitting man who was rising, and the sick man who was recovering.
Τὸ γὰρ τὸν κάμνοντα ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν οὐχ ἓν σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾿ ὁτὲ μὲν ὅτι ὁ νῦν κάμνων ἢ καθήμενος, ὁτὲ δ᾿ ὃς ἔκαμνε πρότερον. Πλὴν ὑγιάζετο μὲν καὶ κάμνων καὶ ὁ κάμνων· ὑγιαίνει δ᾿ οὐ κάμνων, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ κάμνων, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ πρότερον.
For 'the sick man does or suffers something' does not signify one thing, but sometimes it means 'the man who is now sick or sitting,' and sometimes 'he who was sick before.' Except that he was recovering while being sick and he who was sick was recovering; but he is well not while being sick, but he who was sick is well, not now, but he who was sick before.
Παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν οἱ τοιοίδε, τὸ βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους. Καὶ ἆρ᾿ ὅ τις γινώσκει, τοῦτο γινώσκει; καὶ γὰρ τὸν γινώσκοντα καὶ τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἐνδέχεται ὡς γινώσκοντα σημῆναι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.
Those depending on ambiguity are of the following kind: 'the wishing me to capture the enemy.' And 'Is that which someone knows, what knows?' For it is possible by this expression to signify both the knower and the known as 'knowing'.
Καὶ ἆρα ὃ ὁρᾷ τις, τοῦτο ὁρᾷ;
And 'Does that which someone sees, see?
ὁρᾷ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὁρᾷ ὁ κίων. Καὶ ἆρα ὃ σὺ φῂς εἶναι, τοῦτο σὺ φῂς εἶναι; φῂς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἄρα φῂς λίθος εἶναι.
He sees the pillar; therefore the pillar sees.' And 'Are you what you say you are?
Καὶ ἆρ᾿ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα.
You say a stone is; therefore you say you are a stone.' And 'Is it possible to speak while being silent?' For 'to speak while being silent' has a double meaning: both that the speaker is silent and that the things spoken of are silent.
Εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἷς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα κυρίως σημαίνῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἷς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν· τρίτος δὲ ὅταν τὸ συντεθὲν πλείω σημαίνῃ, κεχωρισμένον δὲ ἁπλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἐπίσταται γράμματα.
There are three modes of those depending on homonymy and ambiguity: first, when either the expression or the name properly signifies more than one thing, as 'eagle' and 'dog'; second, when we are accustomed so to speak; third, when the combined expression signifies more than one thing, whereas when separated it signifies simply one thing, as 'knowing letters'.
Ἑκάτερον μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἕν τι σημαίνει, τὸ ἐπίσταται καὶ τὰ γράμματα· ἄμφω δὲ πλείω, ἢ τὸ τὰ γράμματα αὐτὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἢ τῶν γραμμάτων ἄλλον.
For each of these, 'knows' and 'letters', happens to signify one thing; but both together signify more than one, either that the letters themselves have knowledge, or that someone else has knowledge of the letters.