§25Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ κυρίως τόδε ἢ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ πῶς ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, λυτέον σκοποῦντι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τούτων τι πεπονθέναι.
Those arguments which depend on being said properly to be of a certain thing, or in a certain respect, or somewhere, or in some way, or in relation to something, and not absolutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion in relation to its contradiction, to see whether it is possible for it to have been affected by any of these.
Τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα καὶ φάσιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ, πῇ μέντοι ἑκάτερον ἢ πρός τι ἢ πῶς, ἢ τὸ μὲν πῇ τὸ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν κωλύει.
For as to contraries, opposites, affirmation, and negation, it is impossible for them to belong absolutely to the same thing, but nothing prevents each from belonging in a certain respect, or in relation to something, or in some way, or one in a certain respect and the other absolutely.
Ὥστ᾿ εἰ τόδε μὲν ἁπλῶς τόδε δὲ πῇ, οὔπω ἔλεγχος.
So that if one is absolutely and the other in a certain respect, it is not yet a refutation.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι θεωρητέον πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν.
And this must be examined in the conclusion in relation to its contradiction.
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τοῦτ᾿ ἔχοντες.
And all the following arguments possess this feature.
Ἆρ᾿ ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι;
Is it possible for what is not to be?
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι γέ τι μὴ ὄν.
But indeed, what is not is something.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τι τῶν ὄντων.
Similarly also, what is will not be; for it will not be some particular one of the things that are.
Ἆρ᾿ ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα εὐορκεῖν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν;
Is it possible for the same person at the same time to swear truly and to swear falsely?
Ἆρ᾿ ἐγχωρεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀπειθεῖν;
Is it possible for the same person at the same time to obey and disobey the same person?
Ἢ οὔτε τὸ εἶναί τι καὶ εἶναι ταὐτόν;
Or is it that being something and being are not the same?
Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ εἰ ἔστι τι, καὶ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς· οὔτ᾿ εἰ εὐορκεῖ τόδε ἢ τῇδε, ἀνάγκη καὶ εὐορκεῖν, ὁ δ᾿ ὀμόσας ἐπιορκήσειν εὐορκεῖ ἐπιορκῶν τοῦτο μόνον, εὐορκεῖ δὲ οὔ· οὐδ᾿ ὁ ἀπειθῶν πείθεται, ἀλλά τι πείθεται.
For as to what is not, it does not follow that if it is something, it also is absolutely; nor if one swears truly regarding this thing or in this way, is it necessary that he also swears truly absolutely; and the one who swore to swear falsely, when he swears falsely, swears truly in respect to this alone, but he does not swear truly absolutely; nor does the disobedient person obey, but he obeys in some respect.
Ὅμοιος δ᾿ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθεύειν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι εὐθεώρητον, ποτέρως ἄν τις ἀποδοίη τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, δύσκολον φαίνεται.
The argument is similar also concerning the same person lying and telling the truth at the same time; but because it is not easy to see which way one should assign telling the truth absolutely or lying, it appears difficult.
Κωλύει δ᾿ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς μὲν εἶναι ψευδῆ, πῇ δ᾿ ἀληθῆ ἢ τινός, καὶ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τινά, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή.
But nothing prevents him from being a liar absolutely, but in a certain respect or regarding something telling the truth, or being true in some respect, but not true absolutely.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε· πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνουσιν.
Similarly also in the cases of relation, where, and when; for all such arguments happen because of this.
Ἆρ᾿ ἡ ὑγίεια ἢ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν;
Are health or wealth a good thing?
Ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄφρονι καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθὸν ἄρα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν.
But to the foolish and to the one who does not use them rightly, they are not a good thing; therefore they are a good thing and not a good thing.
Ἆρα τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ δύνασθαι ἐν πόλει ἀγαθόν;
Is being healthy or being powerful in a city a good thing?
Ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐ βέλτιον· ταὐτὸν ἄρα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν.
But sometimes it is not better; therefore the same thing is a good thing and not a good thing for the same person.
Ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἁπλῶς ὂν ἀγαθὸν τῷδε μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τῷδε μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ νῦν ἢ οὐκ ἐνταῦθ᾿ ἀγαθόν.
Or nothing prevents what is absolutely a good thing from not being a good thing for this person, or being a good thing for this person, but not now or not here.
Ἆρ᾿ ὃ μὴ βούλοιτ᾿ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος, κακόν;
Is that which the prudent person would not wish, an evil?
Ἀποβαλεῖν δ᾿ οὐ βούλεται τἀγαθόν· κακὸν ἄρα τἀγαθόν.
But he does not wish to lose the good; therefore the good is an evil.
Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν τἀγαθὸν εἶναι κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν τἀγαθόν.
For it is not the same to say that the good is an evil and that losing the good is an evil.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου λόγος.
And the argument of the thief is similar.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰ κακόν ἐστιν ὁ κλέπτης, καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν ἐστὶ κακόν· οὔκουν τὸ κακὸν βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν.
For it does not follow that if the thief is bad, obtaining is also bad; therefore he does not wish for the bad, but for the good; for obtaining the good is a good thing.
Καὶ ἡ νόσος κακόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν νόσον.
And disease is a bad thing, but not losing disease.
Ἆρα τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου καὶ τὸ δικαίως τοῦ ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον;
Is what is just more desirable than what is unjust, and being treated justly than being treated unjustly?
Ἀλλ᾿ ἀποθανεῖν ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον.
But dying unjustly is more desirable than dying justly.
Ἆρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔχειν ἕκαστον;
Is it just for each person to have his own?
Ἃ δ᾿ ἄν τις κρίνῃ κατὰ δόξαν τὴν αὑτοῦ, κἂν ᾖ ψευδῆ, κύριά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.
But whatever a judge decides according to his own opinion, even if it is false, is authoritative by law; therefore the same thing is both just and unjust.
Καὶ πότερα δεῖ κρίνειν τὸν τὰ δίκαια λέγοντα ἢ τὸν τὰ ἄδικα;
And should one judge in favor of the one who says what is just, or the one who says what is unjust?
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν ἀδικούμενον δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἱκανῶς λέγειν ἃ ἔπαθεν· ταῦτα δ᾿ ἦν ἄδικα.
But indeed, it is just for the person who has been treated unjustly to state adequately what he suffered; and these things were unjust.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰ παθεῖν τι ἀδίκως αἱρετόν, τὸ ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον τοῦ δικαίως· ἀλλ᾿ ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ δικαίως, τοδὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως.
For it does not follow that if suffering something unjustly is desirable, unjustly is more desirable than justly; rather, justly is so absolutely, though nothing prevents this particular thing from being suffered unjustly rather than justly.
Καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτοῦ δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ τἀλλότρια οὐ δίκαιον· κρίσιν μέντοι ταύτην δικαίαν εἶναι οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ἂν ᾖ κατὰ δόξαν τοῦ κρίναντος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιον τοδὶ ἢ ὡδί, καὶ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον.
And having one's own is just, while having another's is not just; yet nothing prevents this judgment from being just, for instance, if it is according to the opinion of the judge; for if it is just in this particular case or in this way, it does not follow that it is also just absolutely.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄδικα ὄντα οὐδὲν κωλύει λέγειν γε αὐτὰ δίκαιον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ εἰ λέγειν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη δίκαια εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ εἰ ὠφέλιμον λέγειν, ὠφέλιμα.
Similarly also, even if things are unjust, nothing prevents stating them from being just; for if stating them is just, it does not follow that they must be just things, just as if stating them is useful, it does not follow that they are useful things.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων.
And the same applies to just things.
Ὤστ᾿ οὐκ εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα ἄδικα, ὁ λέγων ἄδικα νικᾷ· λέγει γὰρ ἃ λέγειν ἐστὶ δίκαια, ἁπλῶς δὲ καὶ παθεῖν ἄδικα.
So that if the things stated are unjust, it does not follow that the speaker wins by saying what is unjust; for he says what it is just to say, but absolutely, they are also unjust things to suffer.