§24Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς μία μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις πρὸς ἅπαντας.
Against those arguments which depend on accident, there is one and the same solution for all.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδιόριστόν ἐστι τὸ πότε λεκτέον ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων μὲν δοκεῖ καὶ φασίν, ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δ᾿ οὔ φασιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ῥητέον οὖν συμβιβασθέντας ὁμοίως πρὸς ἅπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.
For since it is undetermined when one should speak of the thing when it belongs to the accident, and in some cases it seems so and people say so, while in other cases they say it is not necessary, it must therefore be said, with everyone in agreement, that it is not necessary.
Ἔχειν δὲ δεῖ προφέρειν τὸ οἷον.
But one must be able to produce the example of what sort it is.
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός.
And all the following arguments are dependent on accident.
Ἆρ᾿ οἶδας ὃ μέλλω σε ἐρωτᾶν; Ἆρ᾿ οἶδας τὸν προσιόντα ἢ τὸν ἐγκεκαλυμμένον; Ἆρ᾿ ὁ ἀνδριὰς σόν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; Ἆρα τὰ ὀλιγάκις ὀλίγα ὀλίγα; Φανερὸν γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κατὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθεύεσθαι·
"Do you know what I am going to ask you?" "Do you know the person who is approaching, or the one who is covered?" "Is the statue your work, or is the dog your father?" "Are few times few, few?" For it is clear in all these cases that there is no necessity for what is true of the accident to be true of the thing as well.
μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἓν οὖσιν ἅπαντα δοκεῖ ταὐτὰ ὑπάρχειν·
For only to those things which are indistinguishable and one in substance do all the same attributes seem to belong.
τῷ δ᾿ ἀγαθῷ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ τ᾿ εἶναι καὶ μέλλοντι ἐρωτᾶσθαι, οὐδὲ τῷ προσιόντι ἢ ἐγκεκαλυμμένῳ προσιόντι τε εἶναι καὶ Κορίσκῳ·
But for a good thing, being good is not the same as being about to be asked, nor for the approaching or covered person is being approaching the same as being Coriscus.
ὥστ᾿ οὐκ εἰ οἶδα τὸν Κορίσκον, ἀγνοῶ δὲ τὸν προσιόντα, τὸν αὐτὸν οἶδα καὶ ἀγνοῶ·
Therefore, it is not the case that if I know Coriscus, but do not know the person who is approaching, I both know and do not know the same person.
οὐδ᾿ εἰ τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἐμόν, ἔστι δ᾿ ἔργον, ἐμόν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ κτῆμα ἢ πρᾶγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι.
Nor if this is mine, and is a work, is it my work, but either a possession, or a thing, or something else.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And the same manner applies also to the other cases.
Λύουσι δέ τινες ἀναιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν· φασὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ πρᾶγμα εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ ταὐτό·
But some solve them by demolishing the question; for they say it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, but not in the same respect.
τὸν οὖν προσιόντα οὐκ εἰδότες, τὸν δὲ Κορίσκον εἰδότες, ταὐτὸ μὲν εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν φασίν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό.
Thus, not knowing the person who is approaching, but knowing Coriscus, they say they know and do not know the same person, but not in the same respect.
Καίτοι πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἤδη εἴπομεν, δεῖ τῶν παρὰ ταὐτὸ λόγων τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι διόρθωσιν·
And yet, in the first place, as we have already said, there must be the same correction for arguments dependent on the same cause.
αὕτη δ᾿ οὐκ ἔσται, ἄν τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἢ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξίωμα λαμβάνῃ, οἷον εἰ ὅδε ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἔστι δὲ σός·
But this will not be the case if one assumes the same principle not regarding "knowing" but regarding "being" or "being in some state", as, for instance, if "this is a father, and is yours".
εἰ γὰρ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τὸ λεχθέν.
For if in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet here what is said has nothing in common.
Οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πλείους μοχθηρίας ἔχειν.
And nothing prevents the same argument from having multiple defects.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἡ πάσης ἁμαρτίας ἐμφάνισις λύσις ἐστίν· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ψεῦδος συλλελόγισται δεῖξαί τινα, παρ᾿ ὃ δὲ μὴ δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινηθῆναι.
But the demonstration of every error is not a solution; for it is possible for someone to show that a falsehood has been deduced, but not on account of what it is so, as, for instance, Zeno's argument that motion is impossible.
Ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιχειροίη συνάγειν ὡς ἀδύνατον, ἁμαρτάνει, κἂν εἰ μυριάκις ᾖ συλλελογισμένος·
So that even if anyone should attempt to deduce that it is impossible, he is mistaken, even if he has deduced it ten thousand times; for this is not a solution.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὕτη λύσις.
For the solution was the demonstration of a false deduction, on account of what it is false.
Ἦν γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ᾿ ὃ ψευδής· εἰ οὖν μὴ συλλελόγισται ἢ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπιχειρεῖ συνάγειν, ἡ ἐκείνου δήλωσις λύσις ἐστίν.
If, therefore, he has not deduced, or attempts to deduce either a truth or a falsehood, the showing of that is the solution.
Ἴσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων οὐδὲν κωλύει συμβαίνειν· πλὴν ἐπί γε τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦτο δόξειεν ἄν·
Perhaps in some cases nothing prevents this from happening; but at least in these cases, not even this would seem to hold.
καὶ γὰρ τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος οἶδε, καὶ τὸ προσιὸν ὅτι προσιόν.
For he knows Coriscus to be Coriscus, and the approaching to be approaching.
Ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μή, οἷον ὅτι μὲν λευκὸν εἰδέναι, ὅτι δὲ μουσικὸν μὴ γνωρίζειν· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶδε καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν.
And it seems possible to know and not know the same thing, as, for instance, to know that it is white, but not to recognize that it is musical; for in this way one knows and does not know the same thing, but not in the same respect.
Τὸ δὲ προσιὸν καὶ Κορίσκον, καὶ ὅτι προσιὸν καὶ ὅτι Κορίσκος, οἶδεν
Ὁμοίως δ᾿ ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες, ὅτι ἅπας ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος, ὥσπερ οὓς εἴπομεν·
But as for the approaching and Coriscus, he knows both that it is approaching and that it is Coriscus.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ συμπεραινομένου, τοῦτο παραλιπόντες, ἀληθὲς συμπεπεράνθαι φασί, πάντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον, ἁμαρτάνουσιν.
Similarly also those mistake who solve the argument that "every number is few", like those we mentioned; for if, when it is not concluded, they overlook this and say that a true conclusion has been reached, on the ground that everything is both much and few, they are mistaken.
Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισμούς, οἷον ὅτι σός ἐστι πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς ἢ δοῦλος. Καίτοι φανερὸν ὡς εἰ παρὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι φαίνεται ὁ ἔλεγχος, δεῖ τοὔνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον κυρίως εἶναι πλειόνων·
And some also solve the deductions by means of double meaning, as, for instance, that "this is your father, or son, or slave." Yet it is clear that if the refutation appears to depend on the homonymous use of words, the name or expression must properly belong to several things.
τὸ δὲ τόνδ᾿ εἶναι τοῦδε τέκνον οὐδεὶς λέγει κυρίως, εἰ δεσπότης ἐστὶ τέκνου· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ σύνθεσίς ἐστιν.
But no one speaks of "this being the child of that person" in the proper sense if he is the master of the child; rather, the combination is due to accident.
Ἆρ᾿ ἐστὶ τοῦτο σόν; Ναί. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τέκνον· σὸν ἄρα τοῦτο τέκνον· ὅτι συμβέβηκεν εἶναι καὶ σὸν καὶ τέκνον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ σὸν τέκνον.
"Is this yours?" "Yes." "And this is a child." "Therefore this is your child." Because it happens to be both yours and a child, but not your child.
Καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῶν κακῶν τι ἀγαθόν· ἡ γὰρ φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη τῶν κακῶν.
And the argument that "some of the bad things is good"; for wisdom is knowledge of bad things.
Τὸ δὲ τοῦτο τούτων εἶναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ κτῆμα.
But "this being of these" is not said in many ways, but as a possession.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα πολλαχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῴων φαμὲν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὔ τι κτῆμα) καὶ ἐάν τι πρὸς τὰ κακὰ λέγηται ὡς τινός, διὰ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν.
But if it is indeed said in many ways (for we say that man is of the animals, but not as a possession), and if something is said in relation to bad things as "of something", it is on this account "of the bad things", but this is not "one of the bad things".
Παρὰ τὸ πῇ οὖν καὶ ἁπλῶς φαίνεται.
It appears, therefore, to depend on "in a certain respect" and "absolutely".
Καίτοι ἐνδέχεται ἴσως ἀγαθὸν εἶναί τι τῶν κακῶν διττῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι δοῦλον εἴη ἀγαθὸν μοχθηροῦ, μᾶλλον.
And yet, it is perhaps possible for some of the bad things to be good in two ways, but not in this argument, but rather if some good slave were the slave of a wicked man.
Ἴσως δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τούτου, ἀγαθὸν τούτου ἅμα.
But perhaps not even so; for it is not the case that if he is good and of this man, he is at the same time good for this man.
Οὐδὲ τὸ τὸν ἄνθρωπον φάναι τῶν ζῴων εἶναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς· οὐ γὰρ εἴ ποτέ τι σημαίνομεν ἀφελόντες, τοῦτο λέγεται πολλαχῶς·
Nor is saying that "man is of the animals" said in many ways; for if we sometimes signify something by cutting it short, this is not said in many ways.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἥμισυ εἰπόντες τοῦ ἔπους δός μοι Ἰλιάδα σημαίνομεν, οἷον τὸ
"Μῆνιν ἄειδε θέα. "
For we also signify "give me the Iliad" by saying half of the verse, for instance: "Sing, goddess, the wrath."