§1.1.1Ἡ ΖΩΗ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς εὑρέθη.
Life is found in animals and in plants.
Ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζῴοις φανερὰ καὶ πρόδηλος, ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς δὲ κεκρυμμένη καὶ οὐκ ἐμφανής.
But in animals it is clear and manifest, whereas in plants it is hidden and not apparent.
Εἰς τὴν ταύτης γοῦν βεβαίωσιν πολλὴν ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ ζήτησιν προηγήσασθαι.
For the confirmation of this, therefore, there is a great necessity for much inquiry to precede.
Συνίσταται γὰρ πότερον ἔχουσιν ἢ οὐχὶ τὰ φυτὰ ψυχὴν καὶ δύναμιν ἐπιθυμίας ὀδύνης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ διακρίσεως.
For the question consists in whether plants possess a soul and the capacity of desire, pain, pleasure, and discrimination.
§1.1.2Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐπιθυμίᾳ ταῦτα κινεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι διαβεβαιοῦνται.
Therefore, Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that these are moved by desire, and they assert that they perceive, feel pain, and rejoice.
Ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ζῷα εἶναι καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι εἶπε, τῇ τε ἀπορροῇ τῶν φύλλων καὶ τῇ αὐξήσει τοῦτο ἐκλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γένος ἐν τούτοις κεκραμένον εἶναι ἐδόξασεν.
Of these, Anaxagoras said that they are even animals and experience pleasure and pain, inferring this from the falling of leaves and from growth, while Empedocles believed that there is a blended gender in them.
§1.1.3Ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν.
Likewise, Plato also said that they only desire because of the intense necessity of the nutritive power.
Ὅ ἐὰν συσταίη, ἥδεσθαι ὄντως αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαί τε σύμφωνον ἔσται.
If this should be established, it will be consistent that they indeed rejoice, feel pain, and perceive.
Ἃν δὲ συσταίη τοῦτο, τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἀεὶ τῷ ὕπνῳ ἀνακτῶνται καὶ ἐγείρονται ταῖς ἐγρηγόρσεσι, σύμφωνον ἔσται.
And if this should be established in their desiring, it will be consistent, even if they always recover through sleep and are aroused by awakenings.
§1.1.4Ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐὰν ζητήσωμεν εἰ πνοὴν καὶ γένος ἐκ συγκράσεως ἔχουσιν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, πολλὴν ἄν τὴν περὶ τούτου ἀμφιβολίαν καὶ μακρὰν ποιήσωμεν τὴν ζήτησιν.
Likewise, if we should inquire whether they have breath and a class arising from mixture or the opposite, we would produce much doubt about this and make the inquiry long.
Τὸ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα παραλιμπάνειν καὶ μὴ εὐαναλώτοις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐρεύναις ἐνδιατρίβειν πρέπον ἐστίν.
But it is fitting to omit such things and not to spend time on inquiries that are not easily resolved concerning individual matters.
§1.1.5Τίνες δὲ ἔχειν ψυχὰς τὰ φυτὰ εἶπον, ὅτι γεννᾶσθαι τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι, νεάζειν καὶ χλοάζειν γήρᾳ τε διαλύεσθαι τεθεωρήκασιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲν ἄψυχον ταῦτα μετὰ τῶν φυτῶν ἔχει κοινά.
And some have said that plants possess souls, because they have observed that they are born, nourished, grow, rejuvenate, become green, and dissolve in old age, since nothing inanimate shares these things with plants.
Διότι δὲ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὰ φυτά, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὡσαύτως κατέχεσθαι ἐπίστευον.
And because plants have these things, they believed that they are likewise possessed by desire.
Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον τοῖς φανεροῖς, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς κεκρυμμένοις ἀκολουθήσωμεν.
But let us follow first the manifest things, and then also the hidden ones.
§1.1.6Λέγομεν τοίνυν ὡς ἐὰν εἴ τι τρέφεται, ἢδη καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἡδύνεται μὲν τῷ κόρῳ, λυπεῖται δὲ ὅτε πεινᾷ· καὶ οὐκ ἐμπίπτουσιν αὗται αἱ διαθέσεις εἰ μὴ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως.
We say, then, that if anything is nourished, it already also desires, and is pleased with satiety, and is pained when it is hungry; and these states do not occur except with sensation.
Τούτου ἄρα θαυμάσιος μέν, οὐ μὴν φαῦλος πλανᾶται σκοπός, ὃς καὶ τὰ φυτὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐδόξασεν.
Therefore, the aim of the one who believed that plants also perceive and desire is wonderful indeed, yet not worthless (erroneous).
§1.1.7Ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ νοῦν καὶ γνῶσιν εἶπον ἔχειν τὰ φυτά.
But Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Empedocles said that plants also possess intellect and knowledge.
Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς φαῦλα ἀποτρεπόμενοι τῷ ὑγιεῖ ἐνστῶμεν λόγῳ.
We, turning away from such views as worthless, let us stand by healthy reason.
Λέγομεν οὖν ὅτι τὰ φυτὰ οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν οὔτε αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν.
We say, then, that plants have neither desire nor sensation.
Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ μὴ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου δὲ θελήματος τέλος πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποστρέφεται.
For desire does not exist except from sensation, and the end of our will is directed toward sensation.
§1.1.8Οὐχ εὑρίσκομεν γοῦν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αἴσθησιν οὔτε μέλος αἰσθανόμενον, οὔτε ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ, οὔτε εἶδος διωρισμένον, οὔτε τι ἀκόλουθον τούτῳ, οὔτε τοπικὴν κίνησιν, οὔτε ὁδὸν πρός τι αἰσθητόν, οὔτε σημεῖόν τι δι’ οὗ ἂν κρίνωμεν ταῦτα αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, καθὼς σημεῖα δι’ ὧν ἐπιστάμεθα ταῦτα καὶ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι εὑρίσκομεν.
At any rate, we do not find in such things sensation, nor a sensing organ, nor any likeness of it, nor a defined form, nor anything consequential to this, nor local movement, nor a way toward something perceptible, nor any sign by which we might judge them to have sensation, just as we find signs by which we know that they are both nourished and grow.
§1.1.9Οὐδὲ συνίσταται παρ’ ἡμῶν τοῦτο εἰ μὴ διότι τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν νοοῦμεν μέρη εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς.
Nor is this established by us except because we understand the nutritive and growth-promoting parts to be parts of the soul.
Ὁπόταν γοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον φυτὸν εὑρίσκωμέν τι μέρος ψυχῆς τοιαύτης ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης νοοῦμεν καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχειν αὐτό· ὅτε δὲ στερεῖται αἰσθήσεως, τότε αἰσθητικὸν αὐτὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ἐγχωρεῖν οὐ δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις αἰτία ἐστὶν ἐλλάμψεως ζωῆς.
Therefore, whenever we find such a plant having some part of such a soul in itself, we necessarily understand that it also has a soul; but when it is deprived of sensation, then it must not be that its not being sensitive is impossible; for sensation is the cause of the illumination of life.
§1.1.10Τὸ δὲ θρεπτικὸν αἰτία ἐστὶν αὐξήσεως πράγματός τινος ζῶντος.
And the nutritive part is the cause of growth of some living thing.
Αὗται δὲ αἱ διαφοραὶ προβαίνουσιν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι δυσχερὲς ἐν ταὐτῷ μεταξὺ ζωῆς καὶ τῆς στερήσεως αὐτῆς μέσον τι καταλαβεῖν.
And these differences proceed in this place, because it is difficult to grasp any middle between life and its deprivation at the same time.
Εἴποι δέ τις ἂν ὡς ἐπεὶ τὸ φυτὸν ζῶν ἐστίν, ἤδη τοῦτο καὶ ζῷον εἴποιμεν ἄν.
But someone might say that since the plant is living, we might already also call it an animal.
Οὐδαμῶς.
By no means.
§1.1.11Καὶ γὰρ δυσνόητόν ἐστι τὴν διοίκησιν τοῦ φυτοῦ ἀποδιδόναι τῇ διοικήσει τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ζῴου.
For it is also difficult to understand attributing the administration of the plant to the administration of the animal's soul.
Τὸ γὰρ τὰ φυτὰ τοῦ ζῆν ἀποφάσκον οὕτως, τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ αἰσθάνονται.
For that which denies plants life in this way is that they do not perceive.
Καὶ γάρ εἰσι καί τινα ζῷα γνώσεως ἐστερημένα.
For indeed there are also some animals deprived of knowledge.