Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Rhetoric §3.17.11-3.17.17

Use of Praise, Order of Refutation, and Ethos

Passage 96 of 98 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle discusses the use of praise in epideictic speeches, the proper application and types of enthymemes, the order of refutation, and the rhetorical technique of speaking through another character.

§3.17.11ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει.
In epideictic speeches, one must introduce episodes of praise into the speech, as Isocrates does; for he always introduces someone.
καὶ ὃ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταὐτό ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἣ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.
And what Gorgias used to say, that "the speech never fails him," is the same thing; for if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then the god, and likewise also courage, which does this and that or is of such a kind.
§3.17.12ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ἁρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.
So then, if you have proofs, you should speak both ethically and demonstratively, but if you do not have enthymemes, speak ethically; and indeed it is more fitting for a good man to appear honest than for his speech to be exact.
§3.17.13τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται· παρʼ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τἀναντία γνωρίζεται.
Of the enthymemes, the refutative ones are more highly esteemed than the demonstrative, because those which effect refutation make it more obvious that a syllogism has been constructed; for contraries are better known when placed side by side.
§3.17.14τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεών ἐστι τὸ τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ.
The arguments against the opponent are not a different species, but it is a part of the proofs to refute some by objection, others by syllogism.
δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τἀναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα.
And one must, both in advice and in court, when beginning, speak one's own proofs first, and later meet the opposite arguments by refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand.
ἂν δὲ πολύχους ᾖ ἡ ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελὼν οὕτως τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν.
But if the opposition is very extensive, the opposite arguments should come first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; for after stripping away beforehand what they would say, he then spoke himself in this way.
§3.17.15ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ᾖ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι.
But when speaking later, one must first speak against the opposing speech, refuting it and counter-syllogizing, and especially if it has been well received; for just as the soul does not receive a person who has been previously slandered, in the same way neither does it receive a speech, if the opponent seems to have spoken well.
δεῖ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλῃς·
Therefore, one must make room in the hearer for the coming speech; and it will be so if you sweep away the opponent's.
διὸ ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ τὰ εὐέλεγκτα μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον.
Therefore, after fighting either against all, or the greatest, or the well-received, or the easily refuted points, one should then make one's own arguments trustworthy.
" ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι· ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἥραν· " ἐν τούτοις ἥψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.
"First I will become an ally to the goddesses; for I, Hera..." In these verses she touched first upon the silliest point.
§3.17.16περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα.
So much, then, concerning proofs.
εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ " χρημάτων δʼ ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἀπώμοτον, " καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὗ ἀρχὴ " οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω, " καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἵμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἑτέρων.
As for character, since saying certain things about oneself is either invidious, or involves tediousness, or contradiction, and about another, either abuse or boorishness, one should make another person speak, as Isocrates does in the Philippus and in the Antidosis, and as Archilochus censures; for he makes the father speak about his daughter in the iambic poem: "Of things nothing is unexpected or to be sworn impossible," and Charon the carpenter in the iambic poem whose beginning is: "Not for me the wealth of Gyges," and as Sophocles makes Haemon speak on behalf of Antigone to his father, as though others were saying these things.
§3.17.17δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον χρὴ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν, ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὦσιν καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.
And one must also vary the enthymemes and sometimes make maxims of them, for instance: "Wise men should make peace when they are successful; for thus they would gain the greatest advantage," but in the form of an enthymeme: "For if indeed one must make peace when the reconciliation is most useful and most advantageous, then one must make peace when successful."

Notes

  1. 3.17.11ἐπεισοδιοῦν — An infinitive functioning as the complement of the verb δεῖ. The subject is the accusative τὸν λόγον, and ἐπαίνοις (by praises) is a dative of means/instrument.
  2. 3.17.14τὸ τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ — An articular infinitive phrase forming the predicate for the subject τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον. It defines the arguments against the opponent as refuting some by objection and others by syllogism.
  3. 3.17.16ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν — An accusative and infinitive construction governed by χρή. The word ἕτερον (another person) is the direct object of ποιεῖν, while the participle λέγοντα functions as a predicate complement: "one must make another person the speaker."

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Rhetoric §3.17.11-3.17.17. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:3.17.11-3.17.17

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.