§3.17.1τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι·
The proofs must be demonstrative.
ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεί περ τεττάρων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οἷον, εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως, ὡσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.
And one must demonstrate, since the dispute is about four points, by bringing the demonstration concerning the point in dispute, for instance, if it is disputed that [the deed] has not happened, in the trial one must especially bring the demonstration of this, and if that it did no harm, of this, and that it was not so much, or that it was done justly; likewise also if the dispute is about whether it happened.
§3.17.2μὴ λανθανέτω δʼ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν, ὥστʼ ἐν τούτῳ χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔ.
But let it not escape notice that in this dispute alone it is necessary for one of the two parties to be wicked; for ignorance is not the cause, as it would be if some were disputing about what is just; so that one should spend time on this, but not on the others.
§3.17.3ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς τὸ πολὺ ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα ἡ αὔξησις ἔστω· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεύεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, ἐὰν ἄπιστα ᾖ ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλος αἰτίαν ἔχῃ.
In epideictic speeches, for the most part, let the amplification be that [the deeds] are noble and useful; for the facts must be believed; for they rarely bring demonstrations of these, unless they are untrustworthy or if someone else has the blame.
§3.17.4ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἄν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται μὲν ποιοῦσιν ἃ κελεύει, ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικαῦτα.
In political speeches, one might dispute either that it will not be, or that it will be indeed if they do what he bids, but not just, or not useful, or not of such importance.
δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι ψεύδεται.
And one must also watch if he lies in anything outside the matter; for these appear as proofs of his lying in other things as well.
§3.17.5ἔστιν δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δʼ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστʼ ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην.
Examples are more suited to political speeches, and enthymemes to judicial ones; for the former is about the future, so that it is necessary to speak of examples from things that have happened, while the latter is about things that are or are not, where demonstration and necessity are more possible; for that which has happened has necessity.
§3.17.6οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλʼ ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα.
And one should not speak enthymemes in succession, but mix them; otherwise, they damage each other.
ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος.
For there is also a limit to quantity.
"
ὦ φίλʼ, ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσʼ ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνήρ,
"
ἀλλʼ οὐ τοιαῦτα.
"O friend, since you have said as much as a wise man would," but not such things as.
§3.17.7καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, οἳ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν.
And do not seek enthymemes about all things; otherwise, you will do what some of those who philosophize do, who syllogize things that are better known and more trustworthy than the premises from which they speak.
§3.17.8καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῇς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα (ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦοιν), οὐδʼ ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἦθος οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
And when you are producing emotion, do not speak an enthymeme (for either it will drive out the emotion or the enthymeme will have been spoken in vain; for simultaneous movements drive out each other, and either banish or weaken each other), nor when you make the speech ethical, is it necessary to seek some enthymeme at the same time; for demonstration has neither character nor choice.
§3.17.9γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γὰρ
καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν
· ἐὰν δὲ παθητικῶς,
καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἠδικημένῳ· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ περίεστιν τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον. §3.17.10τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ), καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς· ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾷον εὑρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν.
But one should use maxims both in narrative and in proof; for it is ethical: "And I have given, and that too knowing that one ought not to trust;" and if emotionally: "and I do not regret it, although I have been wronged; for to him remains the profit, but to me justice." And speaking in public is more difficult than pleading in court, and naturally so, because it is about the future, whereas the other is about what has happened, which is already known even to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said (for he did not prophesy about things that would be, but about things that had happened indeed but were obscure), and the law is the premise in judicial cases; and having a starting point, it is easier to find demonstration.
καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὑτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἥκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστῇ.
And it does not have many digressions, such as against the opponent or about oneself, or to produce emotion, but least of all, unless one departs from the subject.
δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δʼ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.
Therefore, when at a loss, one should do what the orators at Athens do, and Isocrates; for even when advising, he accuses, as, for instance, of the Lacedaemonians in the Panegyricus, and of Chares in the Social [Oratorical Speech].