§2.26.1τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχεῖον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει.
But magnifying and minimizing are not elements of an enthymeme; for I call element and topic the same thing; for an element and a topic is that into which many enthymemes fall.
τὸ δʼ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.
But magnifying and minimizing are enthymemes for showing that something is great or small, just as showing that it is good or bad, or just or unjust, or any other of such things.
§2.26.2ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὥστʼ εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν.
And all these are the subjects about which syllogisms and enthymemes are concerned, so that if none of these is a topic of an enthymeme, neither is magnifying and minimizing.
§2.26.3οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμήματος εἶδός τί ἐστιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδείκνυσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ ἔδειξε ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν·
Nor are refutative enthymemes any special kind; for it is clear that one refutes either by proving or by bringing an objection, and one counter-proves the opposite, for instance, if one has proved that a thing has happened, the other proves that it has not, and if one has proved that it has not happened, the other proves that it has.
ὥστε αὕτη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη διαφορά (τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσιν)· §2.26.4ἡ δʼ ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλά, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦδός τι εἴληφεν.
So this would not be a difference (for both use the same means; for they bring forward enthymemes to show that something is or is not); but an objection is not an enthymeme, but, just as in the *Topics*, it is the stating of some opinion from which it will be clear that there has been no valid deduction, or that some falsehood has been assumed.
§2.26.5ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.
And since there are three things that must be treated concerning speech, regarding examples, maxims, enthymemes, and in general everything concerning the thought, both from what sources we shall be well provided with them and how we shall refute them, let so much have been said by us; and what remains is to discuss style and arrangement.