§2.22.9ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὁτουοῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ·
Likewise, concerning any other subject whatever, for instance, justice, whether it is good or not good, one must speak from the facts belonging to justice and to the good.
§2.22.10ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, §2.22.11περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δʼ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά.
So, since all men appear to demonstrate in this way, whether they syllogize more strictly or more loosely (for they do not take premises from everything, but from the facts belonging to each subject), and since it is clear through reason that it is impossible to demonstrate in any other way, it is evident that it is necessary, just as in the Topics, first to have for each subject a selection of premises concerning possible and most opportune matters, and concerning things that arise on the spur of the moment, to seek them in the same way, looking not to indefinite things but to the facts belonging to the subject of the speech, and circumscribing as many and as close to the matter as possible; for the more facts one has belonging to the subject, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the closer they are, the more appropriate they are and the less common.
§2.22.12λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην·
By "common" things I mean, for example, praising Achilles because he is a human, and because he is one of the demigods, and because he campaigned against Ilium; for these facts belong to many others as well, so that such a person praises Achilles no more than Diomedes.
ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἕκτορα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὤν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὢν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
By "specific" things I mean what has happened to no one else but Achilles, for instance, his killing of Hector, the best of the Trojans, and of Cycnus, who being invulnerable prevented everyone from landing, and that he campaigned being the youngest and not bound by an oath, and other such things.
§2.22.13εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν·
This, then, is one first method of selection, namely the topical one; now let us speak of the elements of enthymemes.
στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό.
I mean the same thing by "element" and "topos" of an enthymeme.
πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.
But first let us speak of those things which it is necessary to speak of first.
§2.22.14ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δʼ ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός.
For there are two species of enthymemes: some are demonstrative, showing that something is or is not, and others are refutative; and they differ just as refutation and syllogism do in dialectic.
§2.22.15ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν.
And the demonstrative enthymeme is to draw a conclusion from agreed-upon premises, while the refutative is to draw a conclusion from premises that are not agreed upon.
§2.22.16σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξειλεγμέναι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν, ὥστε ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ, ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ ἕξεων ὡσαύτως, εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι.
Now, we have the topoi nearly complete for each of the useful and necessary species; for the propositions concerning each have been selected, so that the topoi from which we must bring forth enthymemes—concerning good or bad, noble or shameful, just or unjust, and likewise concerning characters, emotions, and habits—are already possessed by us beforehand.
§2.22.17ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἁπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς, καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν.
Furthermore, let us grasp them in another way, universally concerning all things, and let us speak while marking both the refutative and demonstrative ones, as well as those of apparent enthymemes which are not really enthymemes, since indeed they are not even syllogisms.
δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.
Once these have been made clear, let us define, concerning solutions and objections, from what sources they must be brought against enthymemes.