§2.22.1περὶ δʼ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον τούτων ἐστίν.
Now let us speak of enthymemes in a general way, as to how we must seek them, and after this, of their topoi; for each of these is a different kind of thing.
§2.22.2ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν διαλεκτικῶν·
That an enthymeme is a syllogism has been said before, and how it is a syllogism, and how it differs from dialectical ones.
§2.22.3οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν.
For one must not draw conclusions by taking premises either from too far back or including everything; for the former is obscure because of its length, and the latter is idle babbling because of stating what is obvious.
τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρʼ ὄχλῳ μουσικωτέρως λέγειν·
This is also the reason why the uneducated are more persuasive than the educated among crowds, just as the poets say that the uneducated speak more "musically" before a crowd.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς·
For the latter speak of common and universal things, whereas the former speak from what they know and what is close at hand.
ὥστʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται, καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις·
Therefore, one must speak not from all accepted opinions, but from those that are defined, for instance, either by those who judge or those whom they accept, and this because it appears to be clear in this way to all or to most.
καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
And one must draw conclusions not only from necessary premises, but also from those that are for the most part true.
§2.22.4πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθʼ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· μηδὲν γὰρ ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν.
First of all, then, one must understand that concerning whatever one must speak and syllogize, whether by political syllogism or any other kind, it is necessary to possess the facts belonging to it, either all or some of them; for if you have nothing, you would have nothing from which to draw a conclusion.
§2.22.5λέγω δʼ οἷον πῶς ἂν δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·
I mean, for example, how could we advise the Athenians whether to go to war or not to go to war, if we do not know what their power is, whether naval or military or both, and how great it is, and what their revenues are, or their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have waged and how, and other such things?
§2.22.6ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.
Or how could we praise them, if we did not have the naval battle at Salamis or the battle at Marathon or the deeds done by the Heracleidae or any other such things?
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.
For it is from the noble things that actually belong to them, or are thought to belong to them, that all men praise.
§2.22.7ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.
Likewise, they also censure from the opposite facts, looking to see what of this sort actually belongs to them or is thought to belong, for instance, that they enslaved the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had allied with them against the barbarian and excelled in bravery, and whatever other such things, if any other such error belongs to them.
ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπούμενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται.
In the same manner, both those who accuse and those who defend accuse and defend by looking to the facts that are present.
§2.22.8οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵνʼ ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δʼ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, συμβουλεύοντες δʼ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.
And it makes no difference whether we do this very same thing concerning the Athenians or Lacedaemonians, or a man or a god; for whether advising Achilles, or praising and blaming him, or accusing and defending him, one must take the facts that actually belong or are thought to belong to him, so that we may speak from these: if we praise or blame, whether anything noble or shameful belongs to him; if we accuse or defend, whether anything just or unjust; and if we advise, whether anything advantageous or harmful.