§1.9.1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι·
After this, let us speak of virtue and vice, and of the honorable and the shameful; for these are the targets for one who praises and blames.
συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.
For it will happen that, while speaking about these things, we at the same time make clear those things from which we shall be assumed to be of a certain character, which was the second source of persuasion; for from the same things we shall be able to make both ourselves and another trustworthy in respect to virtue.
§1.9.2ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.
And since it happens that people praise, both without serious intent and with serious intent, often not only a human being or a god, but also inanimate things and any of the other animals, we must grasp premisses about these things in the same way, so that we should speak of these also as far as is necessary for the sake of example.
§1.9.3καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν διʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν·
Now, the honorable is that which, being desirable for its own sake, is praiseworthy, or that which, being good, is pleasant because it is good.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν.
And if this is the honorable, virtue must be honorable; for, being good, it is praiseworthy.
§1.9.4ἀρετὴ δʼ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα·
Virtue, as it seems, is a capacity for providing and preserving good things, and a capacity for conferring many and great benefits, indeed all benefits in all things.
§1.9.5μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, σοφία.
And the parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, prudence, and wisdom.
§1.9.6ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις.
And the greatest virtues must be those which are most useful to others, if virtue is indeed a beneficial capacity; and for this reason people honor most the just and the courageous, for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former both in war and in peace.
εἶτα ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι.
Next is liberality; for they let go of money and do not contend for it, which is what others most desire.
§1.9.7ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ διʼ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ διʼ ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος.
And justice is a virtue through which everyone has their own things, and in accordance with the law; injustice is that through which they have others' things, not in accordance with the law.
§1.9.8ἀνδρεία δὲ διʼ ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον.
And courage is that through which they are doers of noble deeds in dangers, and as the law commands, and are subservient to the law; cowardice is the opposite.
§1.9.9σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ διʼ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον.
And temperance is a virtue through which they are disposed toward bodily pleasures in the way that the law commands; licentiousness is the opposite.
§1.9.10ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον.
And liberality is doing good with respect to money; illiberality is the opposite.
§1.9.11μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων,
And magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits.
§1.9.12μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικροπρέπεια τἀναντία.
And magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in expenditures; pusillanimity and meanness are the opposites.
§1.9.13φρόνησις δʼ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθʼ ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
And prudence is a virtue of intellect by which they are able to deliberate well about the goods and evils mentioned in relation to happiness.
§1.9.14περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν·
Concerning, then, virtue and vice in general, and concerning their parts, enough has been said for the present occasion; and concerning the other things, it is not difficult to see them.
φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα·
For it is clear that things productive of virtue must be honorable (for they are directed toward virtue), as well as those produced from virtue; and of this kind are both the signs of virtue and its works.
§1.9.15ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ πάθη καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρείας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀνδρείας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὔ· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.
And since the signs and such things as are works or experiences of a good person are honorable, it is necessary that all works or signs of courage, or things done courageously, are honorable, as well as just things and things done justly (but not experiences; for in this virtue alone, what is done justly is not always honorable, but in the case of being punished, to be punished justly is uglier than to be punished unjustly), and similarly with respect to the other virtues.
§1.9.16καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα τιμή, καλά.
And those things for which the prizes are honor are honorable.
καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα.
And those for which the prize is honor rather than money.
καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, §1.9.17καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα τε ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τις ἐποίησεν παριδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά· αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
And whatever things among those that are desirable someone does not for his own sake, and things that are good absolutely, and whatever a person does for his fatherland while overlooking his own interest, and things that are good by nature, and what are not good to himself; for such things are for his own sake.