§1.6.1ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομένων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν.
Since, then, the things one should aim at in exhorting, as being future or present, and the things to turn from, are clear; for these are the contraries of those.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς.
But since the target set before the counselor is the expedient (for people deliberate not about the end, but about the means to the end, and these are the things expedient in action, and the expedient is a good), we should grasp the elements concerning the good and the expedient in general.
§1.6.2ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· τοῦτό γάρ ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.
Let "good" then be defined as that which is choice-worthy for its own sake, and for the sake of which we choose something else, and which all things aim at, either all things that have sensation or intellect, or those that would if they acquired intellect; and whatever intellect would assign to each, and whatever the intellect concerning each assigns to each (for this is the good for each); and that which, when present, makes one well-disposed and self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency, and that which produces or preserves such things, and that which such things follow, and those things which prevent and destroy their contraries.
§1.6.3ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα), καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν.
And it follows in two ways (either simultaneously or later; for instance, knowing follows learning later, but living follows being healthy simultaneously); and things that produce do so in three ways: some in the way that being healthy produces health, others as food produces health, and others as taking exercise does, because for the most part it produces health.
§1.6.4τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὕστερον.
These things being established, it is necessary both that the acquisition of goods and the riddance of evils are good; for to the latter, not having the evil follows simultaneously, and to the former, having the good follows later.
§1.6.5καὶ ἡ ἀντʼ ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τούτῳ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν λῆψις τοῦ δʼ ἀποβολή.
And the acquisition of a greater good instead of a lesser one, and of a lesser evil instead of a greater one are good; for in the degree that the greater exceeds the lesser, there comes to be an acquisition of the one and a riddance of the other.
§1.6.6καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ πρακτικαί· §1.6.7περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ καὶ τίς καὶ ποία χωρὶς ῥητέον), καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθʼ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.
And the virtues must also be a good (for in accordance with them those who possess them are well-disposed, and they are productive and practical of goods; but concerning each of them, what it is and of what kind, must be spoken of separately); and pleasure must be a good, for all animals naturally aim at it; wherefore pleasant things and beautiful things must also be goods; for some produce pleasure, and of beautiful things, some are pleasant and others are choice-worthy for their own sake.
§1.6.8ὡς δὲ καθʼ ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε.
To speak of them individually, the following must be goods.
εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῆς τἆλλα αἱρούμεθα.
Happiness; for it is choice-worthy for its own sake and self-sufficient, and for its sake we choose all other things.
§1.6.9δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς.
Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other such states; for they are virtues of the soul.
§1.6.10καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν.
And health, beauty, and the like; for they are virtues of the body and productive of many things; for instance, health produces both pleasure and life, wherefore it is also thought to be the best, because it is the cause of two of the things most valued by the majority of people: pleasure and life.
§1.6.11πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολλῶν.
Wealth; for it is the virtue of possession and productive of many things.
§1.6.12φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν.
A friend and friendship; for a friend is choice-worthy for his own sake and productive of many things.
§1.6.13τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐταῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφʼ οἷς τιμῶνται.
Honor and glory; for they are pleasant and productive of many things, and they are usually followed by the actual possession of those qualities for which people are honored.
§1.6.14δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν.
The power of speaking and of acting; for all such things are productive of goods.
§1.6.15ἔτι εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν.
Furthermore, good natural ability, memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all such things; for these capacities are productive of goods.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι.
Likewise also all sciences and arts.
καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, §1.6.16καθʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν.
And life; for even if no other good should follow, it is choice-worthy for its own sake.
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν.
And what is just; for it is a kind of common expedient.