§1.5.9τιμὴ δʼ ἐστὶν μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς εὐδοξίας, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν·
Honor is a sign of a reputation for doing good, and those who have done good are honored justly and most of all, though nevertheless he who is able to do good is also honored.
εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὧν μὴ ῥᾳδία ἡ κτῆσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε· πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλʼ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι.
And doing good is either for safety and whatever causes existence, or for wealth, or for some of the other goods, the possession of which is not easy, either as a whole, or in this place, or at this time; for many obtain honor because of things that seem small, but the places and the times are the cause.
μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνῆμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ παρʼ ἑκάστοις τίμια.
And the parts of honor are sacrifices, memorials in meter and without meter, privileges, sacred precincts, front seats, tombs, statues, public maintenance, barbarian customs, such as prostrations and giving way, and gifts that are held in honor among each people.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἐστιν οὗ ἐφίενται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει οὗ οἱ φιλότιμοι.
For indeed a gift is a giving of a possession and a sign of honor, wherefore both those who love money and those who love honor desire them; for it has what both need; for it is a possession, which those who love money desire, and it has honor, which those who love honor desire.
§1.5.10σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.
And the virtue of the body is health, and this in such a way as to be free from disease while using their bodies; for many are healthy, as Herodicus is said to have been, whom no one would congratulate on their health because of their abstaining from all or most human affairs.
§1.5.11κάλλος δὲ ἕτερον καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν.
Beauty is different for each age.
νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἡδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν· διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἅμα πεφύκασιν·
For a young man, beauty is to have a body useful for labors, both those of running and of force, while being pleasant to look at for enjoyment; wherefore pentathletes are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted for both force and swiftness.
ἀκμάζοντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς, ἡδὺν δʼ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερότητος·
And for a man in his prime, it is to be sufficient for the labors of war, and to seem pleasant accompanied by awesomeness.
γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἱκανόν, ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται.
And for an old man, it is to be sufficient for necessary labors, and to cause no pain because of having none of those things with which old age does harm.
§1.5.12ἰσχὺς δʼ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ἕλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τούτων τισίν ἐστιν ἰσχυρός.
Strength is the power of moving another as one wishes, and it is necessary to move another either by pulling, pushing, lifting, pressing, or crushing, so that the strong man is strong either in all or in some of these.
§1.5.13μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπάρχειν κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ μείζονʼ ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
And the virtue of stature is to exceed the majority in height, depth, and breadth by so much as not to make one's movements slower because of the excess.
§1.5.14ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός ἐστιν)· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δʼ ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος.
And athletic virtue of body is composed of stature, strength, and swiftness (for indeed the swift man is strong); for he who is able to throw his legs in a certain way and move them quickly and far is a runner; he who can squeeze and hold down is a wrestler; he who can push away with a blow is a boxer; he who can do both of these is a pancratiast; and he who can do all is a pentathlete.
§1.5.15εὐγηρία δʼ ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετʼ ἀλυπίας· οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὔγηρως, οὔτʼ εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ.
And a happy old age is slowness in aging accompanied by freedom from pain; for neither if a man ages quickly is he of happy old age, nor if he does so with difficulty but painfully.
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐκ τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ ὢν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθὴς οὐδʼ ἄλυπος, καὶ πολυχρόνιος οὐκ ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν.
And it is both from the virtues of the body and from fortune; for unless one is free from disease and strong, he will not be free from suffering or pain, and he would not survive to a great age without fortune.
ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοί εἰσιν· ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν.
But there is also another power of longevity apart from strength and health; for many are long-lived without the virtues of the body; but detailed discussion concerning these is not at all useful for the present purpose.
§1.5.16πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα, τοῦ φίλου ὡρισμένου, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅστις ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν διʼ ἐκεῖνον.
Many friends and good friends are not obscure, since a friend has been defined as one who, for the sake of another, does those things which he thinks are good for that other.
ᾧ δὴ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, χρηστόφιλος.
He to whom many such belong is one who has many friends; and he to whom decent men also belong is one who has good friends.
§1.5.17εὐτυχία δέ ἐστιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα.
And good fortune is for those goods of which fortune is the cause, to happen and belong to someone, either all of them, or most of them, or the greatest of them.
αἰτία δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων μὲν καὶ ὧν αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις (ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι)· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις.
And fortune is the cause of some things of which arts are also the cause, and of many things that are independent of art, such as those of which nature is the cause (though it is also possible for them to be contrary to nature); for art is the cause of health, while nature is the cause of beauty and stature.
ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφʼ οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος.
In general, those of such goods are from fortune on which envy is placed.
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀδελφοὶ αἰσχροί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δʼ εὗρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχεν τὸ βέλος, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος, ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
And fortune is also the cause of goods that are contrary to reason, for example, if the other brothers are ugly, but this one is beautiful; or if the others did not see the treasure, but he found it; or if the arrow hit the neighbor but not this man; or if he alone did not go, though he used to go regularly, while those who went once were destroyed; for all such things seem to be pieces of good fortune.
§1.5.18περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπείπερ οἰκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.
And concerning virtue, since the topic is most closely related to praises, when we make our discourse about praise, then we must define it.