§1.4.1πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλʼ ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή,
First of all, then, we must grasp what kinds of goods or evils the deliberative speaker advises about, since he does not advise about all things, but only about those which can either happen or not.
§1.4.2ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή.
But concerning those things which of necessity either are or will be, or which cannot possibly exist or come to be, about these there is no deliberation.
§1.4.3οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν·
Nor indeed is it about all possible things; for among the things which can either happen or not, there are some goods that come about by nature or by chance, concerning which advising is of no use.
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν τὸ βουλεύεσθαι.
Rather, it is clear that it is about those things which are subjects of deliberation.
τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.
And such are those things which by nature are referred to ourselves, and of which the origin of their generation is in our power; for we examine only up to this point, until we find out whether it is possible or impossible for us to do.
§1.4.4καθʼ ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι δʼ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλʼ ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων·
Therefore, to enumerate accurately and to divide into species each of the subjects about which they are accustomed to transact business, and further to define them according to the truth as far as possible, is not something we should seek at the present occasion, because it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to an art that is more intelligent and more truthful, and because much more has already been granted to rhetoric than its own proper theorems.
§1.4.5ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πολιτικῆς, ὁμοία δʼ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις.
For what we happened to have said before is true: that rhetoric is composed of both the analytical science and the political science which is concerned with characters, and is similar in some respects to dialectic, and in others to sophistical speeches.
§1.4.6ὅσῳ δʼ ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.
But in proportion as anyone tries to construct either dialectic or rhetoric not as abilities but as sciences, he will unconsciously destroy their nature by passing over, as he reconstructs them, into sciences of certain underlying subject-matters, instead of merely of speeches.
§1.4.7ὅμως δὲ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δʼ ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν.
Nevertheless, let us speak now of those things which it is useful to distinguish, and which still leave room for inquiry for political science.
σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας·
For almost all the subjects about which people deliberate and about which those who advise speak in public happen to be five in number, and these are the most important: revenue, war and peace, and further, the defense of the country, imports and exports, and legislation.
§1.4.8ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύειν δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων ἐλάττων γένηται·
So that concerning revenue, the one who is going to advise should know what and how great the revenues of the city are, so that if any is overlooked it may be added, and if any is too small it may be increased; and further, he should know all the expenditures of the city, so that if any is superfluous it may be removed, and if any is too great it may be reduced.
οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων.
For people become richer not only by adding to what they have, but also by subtracting from their expenditures.
ταῦτα δʼ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν.
And it is possible to perceive these things not only from experience in private affairs, but it is also necessary, for advice on these matters, to be a inquirer into what has been discovered among other peoples.