§1.3.1ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες.
The species of rhetoric are three in number; for just so many are the hearers of the speeches.
σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.
For a speech is composed of three things: the speaker, the subject about which he speaks, and the audience, and the end is directed to this last—I mean the hearer.
§1.3.2ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων.
And it is necessary for the hearer to be either an observer or a judge, and a judge of either past or future events.
ἔστιν δʼ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ὁ δικαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός,
The one who judges about future events is the assemblyman, while the one who judges about past events is the judge, and the one who judges about ability is the observer.
§1.3.3ὥστʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.
So that of necessity there would be three genera of rhetorical speeches: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic.
συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν.
Of deliberation, one part is exhortation, and the other is dissuasion; for both those who advise privately and those who address the public in common always do one of these.
δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία, τὸ δʼ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας.
Of judicial pleading, one part is accusation, and the other is defense; for of necessity those who dispute must do one or the other of these.
ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.
Of the epideictic, one part is praise, and the other is blame.
§1.3.4χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δʼ ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν πάντες), προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.
And the times proper to each of these are: for the deliberative speaker, the future (for he advises about what is to be, either exhorting or dismissing); for the litigant, the past (for concerning what has been done, one always accuses and the other defends); and for the epideictic speaker, the present is the most critical time (for all praise or blame in accordance with existing circumstances), though they often also make use of other times, recalling past events and anticipating future ones.
§1.3.5τέλος δὲ ἑκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δʼ ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ ψέγουσιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν.
The end of each of these is different, and as there are three classes, so there are three ends: for the deliberative speaker, the advantageous and the harmful; for the one who exhorts advises as for something better, and the one who dissuades dehorts from something worse, and other things— whether just or unjust, honorable or shameful—he takes in addition with reference to this; for litigants, the just and the unjust, and they too take other things in addition with reference to these; for those who praise and blame, the honorable and the shameful, and they too refer other things back to these.
§1.3.6σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἑκάστοις τέλος·
A sign of this is that the aforementioned is the end for each.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δʼ ἀδικεῖ οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης.
For sometimes they would not dispute about other things; for instance, a litigant might argue that a thing did not happen, or that it did no harm, but he would never admit that he is unjust; for if so, there would be no need of a trial.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπʼ ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν· ὡς δʼ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.
Likewise, deliberative speakers often concede other things, but that they are advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is beneficial, they would never admit; but that it is unjust to enslave neighboring peoples and those who have done no wrong, they often do not care at all.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὑτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξεν ὅ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν.
Likewise, those who praise and those who blame do not look to see whether a person has done what is advantageous or harmful, but often, even in praising, they set down that, having disregarded his own advantage, he did what was honorable; for instance, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus, knowing that he must die when it was permitted to him to live.
τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.
To him, such a death was more honorable, but to live was advantageous.
§1.3.7φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶν ῥητορικαί·
It is clear from what has been said that it is necessary to have premises about these matters first; for necessary signs, probabilities, and signs are rhetorical premises.
ὅλως μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεών ἐστιν, τὸ δʼ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστι συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων.
For generally a syllogism is from premises, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the aforementioned premises.
§1.3.8ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἷόν τε οὔτε πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οἷόν τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι, τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή.
And since it is impossible for impossible things either to be done or to have been done, but only possible things, and since it is impossible for what has not happened or what will not be to have been done or to be done in the future, it is necessary for the deliberative, the judicial, and the epideictic speaker alike to have premises about the possible and the impossible, and whether a thing has happened or not, and whether it will be or not.
§1.3.9ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἅπαντες, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες, καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες, καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι, οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρόν, ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, ἢ καθʼ αὑτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Furthermore, since all people, whether they praise and blame, or exhort and dehort, or accuse and defend, try to show not only what has been mentioned, but also that the good or the bad, the honorable or the shameful, the just or the unjust, is great or small, speaking either of them by themselves or comparing them with one another, it is clear that they would also need to have premises about greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and particularly; for instance, what is a greater or smaller good, or injustice, or justice; and likewise about other things.
περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.
Concerning the things, then, about which it is necessary to grasp premises, has been stated; after this, we must divide each of these separately, as for instance, about what matters deliberation is concerned, and about what epideictic speeches are, and thirdly, about what trials are.