§1.2.13ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδʼ ἐνδόξων, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δʼ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν·
And it is possible to syllogize and draw conclusions, on the one hand, from things previously syllogized, and on the other hand, from things that have not been syllogized but require a syllogism because they are not reputable; but of these, it is necessary that the former should not be easy to follow because of its length (for the judge is assumed to be a simple person), and the latter not be persuasive because they do not proceed from agreed-upon or reputable premises. So that both the enthymeme and the example must necessarily be concerned with things that for the most part admit of being otherwise (the example being an induction and the enthymeme a syllogism), and must be derived from few premises, often fewer than those from which the primary syllogism is derived; for if any of these premises is well-known, there is no need even to state it; for the listener himself adds this.
αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής, οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενίκηκεν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν, τὸ δʼ ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ Ὀλύμπια οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες.
For instance, to show that Dorieus has won a contest where a crown is the prize, it is sufficient to say that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for everyone knows this.
§1.2.14ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων, τὰ δʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων· δῆλον δʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δʼ ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι.
And since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are derived are necessary (for most of the things about which decisions and inquiries are made admit of being otherwise; indeed, people deliberate and inquire about things they do, and all actions are of this kind, and almost none of them is of necessity; and what happens for the most part and is possible must be syllogized from other premises of the same kind, while necessary things must be syllogized from necessary ones; and this is also clear to us from the Analytics), it is evident that as for the premises from which enthymemes are spoken, some will be necessary, but most of them will hold for the most part, and that enthymemes are spoken from probabilities and from signs, so that each of these must necessarily be the same as each of those.
§1.2.15τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος·
For the probability is that which happens for the most part, but not absolutely as some define it, but rather that which, being concerned with things that admit of being otherwise, is related to that in respect of which it is probable, as the universal is to the particular.
§1.2.16τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος.
Of signs, on the one hand, one is related as the particular to the universal, and on the other hand, another is related as the universal to the particular.
τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν.
Of these, the necessary one is a complete proof, while the non-necessary one is nameless according to its difference.
§1.2.17ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός· διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν·
Now, I call necessary those premises from which a syllogism is produced; which is why such a sign is a complete proof.
ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν.
For when people think that what has been said cannot be refuted, they think they are bringing forward a complete proof as something demonstrated and completed; for 'tekmar' and 'limit' are the same in the ancient tongue.
§1.2.18ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος.
Of signs, indeed, that which is related as particular to universal is as follows: for instance, if someone should say it is a sign that the wise are just, because Socrates was wise and just.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ), τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν, ὅτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον.
This is indeed a sign, but it is refutable, even if the statement is true (for it is not syllogized); but the other kind—for instance, if someone should say it is a sign that a person is sick, because they have a fever, or that a woman has given birth, because she has milk—is necessary.
ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἄλυτόν ἐστιν.
This indeed is the only one among signs that is a complete proof; for this alone, if true, is irrefutable.
τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι πυρέττει σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ.
On the other hand, that which is related as universal to particular is like this: for instance, if someone should say it is a sign that a person has a fever, because they breathe rapidly.
λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστιᾶν.
But this too is refutable, even if true; for it is possible for someone who does not have a fever to gasp for breath.
τί μὲν οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν, μᾶλλον δὲ φανερῶς καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν.
What probability is, then, and what a sign and a complete proof are, and how they differ, has been stated now as well; but more clearly concerning these things, and for what reason some are not syllogized while others are, has been defined in the Analytics about them.