§1.2.8περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς·
Thus, concerning their capacity, and how they stand in relation to one another, enough has been said.
τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δʼ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός.
But of those [modes of persuasion] that occur through demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate, just as in dialectic one is induction, another syllogism, and another apparent syllogism, so it is here likewise; for the example is an induction, the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism.
καλῶ δʼ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ῥητορικήν.
And I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example a rhetorical induction.
πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν·
Indeed, everyone produces persuasion through demonstrating either by speaking of examples or of enthymemes, and besides these there is nothing else.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἢ συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν (δῆλον δʼ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι.
So that, if indeed it is absolutely necessary to demonstrate anything whatever either by syllogizing or by inducing (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it is necessary that each of the former be the same as each of the latter.
§1.2.9τίς δʼ ἐστὶν διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον), ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐκεῖ μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται.
Now, what the difference is between an example and an enthymeme is clear from the Topics (for there, syllogism and induction have been spoken of earlier), namely, that demonstrating on the basis of many similar cases that something is so, is induction there, but example here; whereas when certain things being the case, something else turns out to be so besides them because of their being so, either universally or for the most part, this is called a syllogism there, but an enthymeme here.
§1.2.10φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶν γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ῥητορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί.
It is also clear that each of the two possesses a good form of rhetoric; for just as has been said in the methodological treatises, so it is in these cases likewise; for some rhetorics are of the example-using kind, and others of the enthymeme-using kind, and similarly, some speakers are example-users and others are enthymeme-users.
πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἧττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί· §1.2.11τὴν δʼ αἰτίαν, καὶ πῶς ἑκατέρῳ χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.
Now, speeches using examples are no less persuasive, but those using enthymemes receive more applause; but the cause of this, and how one must use each, we shall state later; for now, let us define these same things more clearly.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει διʼ αὑτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἱππίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοισδί, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική.
For since the persuasive is persuasive to someone, and one thing is persuasive and credible immediately through itself, while another because of seeming to be demonstrated through things of that sort, and since no art examines the particular—for instance, medicine does not examine what is healthy for Socrates or for Callias, but what is so for a person of such a kind or for people of such kinds (for this belongs to art, whereas the particular is infinite and not an object of science)—so neither will rhetoric observe the particular reputable opinion—for instance, for Socrates or for Hippias—but that which is so for people of such a kind, just as dialectic does.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.
For dialectic too does not syllogize from any chance materials (since even to those who rave, some things appear to be so), but rather from things that stand in need of discussion, whereas rhetoric syllogizes from things about which we are already accustomed to deliberate.
§1.2.12ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί τε τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν.
Its function, indeed, is concerned with such subjects about which we deliberate and do not possess arts, and among such listeners who are unable to see through many stages or to reason from a long way back.
βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον.
And we deliberate about those things that appear to admit of being otherwise; for about things that are impossible to have happened, to be going to happen, or to be in any other way, no one deliberates, if they suppose them to be so; for there is nothing further to be gained.