§7.1325aἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαί που καθʼ ἑαυτὴν νόμοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἧς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων· μηθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον.
such a city clearly governs itself well, if indeed it is possible for a city to be inhabited somewhere by itself, using excellent laws, the organization of whose constitution will not be for war nor for dominating enemies; for let nothing of this sort be present.
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας.
It is clear, then, that all cares directed toward war must be set down as noble, yet not as the ultimate end of all, but for the sake of that other end.
τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας.
And it is the work of an excellent legislator to contemplate how a city and a race of human beings and every other community may share in a good life and in the happiness possible for them.
διοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον.
However, some of the regulations laid down will differ; and it is the task of the legislative art to see, if there are any neighbors, what kind of training must be practiced toward what kind of people, or how to use the appropriate measures toward each.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·
But this question indeed—to what end the best constitution must stretch—might obtain its proper examination later.
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετʼ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δʼ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές·
But to those who agree indeed that the life with virtue is most choiceworthy, but differ about its use, we must speak to both of them. For some reject political offices, thinking that the life of a free person is something other than the political life and is the most choiceworthy of all, while others think this latter is best; for it is impossible for one who does nothing to do well, and doing well and happiness are the same. To these we must say that both speak partly correctly and partly incorrectly: the former, in that the life of a free person is better than that of a master.
οὐθὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ ᾗ δοῦλος χρῆσθαι σεμνόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν.
For this is true; for there is nothing grand in using a slave as a slave, since giving commands concerning necessary chores shares in none of the noble things.
τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δούλου.
However, to think that every rule is a master's rule is not correct; for the rule over free persons does not differ less from the rule over slaves than the naturally free differs from the naturally slave.
διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.
But these matters have been sufficiently defined in the first books.
τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀληθές· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις.
On the other hand, to praise inactivity more than action is not true; for happiness is action, and furthermore, the actions of the just and temperate have as their end many noble things.
καίτοι τάχʼ ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων.
Yet perhaps someone might assume, these things being thus defined, that to be master of all is best; for in this way one would be master of the greatest and noblest actions.
ὥστε οὐ δεῖν τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθʼ ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηθένα ὑπόλογον ποιεῖσθαι μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρετώτατον, τὸ δʼ εὖ πράττειν ἄριστον.
Consequently, one who is able to rule ought not to yield to his neighbor, but rather take it away, and neither father should take account of children, nor children of father, nor in general friend of friend, nor care for this; for the best is most choiceworthy, and doing well is best.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν,
Now they say this indeed perhaps truly,