§3.1276aἆρʼ εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου τοῦ τʼ ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς.
Is it the case that if one is not unjustly a citizen, he is not a citizen? As though 'unjust' and 'false' had the same meaning.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλʼ οὐ δικαίως, ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν), δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους·
But since we see also some ruling unjustly, of whom we shall say that they do rule but not justly, and the citizen is defined by a certain office (for he who shares in such an office is a citizen, as we said), it is clear that we must say that these also are indeed citizens.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν.
But concerning 'justly or not justly' it connects with the dispute mentioned before.
ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθʼ ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὔτʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὔσας, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον)·
For some raise the difficulty as to when the city performed an action and when not the city, for example, when a democracy arises out of an oligarchy or a tyranny (for at that time some do not wish to discharge contracts, on the ground that it was not the city but the tyrant who received them, nor to do many other such things, on the ground that some of the constitutions exist by virtue of being dominant, and not for the common advantage).
εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.
If therefore indeed some also live under a democracy in this manner, we must say that the actions of this constitution are in like manner those of this city, just as are those from the oligarchy and the tyranny.
ἔοικε δʼ οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης πως ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν.
But the discussion appropriate to this difficulty seems to be how on earth one ought to say that the city is the same, or not the same but different.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δʼ ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον.
The most superficial inquiry, then, into this difficulty is about the place and the people; for it is possible for the place and the people to be separated, and for some to inhabit one place and others another.
ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης, ἐστί πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως·
We must, then, set this down as a milder difficulty; for since 'city' is spoken of in many ways, there is a certain ease in such an inquiry.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν;
But in like manner, when the people inhabit the same place, when must we consider the city to be one?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἓν τεῖχος.
For surely not by the walls; for it would be possible to throw a single wall around the Peloponnese.
τοιαύτη δʼ ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλὼν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἧς γέ φασιν ἑαλωκυίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως.
Of this sort perhaps is Babylon too, and every enclosure that has the outline of a nation rather than of a city; of which they say indeed that when it was captured, a certain part of the city did not perceive it for three days.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν)· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερον ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος τοῦ δʼ ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν;
But concerning this difficulty, the investigation will be useful on another occasion (for concerning the size of the city, both how large it should be and whether one nation or several is advantageous, must not escape the attention of the statesman); but when the same people inhabit the same place, is it to be said that the city is the same as long as the race of the inhabitants remains the same, although some are always perishing and others being born, just as we are accustomed to call rivers the same and springs the same, although some stream is always flowing in and another flowing out, or are we to say that the humans are indeed the same for this sort of reason, but the city is different?