§4.14#1Τούτων δʼ ἡμῖν οὕτω διωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσα μεταβολὴ καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ.
Since these things have been thus defined by us, it is clear that every change and everything that is moved is in time.
τὸ γὰρ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστιν μεταβολήν (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ οὕτω φαίνεται)· λέγω δὲ θᾶττον κινεῖσθαι τὸ πρότερον μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα καὶ ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν κινούμενον (οἶον ἐπὶ τῆς φορᾶς, εἰ ἄμφω κατὰ τὴν περιφερῆ κινεῖται ἢ ἄμφω κατὰ τὴν εὐθεῖαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων).
For the faster and the slower exist in respect of every change (for in all of them it appears so); and I mean by "being moved faster" that which changes prior into the underlying subject while moving over the same interval and with uniform motion (for example, in the case of locomotion, if both are moved along the circumference or both along the straight line; and similarly in the case of the others).
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρότερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστί πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ὕστερον λέγομεν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἀπόστασιν, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅρος τοῦ παρήκοντος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος· ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὰ νῦν ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνηῳ ἔσται· ἐν ᾦ γὰρ τὸ νῦν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ νῦν ἀπόστασις. (ἐναντίως δὲ λέγεται τὸ πρότερον κατά τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ παρεληλυθότι πρότερον λέγομεν τὸ πορρώτερον τοῦ νῦν, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον, ἐν δὲ τῷ μέλλοντι πρότερον μὲν τὸ ἐγγύτερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ πορρώτερον. ) ὥστε ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐν χρόνῳ, πάσῃ δʼ ἀκολουθεῖ κινήσει τὸ πρότερον, φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσα μεταβολὴ καὶ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν.
But indeed, the "prior" is in time; for we speak of "prior" and "posterior" in respect of the distance from the "now," and the "now" is the limit of the past and the future; so that since the "nows" are in time, the "prior" and "posterior" will also be in time; for in that which the "now" is, the distance from the "now" is also. (But "prior" is spoken of in opposite ways in respect of past time and future time; for in the past we call "prior" that which is further from the "now," and "posterior" that which is nearer, but in the future we call "prior" that which is nearer, and "posterior" that which is further.) So that since the "prior" is in time, and the "prior" accompanies all motion, it is clear that every change and every motion is in time.
ἄξιον δʼ ἐπισκέψεως καὶ πῶς ποτε ἔχει ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ διὰ τί ἐν παντὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ.
It is also worth investigating how time is related to the soul, and why time seems to be in everything, both in earth and in sea and in heaven.
ἢ ὅτι κινήσεώς τι πάθος ἢ ἕξις, ἀριθμός γε ὥν, ταῦτα δὲ κινητὰ πάντα (ἐν τόπῳ γὰρ πάντα), ὁ δὲ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄμα κατά τε δύναμιν καὶ κατʼ ἐνέργειμαν;
Is it because it is some affection or state of motion, being at least a number, and all these are movable (for all are in place)? And are time and motion together both potentially and actually?
πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὔ, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις.
But whether time would exist if soul did not exist or not, is a question someone might raise.
ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ἀριθμός. ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἠριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν.
For if it is impossible for there to be that which will count, it is also impossible for there to be anything countable, so that it is clear that there would not even be number; for number is either that which has been counted or that which is countable.
εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὕσης, ἀλλʼ ἢ τοῦτο ὅ ποτε ὂν ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς.
And if nothing else is of a nature to count except the soul and the intellect of the soul, it is impossible for there to be time if soul does not exist, but only this which, whatever it is in being, is time—as for instance, if it is possible for there to be motion without soul.
τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ᾗ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν.
But the "prior" and "posterior" are in motion, and time is these in so far as they are countable.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις
καὶ ποίας κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός.
And someone might also raise the question of what kind of motion time is the number.
ἢ ὁποιασοῦν;
Or is it of any motion whatsoever?
καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ φθείρεται καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ φέρεται· ᾗ οὖν κίνησίς ἐστι, ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ἑκάστης κινήσεως ἀριθμός.
For indeed things come into being and pass away and increase and alter and are carried in time; so that in so far as it is motion, in this respect it is the number of each motion.
διὸ κινήσεως ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀριθμὸς συνεχοῦς, ἀλλʼ οὐ τινός.
Therefore, it is simply the number of continuous motion, but not of some particular one.
ἀλλʼ ἔστι νῦν κεκινῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλο ὧν ἑκατέρας τῆς κινήσεως εἴη ἂν ἀριθμός.
But it is possible now for one thing to have been moved and also another, of each of which motions there would be a number.
ἕτερος οὖν χρόνος ἔστιν, καὶ ἅμα δύο ἴσοι χρόνοι ἂν εἶεν·
Is there then a different time, and would there be two equal times at once?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ χρόνος καὶ εἶς ὁ ἴσος καὶ ἅμα· εἴδει δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ ἅμα· εἰ γὰρ εἶεν κύνες, οἱ δʼ ἵπποι, ἑκάτεροι δʼ ἑπτά, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός.
For the equal and simultaneous time is the same and one time; and even those that are not simultaneous are the same in species (for if there were dogs, and others horses, and seven of each, there would be the same number).
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἅμα περαινομένων ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ταχεῖα ἴσως ἡ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἡ μὲν φορὰ ἡ δʼ ἀλλοίωσις·
And in this way, there is also the same time for motions that are completed at the same time, although one is perhaps fast and the other not, and one is locomotion and the other alteration.
ὁ μέντοι χρόνος ὁ αὐτός, εἴπερ καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἅμα, τῆς τε ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ τῆς φορᾶς.
The time, however, is the same, if indeed it is both equal and simultaneous, for both the alteration and the locomotion.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ μὲν κινήσεις ἕτεραι καὶ χωρίς, ὁ δὲ χρόνος πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πανταχοῦ ὁ τῶν ἴσων καὶ ἅμα.
And because of this, though the motions are different and separate, the time is everywhere the same, because the number of things that are equal and simultaneous is also one and everywhere the same.