§1.1.1Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως 1 ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιῶτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δʼ οἷον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.
In every investigation and method of inquiry, alike1 the lowlier and the more honorable, there appear to be two kinds of disposition: of which it is right to call the one the scientific knowledge of the subject, and the other a sort of education. For it is characteristic of an educated person to be able to judge appositely what the speaker presents well or not well.
τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰὀμεθʼ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον.
For we indeed think that the universally educated person is someone of this sort, and that to be educated is to be able to do what has been said.
πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον.
Except that we regard the former as being, so to speak, a critic about all things, being a single person in number, while the latter as being so about some definite nature; for there might be someone else disposed in the same manner as the one mentioned concerning a part.
§1.1.2ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς 2 ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους, πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τού πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως.
Hence it is clear that for the investigation of nature too there must exist certain limits2 of this kind, by referring to which one will accept the method of the proofs, apart from how the truth stands, whether so or otherwise.
λέγω δʼ οἷον πότερον δεῖ λαμβάνοντας μίαν ἑκάστην οὐσίαν περὶ ταύτης διορίζειν καθʼ αὑτήν, σἷον περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ἢ λέοντος ἢ βοὸς ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου καθʼ ἕκαστον προχειριζομένους, ἢ τὰ κοινῇ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι κατά τι κοινὸν ὑπσθεμένους.
I mean, for example, whether one should take each single substance and define it by itself, for instance, treating individually the nature of man, or of lion, or of ox, or of some other, or rather assume the attributes common to all in virtue of something common.
πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταὐτὰ πολλοῖς γένεσιν ἑτέροις οὖσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ὕπνος, ἀναπνοὴ, αὔξησις, φθίσις, θάνατος, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅσα τοιαύτα τῶν λειπομένων παθὼν τε καὶ διαθέσεων· ἄδηλον γὰρ καὶ ἀδιόριστόν ἐστι λέγειν νῦν περὶ τούτων.
For many of the same attributes belong to many genera which are different from one another, such as sleep, respiration, growth, decay, death, and in addition to these all other such remaining affections and dispositions; for to speak about these now is unclear and undefined.
§1.1.33 φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι καὶ κατὰ μέρος μὲν λέγοντες περὶ πολλῶν ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις ταὐτά·
3 But it is clear that if we speak of individual parts, we shall often say the same things about many things.
καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει τῶν εἰρημένων ἕκαστον, ὥστε ἐὰν καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν συμβεβηκότων λέγῃ τις, πολλάκις ἀναγκασθήσεται περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ὅσα ταὐτὰ μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσι τῶν ζῴων, αὐτὰ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχει διαφοράν.
For to horses, dogs, and humans, there belongs each of the mentioned attributes, so that if one speaks of each of the accidents individually, one will often be compelled to speak of the same things, namely all those that belong as identical to animals differing in species, while having themselves no difference.
ἕτερα δʼ ἴσως ἐστὶν οἷς συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν κατηγορίαν ἔχειν τὴν αὐτήν, διαφέρειν δὲ τῇ κατʼ εἶδος διαφορᾷ οἷον ἡ τῶν ζῴων πορεία· οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται μία τῷ εἴδει· διαφέρει γὰρ πτῆσις καὶ νεῦσις καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἕρψις.
But there are perhaps other attributes which happen to have the same predicate, yet differ by a specific difference, for example, the locomotion of animals; for this does not appear to be single in species; for flight, swimming, walking, and creeping differ.
§1.1.44 διὸ δεῖ μὴ διαλεληθέναι πῶς ἐπισκεπτέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον κοινὴ κατὰ γένος πρῶτον, εἶθʼ ὕστερον περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρητόν, τέον, ἢ καθʼ ἕκαστον εὐθύς.
4 Therefore, we must not overlook how we are to investigate, I mean whether we should first examine what is common by genus, and later about the peculiar, or rather immediately about each.
νῦν γὰρ οὐ διώρισται περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδέ γε τὸ νῦν ῥηθησόμενον.
For now this has not been defined, nor indeed has that which is now about to be said.
/ οἷον πότερον καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν δεικνύουσιν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τὰ φαινὸμενα πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρήσαντα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, ἔπειθʼ οὕτω λέγειν τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἢ ἄλλως πως.
For instance, whether, just as the mathematicians prove the matters concerning astronomy, so too the natural philosopher, having first observed the phenomena concerning animals and the parts concerning each, should then in this way state the "why" and the causes, or in some other way.
/πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φυσικήν, οἷον τήν θʼ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα πέφυκεν.
And in addition to these, since we see more than one cause concerning natural generation, such as both that for the sake of which and that from which is the starting-point of motion, we must also define concerning these, which of them is by nature first and which second.
§1.1.55 φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δʼ ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν.
5 And the first appears to be the one we call "for the sake of something"; for this is the definition, and the definition is the starting-point alike both in matters of art and in those constituted by nature.
ἢ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δʼ οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας σὗ ποιοῦσιν ἑκά στου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως.
For having defined, either by thought or by perception, the doctor health, and the builder the house, they render the definitions and the causes of each thing they make, and why it must be made in this way.
μᾶλλον δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνηε.
And the "for the sake of something" and the "beautiful" are present more in the works of nature than in those of art.
/ τὸ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοίως, εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες. σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν, οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
But the "of necessity" does not belong to all things by nature in the same way, to which almost all try to refer their definitions, without having distinguished in how many ways the "necessary" is spoken of.