§9.1περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος ἀναφέρονται εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τἆλλα ὄντα, τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ οὕτω λεγόμενα· πάντα γὰρ ἕξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις)·
Concerning, then, that which is primarily being, and to which all the other categories of being are referred—namely, substance—we have spoken; for it is according to the formula of substance that the other beings are spoken of, namely quantity and quality and the other things which are spoken of in this way; for all of them will contain the formula of substance, as we said in our first discussions.
ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγεται τὸ ὂν τὸ μὲν τὸ τὶ ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον, διορίσωμεν καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δυνάμεως ἣ λέγεται μὲν μάλιστα κυρίως, οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα νῦν· ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν.
But since being is spoken of on the one hand as the 'what' or 'quality' or 'quantity', and on the other hand in terms of potentiality and completion and in terms of activity, let us also define potentiality and completion, and first potentiality, which is spoken of in the most proper sense, though indeed it is not the most useful for our present purpose; for potentiality and actuality extend further than those which are spoken of only in terms of motion.
ἀλλʼ εἰπόντες περὶ ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσομεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι, διώρισται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις·
But after speaking about this, we shall make clear in our definitions concerning actuality the other kinds of potentiality as well.
τούτων δʼ ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν (ἔνιαι γὰρ ὁμοιότητί τινι λέγονται, καθάπερ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγομεν τῷ εἶναί πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, πᾶσαι ἀρχαί τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἥ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.
Now, that potentiality and being capable are spoken of in many ways has been defined by us in other places; of these, let those which are called potentialities homonymously be set aside (for some are so called by a certain similarity, as in geometry we speak of 'powers' and things 'possible' and 'impossible' by their being or not being in a certain way), but all those which are referred to the same form are certain principles, and are spoken of in relation to one primary potentiality, which is a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο· ἡ δʼ ἕξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο ὑπʼ ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς.
For one is a potentiality of being acted upon, which is a principle of passive change in the patient itself, by another thing or by itself qua other; and another is a state of insusceptibility to deterioration and destruction by another thing, or by itself qua other, arising from a change-producing principle.
ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος.
For in all these definitions there is present the formula of the primary potentiality.
πάλιν δʼ αὗται δυνάμεις λέγονται ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν ἢ τοῦ καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν προτέρων δυνάμεων λόγοι.
Again, these are called potentialities either of merely acting or being acted upon, or of doing so well, so that even in the definitions of these latter there are present in some way the formulas of the prior potentialities.
—φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ), ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἄλλη.
It is clear, then, that in one sense the potentiality of acting and of being acted upon is one (for a thing is capable both because it itself has a potentiality of being acted upon, and because something else has a potentiality of being acted upon by it), but in another sense they are different.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπʼ ἄλλου· τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δʼ ὑπεῖκον ὡδὶ θλαστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ·
For one is in the patient (since it is because of having a certain principle, and because the matter also is a certain principle, that the patient is acted upon, and one thing by another; for that which is oily is flammable, and that which yields in a certain way is crushable, and similarly in other cases), while the other is in the agent, as heat and the art of building, the one in that which heats and the other in that which builds.
διὸ ᾗ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ· ἓν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο.
Therefore, in so far as a thing is naturally united, it undergoes nothing by itself; for it is one and not other.
καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἡ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐναντία στέρησίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ.
And impotence and the impossible are the privation contrary to such potentiality, so that every potentiality has a corresponding impotence for the same thing and in the same respect.
ἡ δὲ στέρησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ ἢ ὡδί, οἷον παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὁπωσοῦν.
But privation is spoken of in many ways; for it is both that which does not have something, and that which would naturally have it but does not have it, either completely or when it is natural for it to have it, and either in this way (namely, totally) or even in any way at all.
ἐπʼ ἐνίων δέ, ἂν πεφυκότα ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ βίᾳ, ἐστερῆσθαι ταῦτα λέγομεν.
And in some cases, if things which naturally have something do not have it due to force, we say that these have been deprived.