§7.7#2τῶν δὴ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους νόησις ἡ δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως ποίησις.
Of comings-to-be and movements, one is called thinking and the other production; that which starts from the principle and the form is thinking, and that which starts from the end of thinking is production.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μεταξὺ ἕκαστον γίγνεται.
And in the same way each of the other intermediate things comes to be.
λέγω δʼ οἷον εἰ ὑγιανεῖ, δέοι ἂν ὁμαλυνθῆναι.
I mean, for instance, that if the subject is to be healthy, it will need to be made even.
τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι;
What, then, is being made even?
τοδί, τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται εἰ θερμανθήσεται.
This; and this will be if it is heated.
τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστι;
And what is this?
τοδί.
This.
ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδὶ δυνάμει· τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἐπʼ αὐτῷ.
And this belongs to it potentially; and this is already in his power.
τὸ δὴ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅθεν ἄρχεται ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἂν μὲν ἀπὸ τέχνης, τὸ εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν δʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἀπὸ τούτου ὅ ποτε τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄρχει τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰατρεύειν ἴσως ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνειν ἡ ἀρχή (τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ τῇ τρίψει)·
The producing agent, then, and that from which the movement of being healthy begins, if it is from art, is the form in the soul; but if it is from spontaneity, it is from that which at some time begins the producing for the producer from art, just as in healing the beginning is perhaps from heating (and this he produces by rubbing).
ἡ θερμότης τοίνυν ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ ἕπεταί τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον ὅ ἐστι μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας, ἢ διὰ πλειόνων· τοῦτο δʼ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας,—καὶ τῆς οἰκίας (ὁἷον οἱ λίθοι) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
Heat, then, in the body is either a part of health, or some such thing follows it which is a part of health, or it is through several steps; and this is the last thing, that which produces the part of health— and so too with a house (as, for instance, the stones) and other things.
ὥστε, καθάπερ λέγεται, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι εἰ μηδὲν προϋπάρχοι.
So, as is said, it is impossible for anything to come to be if nothing pre-exists.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τι μέρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη μέρος (ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ καὶ γίγνεται αὕτη).
It is clear, then, that some part must of necessity pre-exist; for the matter is a part (for this is present in the thing and comes to be).
ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ;
But does any of the things in the formula also pre-exist?
ἀμφοτέρως δὴ λέγομεν τοὺς χαλκοῦς κύκλους τί εἰσι, καὶ τὴν ὕλην λέγοντες ὅτι χαλκός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅτι σχῆμα τοιόνδε, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γένος εἰς ὃ πρῶτον τίθεται.
Indeed, we state in both ways what bronze circles are, both saying of the matter that it is bronze, and of the form that it is such-and-such a figure, and this is the genus in which it is first placed.
ὁ δὴ χαλκοῦς κύκλος ἔχει ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν ὕλην. —ἐξ οὗ δὲ ὡς ὕλης γίγνεται ἔνια λέγεται, ὅταν γένηται, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλʼ ἐκείνινον, οἷον ὁ ἀνδριὰς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ὑγιαίνων οὐ λέγεται ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ·
So the bronze circle has its matter in its formula. —And some of the things that come to be from something as matter are called, when they have come to be, not "that" but "made of that", e.g., the statue is not "stone" but "stony"; but the man who becomes healthy is not called that from which he comes to be.
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὃ λέγομεν τὴν ὕλην (οἷον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ κάμνων γίγνεται ὑγιής), μᾶλλον μέντοι λέγεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως, οἷον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιὴς ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, διὸ κάμνων μὲν ὁ ὑγιὴς οὐ λέγεται, ἄνθρωπος δέ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιής·
The cause is that they come to be both from the privation and from the subject, which we call matter (for both the man and the sick man become healthy), but they are rather said to come to be from the privation, e.g., healthy from a sick man rather than from a man; therefore the healthy man is not called "sick", but "man", and the man is healthy.
ὧν δʼ ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος, οἷον ἐν χαλκῷ σχήματος ὁποιουοῦν ἢ ἐν πλίνθοις καὶ ξύλοις οἰκίας, ἐκ τούτων δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐκ κάμνοντος·
But where the privation is obscure and nameless, e.g., in bronze the privation of any shape whatever, or in bricks and wood the privation of a house, they seem to come to be from these as in the other case from the sick man.
διὸ ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐκεῖ ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο οὐ λέγεται, οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνδριὰς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παράγεται ξύλινος, καὶ χαλκοῦς ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλκός, καὶ λίθινος ἀλλʼ οὐ λίθος, καὶ ἡ οἰκία πλινθίνη ἀλλʼ οὐ πλίνθοι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐκ ξύλου γίγνεται ἀνδριὰς ἢ ἐκ πλίνθων οἰκία, ἐάν τις ἐπιβλέπῃ σφόδρα, οὐκ ἂν ἁπλῶς εἴπειεν, διὰ τὸ δεῖν μεταβάλλοντος γίγνεσθαι ἐξ οὗ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπομένοντος.
Therefore, just as in that case that from which this comes to be is not called by the name of that from which it came, so here too the statue is not called "wood", but paronymously "wooden", and "bronzen" but not "bronze", and "stony" but not "stone", and the house "bricky" but not "bricks", since if one looks at it very carefully, one would not even say without qualification that a statue comes to be from wood, or a house from bricks, because that from which it comes to be must be something that changes, and not something that persists.
διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὕτως λέγεται.
It is for this reason, then, that we speak in this way.