§7.14φανερὸν δʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων τὸ συμβαῖνον καὶ τοῖς τὰς ἰδέας λέγουσιν οὐσίας τε χωριστὰς εἶναι καὶ ἅμα τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τοῦ γένους ποιοῦσι καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν.
It is clear from these very facts what follows also for those who say that the Ideas are separable substances and at the same time make the species out of the genus and the differences.
εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ, ἤτοι ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερον· τῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἕν· τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν διέξεισι λόγον ὁ λέγων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ.
For if the species exist, and 'animal' is in 'man' and 'horse', it is either one and the same in number or different; for in formula it is clearly one, since he who speaks of it in each of the two details the same formula.
εἰ οὖν ἐστί τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῷον.
If, then, there is a certain 'man himself' which is 'a this' and separate, it is necessary that the things from which he is composed, such as 'animal' and 'two-footed', should also signify 'a this' and be separate and substances; so that 'animal' also must be so.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι χωρὶς ἓν ἔσται, καὶ διὰ τί οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὑτοῦ ἔσται τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο;
If, then, that which is in 'horse' and 'man' is one and the same, just as you are to yourself, how will that which is one in things that exist separately be one, and why will this 'animal' not also exist separately from itself?
ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος καὶ τοῦ πολύποδος, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τἀναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷδέ τινι ὄντι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸ ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν ἢ πεζόν;
Next, if on the one hand it is to participate in 'two-footed' and 'many-footed', an impossible thing follows, for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to it, being one and 'a this'; but if not, what is the manner when one says that 'animal' is 'two-footed' or 'pedestrian'?
ἀλλʼ ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἅπτεται ἢ μέμικται· ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα.
But perhaps they are composed and touch or are mixed; yet all these are absurd.
ἀλλʼ ἕτερον ἐν ἑκάστῳ· οὐκοῦν ἄπειρα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔσται ὧν ἡ οὐσία ζῷον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκ ζῴου ἅνθρωπος.
But suppose it is different in each; then there will be, so to speak, infinitely many things of which the substance is 'animal'; for it is not by accident that man is from animal.
ἔτι πολλὰ ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον· οὐσία τε γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ζῷον (οὐ γὰρ κατʼ ἄλλο λέγεται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ γένος αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο), καὶ ἔτι ἰδέαι ἅπαντα ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄλλου μὲν ἰδέα ἔσται ἄλλου δʼ οὐσία (ἀδύνατον γάρ)· αὐτὸ ἄρα ζῷον ἓν ἕκαστον ἔσται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
Further, 'animal itself' will be many things; for the animal in each is a substance (for it is not so called in virtue of anything else; otherwise, man would be from that other thing and that would be his genus), and further, all the things from which man is composed are Ideas; so that it will not be the Idea of one thing and the substance of another (for that is impossible); therefore, each one of the things in animals will be 'animal itself'.
ἔτι ἐκ τίνος τοῦτο, καὶ πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ζῴου;
Further, from what is this composed, and how is it from 'animal itself'?
ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ ζῷον, ᾧ οὐσία τοῦτο αὐτό, παρʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον;
Or how is it possible for 'animal', of which this very thing is the substance, to exist apart from 'animal itself'?
ἔτι δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα.
And further, in the case of sensible things, both these and more absurd things than these follow.
εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὥς τινές φασιν.
If, then, it is impossible for it to be so, it is clear that the species do not exist in the way that some say they do.