§7.13ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ σκέψις ἐστί, πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν.
Since our inquiry is concerning substance, let us return to it again.
λέγεται δʼ ὥσπερ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ τὸ καθόλου.
And substance is said to be both the subject, the essence, that which is composed of these, and the universal.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖν δυοῖν εἴρηται (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὅτι διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τι ὄν, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἢ ὡς ἡ ὕλη τῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ), δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἴτιόν τισιν εἶναι μάλιστα, καὶ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ καθόλου·
Now concerning two of these we have spoken (for we have spoken concerning the essence and the subject, that it is a subject in two ways, either as being a 'this'—as the animal is to its attributes—or as matter is to complete reality).
διὸ ἐπέλθωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτου.
But the universal also is thought by some to be a cause in the highest degree, and the universal to be a principle; wherefore let us go over this also.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων.
For it seems impossible for any of the things called universal to be substance.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ, ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν.
For first, the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to each, which does not belong to anything else, but the universal is common; for that is called universal which is of such a nature as to belong to several things.
τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτʼ ἔσται;
Of which, then, will this be the substance?
ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἑνὸς δʼ εἰ ἔσται, καὶ τἆλλα τοῦτʼ ἔσται· ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἕν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἕν.
For it must be the substance either of all or of none, but it is not possible for it to be of all; and if it is to be of one, the others also will be this; for those things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one.
ἔτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθʼ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται ἀεί.
Further, substance is said to be that which is not predicated of a subject, but the universal is always predicated of some subject.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα οὕτω μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ;
But is it then not possible for it to be substance in the way that the essence is, yet to be present in this essence, as 'animal' is present in 'man' and 'horse'?
οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις αὐτοῦ λόγος.
Is it not then clear that there is some formula of it?
διαφέρει δʼ οὐθὲν οὐδʼ εἰ μὴ πάντων λόγος ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον οὐσία τοῦτʼ ἔσται τινός, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν· ἔσται γὰρ ἐκείνου οὐσία, οἷον τὸ ζῷον, ἐν ᾧ ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει.
And it makes no difference even if there is not a formula of all the things in the substance; for none the less this will be the substance of something, as 'man' is of the man in whom it is present, so that the same thing will happen again; for it will be the substance of that, as 'animal', in which it is present as peculiar.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ τόδε καὶ οὐσίαν, εἰ ἔστιν ἔκ τινων, μὴ ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι μηδʼ ἐκ τοῦ τόδε τι ἀλλʼ ἐκ ποιοῦ· πρότερον γὰρ ἔσται μὴ οὐσία τε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ τόδε.
And further, it is both impossible and absurd that 'a this' and substance, if it is composed of some things, should be composed not of substances nor of 'a this' but of a quality; for then that which is not substance and quality will be prior to substance and 'a this'.
ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε λόγῳ γὰρ οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε γενέσει οἷόν τε τὰ πάθη τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι πρότερα· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ χωριστά.
Which is impossible; for neither in formula, nor in time, nor in generation is it possible for the attributes of substance to be prior; for they would then be separable.
ἔτι τῷ Σωκράτει ἐνυπάρξει οὐσία οὐσίᾳ, ὥστε δυοῖν ἔσται οὐσία.
Further, a substance will be present in Socrates as in a substance, so that he will be the substance of two things.
ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηδενὸς οὐσίαν μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δʼ οἷον οὐκ εἶναί τι ζῷον παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδʼ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐδέν.
And in general it follows, if man and such things as are so called are substance, that none of the things in the formula is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from them nor in another; I mean, for example, that there is no such thing as 'animal' apart from the particular ones, nor any other of the things in the formulas.
ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.
From these considerations, then, it is clear to those who examine the matter that none of the things that belong universally is substance, and that none of the common predicates signifies 'a this', but rather 'such'.
εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.
Otherwise, many other difficulties follow, and 'the third man'.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε δῆλον.
And it is also clear from what follows.
ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ· τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε·
For it is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances present in it as in complete reality; for two things which are thus in complete reality are never one in complete reality, but if they are two in potentiality they will be one (as the double is made of two halves, but in potentiality; for complete reality separates them).
ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει), ὥστʼ εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἕν, οὐκ ἔσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν ἐκ δύο ἓν ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ.
So that if substance is one, it will not be composed of substances present in it, and in this way also Democritus speaks correctly; for he says it is impossible for one to come from two, or two from one; for he makes the indivisible magnitudes his substances.
ὁμοίως τοίνυν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπʼ ἀριθμοῦ ἕξει, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς σύνθεσις μονάδων, ὥσπερ λέγεται ὑπό τινων· ἢ γὰρ οὐχ ἓν ἡ δυὰς ἢ οὐκ ἔστι μονὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ. —ἔχει δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀπορίαν.
Likewise, then, it is clear that it will hold also in the case of number, if indeed number is a composition of units, as is said by some; for either the dyad is not one, or there is no unit in it in complete reality.—And the consequence involves a difficulty.
εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐκ τῶν καθόλου οἷόν τʼ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τόδε τι σημαίνειν, μήτʼ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνδέχεται ἐντελεχείᾳ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν σύνθετον, ἀσύνθετον ἂν εἴη οὐσία πᾶσα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας.
For if no substance can be composed of universals because they signify 'such' and not 'a this', nor can any composite substance be composed of substances in complete reality, every substance would be incomposite, so that there would be no formula of any substance.
ἀλλὰ μὴν δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον οὐσίας εἶναι ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα· νῦν δʼ οὐδὲ ταύτης.
But indeed, it is thought by all and was stated long ago that definition is either of substance alone or of it in the highest degree; but now it seems that there is no definition even of this.
οὐδενὸς ἄρʼ ἔσται ὁρισμός· ἢ τρόπον μέν τινα ἔσται τρόπον δέ τινα οὔ.
There will, then, be a definition of nothing; or in one way there will be, and in another way there will not.
δῆλον δʼ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον μᾶλλον.
And what is said will be clearer from what follows.